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ABSTRACT 
Using identity, incorporation and inequality, as essential dimensions of American 
ethnicity, I describe how the political and civic work that occurs in two ethnic-specific 
organizations reveals group boundaries.  
My data and analysis encourage the use of an ecological model for studying 
American ethnicity. This ecological approach evaluates the identity claims ethnic groups 
make in light of ongoing geopolitical changes that impact them, and the cultural imprint 
those events have on the American mainstream. By focusing on these factors I hope to 
add dimension to existing analyses of American ethnicity that identify how intergroup 
dynamics predict distinctiveness. Instead of determining how identities are formed in 
relation to other groups that participate in American society, I prioritize the content of 
identity claims groups make in the space of an organization, and the larger social and 
political contexts in which the claims are offered. I find that claims of ethnic 
distinctiveness are substantiated by specific histories and events that determine shared 
experiences within an ethnic group, and simultaneously reinforce boundaries of exclusion 
with other out-groups. I also find that the salience of the identity claims groups make is 
mediated by ongoing geopolitical projects that shape cultural discourses and accepted 
political wisdoms. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
IDENTITY, INCORPORATION, AND INEQUALITY:  
 
ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF AMERICAN ETHNICITY 
 
Ethnic-Specific Organizations as an Analytic Field 
 
I grew up in a family that participated in a number of organizations that were 
primarily made up of other black people. For many years, my mother was very active in 
the National Urban League. My father was involved on a variety of church boards that 
sought to address the needs of people living in black communities. Two of my uncles 
were members of the Black Freemasons. One uncle, who grew up in the segregated 
south, also maintained a lifelong commitment to an organization made up of his high 
school senior class – a group of African Americans that were witness to Louisville, 
Kentucky’s long history of racial exclusion. As I grew older I also joined these types of 
organizations because I believed them to be pivotal ways for me to contribute to black 
communities I belonged to. My membership in a historically black sorority and college 
organizations for black students served as important entry points.   
The spaces were always distinctive in that there was both camaraderie and a sense 
of urgency for social change. Conversations that almost seemed sacred occurred in the 
space of the organizations I participated in. They were spaces where people could vent 
frustrations or reconcile aggressions that seemed to be racially motivated. 
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In the space of those organizations people shed masks that were worn in other places that 
were primarily made up of whites.  
The spaces also acknowledged a shared history of disenfranchisement and an 
expressed hope for the future. Goals we set focused upon the ‘community’ and ‘our’ 
people. Organizational work focused upon developing strategies that responded to 
experiences that seemed to reinforce inequalities. The work that we did around these 
objectives not only engendered solidarity, it also held social implications. We felt the 
work that we did could change the experiences that ‘we’ had.  
And it was always “we”. Although the organizations I belonged to were spaces 
that advocated social justice and equality as universal objectives, the social justices we 
pursued were inevitably those that confronted the black community. It was as if social 
justice could mean nothing else. My participation in these types of organizations greatly 
shaped my activism and my outlook. I continue to participate in them today because I 
believe they make valuable contributions to the world in which we live.   
Of course ethnic-specific organizations have long been features of American 
society. Historically, they have served as a means of preserving culture and history. They 
have also been sites where collective interests are pursued. Analysts have identified 
several functions for organizations. Moore (1996) suggest that organizations provide 
collectives with a platform for actors to convince the public of the truthfulness of the 
claims they make. They “identify a subject and a way to go about producing or engaging 
the subject (Moore 1996, p. 1598),” and through enrolling processes show that many 
people agree to the principles that the organization presents. Organizations therefore 
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legitimate action in response to specific claims that are made. As organizations make 
social boundaries visible and substantiate the existence of a unified group (Moore 1996), 
their actions may also impact the allocation of resources to groups and places (Marwell 
2004). Environments change endogenously and organizations participate in developing 
systems (Levitt and March 1988). The arrival of ‘new’ ethnics to American society and 
increasing populations of other immigrating groups provide an opportunity to reconsider 
how these types of organizations are being used at points in time when the American 
social context is impacted by the dynamism of domestic and global social processes.  
Examining American Ethnicity in Ethnic-Specific Organizations 
Identity as a Dimension of American Ethnicity  
This is a study of two ethnic-specific organizations: The United Iraqi Christian 
Council (UICC) and the Coalition for Cuban American Nations and Exiles (CCANE). 
Recent analyses (Bonilla-Silva 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006; Herring 2002; Murguia and 
Forman 2003; Song 2006;) suggest that groups like the Iraqi Christians and Cubans in my 
study have “honorary status” in American society’s existing racial hierarchy. Taking into 
account statistical analyses of objective data that evaluates employment and education 
outcomes along racial and ethnic lines, and other data that look at social interactional 
indicators (e.g., intermarriage and residential choices) scholars including Bonilla-Silva 
(2002) and Herring (2002) conclude that the traditional black-white binary is giving way 
to a new racial order that includes groups that occupy intermediary positions in the 
nation’s racial order. Analyses suggest that honorary racial groups act as “buffers” that 
reduce the racial tension between dominant (e.g., whites) and subordinated (e.g., blacks) 
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racial groups. For instance, Murguia and Forman (2003) find that factors such as 
command of the English language, skin color, surname, and social class standing impact 
Mexican Americans association to whiteness. Similarly, Song (2006) describes the 
mapping of specific groups into the existing racial hierarchy. Song additionally notes that 
the inclusion of honorary groups into American society calls into question the “groups 
that do and do not constitute disadvantaged ethnic minority groups (p. 861).”  
Bonilla-Silva (2001, 2004, 2006; see also Omi and Winant 1994) also argues that 
discrepant social and economic outcomes for those who are counted as black and those 
who are counted as white (and honorary), despite pivotal changes in the nation’s laws and 
policies on racial exclusion. He finds that in racialized societies, social relations are 
conditioned by historical understandings of racial groups and the contemporary status 
groups maintain in an existing hierarchy. While dominant groups are positioned to 
receive various social rewards and advantages, systemic disadvantage is conferred to 
groups deemed as racial subordinates.1 According to Bonilla-Silva, the entry of new 
ethnic groups will challenge the existing racial order, but not dismantle it.2  
                                                          
1 Mills (1999) has further asserted that the racialized structure of societies is global (i.e., 
not specific to any one nation or country) and its negotiation is perpetual. Thus, while 
social structures may change, the maintenance of hierarchical relationships is preserved 
(Mills 1999; Bonilla-Silva 2001, 2006). 
 
2 Bonilla-Silva argues that the arrival of new ethnic groups to the United States will bring 
about a new racial order. The black-white binary that has defined the country historically 
will be replaced by a tri-racial system that includes white, honorary whites and collective 
blacks. Other scholars (see Lee and Bean 2007; see also Camarillo 2004; Kaufman 
2003a, 2003b; Mindiola, Niemann & Rodriguez 2002) challenge this conclusion and 
maintain that a white-non-white binary is more likely to emerge. 
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These analyses are occurring at a time when immigration patterns are shifting. 
The most recent wave of immigrants to the United States includes a number of ethnic 
groups who do not easily fit into the black-white racial binary that has defined the nation 
historically (Alba and Nee 2003; Bonilla-Silva 2004). Some analyses find that new 
ethnics are resisting their assignment into racial categories (Kurien 2007; Bashi Treitler 
2007, 2013; Valdez 2011). For instance, Bashi Treitler (2013) maintains that ethnic 
identity is something that people assert for themselves. Ethnicity and ethnic difference 
are based upon a, “self-knowledge process that results in self-naming that joins an 
individual to a group …[Ethnicity] provides a shorthand reference to one’s people, 
culture, heritage, history, and homeland (p. 40).” Bashi Treitler (2007, 2013; see also 
Mathew and Prashad 2000, p. 520) also provides compelling evidence that shows how 
ethnic groups simultaneously engage in “ethnic projects” that secure economic and social 
opportunities along ethnic lines without challenging the existing racial order. Zulema 
Valdez (2011) finds that ethnic business owners shield themselves from the harmful 
effects associated with racialized identities like Hispanic or Latino by adopting ethnic 
identities such as Chilean or Cuban as their primary social identity. These findings 
suggest that in a context where racialization processes have resulted in the assignment of 
people into broad categories (i.e., whites, blacks, Latinos, Asians, etc.), ethnicity provides 
groups with a language to challenge existing conceptualizations. These analyses also 
suggest that as ethnic groups make certain identity claims, the authenticity of those 
claims is verified (or rejected) by the appraisals of non-co-ethnics.  
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These studies add dimension to ongoing dialogues that seek to understand the 
differential outcomes groups experience. Yet with the exception of Bashi-Treitler’s 
(2007) work, they do not identify specific social mechanisms that may allow for 
movement on the hierarchy. I intend to contribute to this ongoing dialogue by describing 
how the work that is carried out in ethnic-specific organizations impacts two groups 
seeking access to resources in the name of ethnicity.  
The emergence of honorary groups like Iraqi Christians and Cubans is also 
occurring as Americans are embracing multiculturalism and diversity as cultural values. 
(Bell and Hartmann 2007; Embrick 2011; see also Embrick and Rice 2010). Prema 
Kurien (2007) argues that although multiculturalism was never adopted as a national 
policy, it is both an ideology and a practice in the United States. According to Kurien, the 
democratic assumption of equality that informs the multiculturalism ethic requires public 
acknowledgement and positive valuation of the cultural authenticity of its diverse 
citizenry. In her consideration of organizational work conducted by Hindu Indian 
Americans, Kurien (2007) argues that American multiculturalism leads to the 
institutionalization, politicization and transnationalization of ethnicity. She maintains that 
in multicultural environments, such as the United States, groups organize, “on the basis 
of cultural similarity and to have ethnic representatives ‘speak for the community’ and its 
concerns.” She continues: 
Multiculturalism has also made ethnic identification an important source of 
cultural capital in Western societies, contributing to ethnicity’s politicization. 
Because official ‘recognition’ can secure a group social, economic, and political 
resources, the ‘struggle for recognition’ is now becoming a central form of 
political conflict in multicultural societies, spurring ethnic mobilization among a 
range of groups. Finally, the ‘authenticity’ demanded by multiculturalism requires 
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the transnational legitimation of ethnicity by traditional sources of authority and 
products from the home country. Again ethnic entrepreneurs work to obtain 
official recognition for their group by making their homelands and ethnic cultures 
visible to the public. (p. 4)    
 
 Thus, multiculturalism allows ethnic groups to claim membership in the American 
collective by pursuing a “cultural politics of presence (Mathew and Prashad 2000).”  
The cultural politics of presence takes into account the collective experiences groups 
have here and other places, including their home-countries (Mathew and Prashad 2000).  
Studying ethnic-specific organizations may explain how, in an environment favorably 
disposed to the tenets of multiculturalism, social, economic or political benefits may be 
conferred to groups who use them.  
 These mediations have implications for the identity claims groups make. Ethnicity 
and race scholars have given considerable attention to the idea of ethnic identity in 
American society. Some analyses have considered how social practices and institutional 
arrangements determine ethnic and racial identity. For instance, analysts (Bashi Treitler 
2013; Feagin 2006; Guglielmo 2000; Ignatiev 1995; Roediger 1981) have shown how the 
ethnic identities of several immigrant groups were effectively neutralized by successful 
“ethnic projects” that encouraged “racial uplift.” These constructivist frameworks explain 
how social arrangements that defined the country historically created different lived 
experiences for a number of ethnic groups. Researchers describe how restricted access to 
resources created durable racial categories that were arbitrarily distinguished by a group’s 
country of origin.3 Other researchers who consider this period of American immigration 
                                                          
3 To explain differences in incorporation in American society, Blauner (1972) 
distinguishes between colonized and immigrant minorities by describing the difference 
access each group had to opportunities. Janet Nakano Glenn’s (2003) work gives 
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focus upon the resolution of these discrepant experiences.4 In general, researchers tend to 
describe how the matriculation of white ethnics into a unified national collective (e.g., 
American) that was defined in opposition to groups considered as non-whites, especially 
black Americans.  
Tanya Golash-Boza (2006) argues that ethnicity also invokes a language of place 
(2006, p. 34). The arrival of “new” immigrant groups like Iraqi Christians and Cubans 
provide the opportunity to consider how the identities associated with groups are 
contingent upon geopolitical projects that impact the places immigrants hail from. 
                                                          
comprehensive consideration to how race and gender created different opportunities for 
Mexican and white immigrants in the Southwest. Others have evaluated how access to 
resources shapes racial differences. For instance Roediger’s (1981) historical analysis of 
American society during the slavery era presents evidence to show how the black-white 
binary was constructed. He describes how white indentured servants were afforded 
psychological and material wages that effectively distinguished them from Africans 
including the right to paid labor and gun ownership. Moreover, even those who argue the 
contemporary applicability of assimilation (as a process leading to greater inclusion) 
concede that America’s newest immigrants who are perceived as black will likely 
experience restrictions in a way that is similar to the restrictions non-immigrant black 
populations have experienced (Alba & Nee 2003).  
 
4 Thomas Guglielmo (2003) and Noel Ignatiev (1995) have described how Irish and 
Italian Americans gained membership in an emerging white collective as a consequence 
of social, political and economic opportunities that were afforded to them but were not 
given to other ethnic groups and racial minorities, especially black Americans. George 
Lipsitz maintains that the value assigned to whiteness in American society is an outcome 
of historic laws and policies that conferred more social and economic benefits to whites 
than non-whites. In her book Facing up to the American Dream Hochschild (1995) 
maintains that the extent to which narratives of equality are integrated into national 
consciousness is determined by the nature of social relations. Societies that are highly 
racialized – like the U.S. – are more likely to reject laws and policies that hold the 
potential to reduce racial inequality, despite the nation’s strong adherence to fairness and 
equality, as guiding principles. And while there is evidence (Wilson 1978) to support that 
blacks, arguably the most marginalized of all non-whites, have made significant inroads 
towards social and economic advancement in post-civil rights American society, other 
researchers (Frazier 1965; Collins 1983) maintain that only marginal integration has 
occurred.   
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Golash-Boza also maintains that identity-making is also partly determined by contextual 
factors in the U.S., such as the cities where immigrants live. I argue that studying ethnic-
specific organizations in local context provides the opportunity to advance these 
understandings in ways that show the role collective experience plays in identity-making 
among ethnic groups.   
Inequality and Incorporation as Dimensions of American Ethnicity 
 
Among scholars of American ethnicity, questions of belonging are inherently 
bound up in larger discussions on incorporation and inequality. For instance, some 
analysts (Alba and Nee 2003; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters and Holdaway 2008) adopt 
assimilationist frameworks to understand how immigrants’ access to different 
opportunity structures may introduce differential economic and social outcomes among 
ethnic groups, including many ‘new’ immigrants. Alba and Nee (2003) maintain that the 
social and economic experiences of ‘new’ ethnic groups in American society continue to 
converge with the experiences of the American mainstream. Others like Philip Kasinitz 
(2008) and his colleagues have investigated second-generation immigrants with the 
intention of comparing the pathways children of immigrants take to advance in areas like 
work and education to the pathways taken by native whites. The authors find that many 
second-generation immigrants are either experiencing greater or similar forms of 
incorporation as native whites. These analyses often describe the social and economic 
outcomes immigrants and second-generation immigrants experience relative to the 
experiences of native born whites and blacks. In these analyses the idea of ethnicity is 
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mostly a factor by which the relative success or failure of foreign-born groups can be 
assessed (Bashi Treitler 2013). 
Earlier analyses such as Edna Bonacich’s (1973) seminal work on “middleman 
minorities” takes into account how the social relations within immigrant communities, 
and the kinds of relationships immigrants establish in their host societies determine the 
positions they occupy in existing social hierarchies. Similarly, assimilationist Milton 
Gordon (1964) took into account how ethnic groups could experience variable kinds of 
inclusion in American political, social and economic life.  
Others have adopted a constructivist approach to evaluate experiences of 
incorporation. For instance, Steinberg (1981) challenges the idea of American pluralism, 
contending that political and economic processes successfully mitigated ethnic 
distinctions between European immigrants, while reinforcing racial differences between 
those who were considered white and those who were considered black (or non-white) in 
American society.  
Whether scholars evaluate experiences of inclusion that are associated with more 
recent waves of immigration, or focus upon investigations that look backward at 
historical migration trends, incorporation is understood an outcome of negotiations that 
challenged unequal statuses in the American social context. These analyses suggest that 
membership in the American collective is highly contested. Changing political and 
economic circumstances can render groups vulnerable to a number of social reprisals and 
structural impediments that effectively eliminate or reduce their ability to participate 
here. Taking into account this history and the social knowledge associated with it, I 
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examine how ethnicity is used as a platform for addressing unequal experiences in an 
environment that values multiculturalism. I understand ethnic-specific organizations as 
sites where experiences of inequality are evaluated and acted upon in ways that can 
encourage greater belonging. I am particularly concerned with understanding how these 
kinds of organizations may serve as a platform for what groups want to achieve in 
particular moments in time. I consider how organizational work contributes to the 
cultural understandings non-ethnic actors have of events or crises that impact ethnic 
actors.  
The nation’s apparent value for multiculturalism can contribute to the “racial 
positionality” scholars describe.5 Yet, in her consideration of the work that Hindu Indian 
American organizations conduct, Kurien writes that,  
 A common critique of multiculturalism from the Left is that although the 
pressure for multiculturalism in the United States grew out of the demands of 
racial minorities for a more inclusive culture and society, it has currently become 
a way to sidestep the issue of racism and unequal structures by focusing on 
cultural diversity. The premise of Western multiculturalism is that there is no 
longer a dominant culture and that society is made up of a ‘mosaic’ of equally 
valued cultures. The reality, of course, is very different. (p. 241)  
 
Thus, the nation’s long history of racism and racial exclusion denies or can minimize 
multiculturalism’s expectation for democratic incorporation and its intention to assign 
positive value all groups. Other scholars (Bobo, Kluegel and Smith 1997; Bonilla-Silva 
2002, p. 6;  Melamed 2006; Zamudio and Rios 2006) similarly suggest that the embrace 
of a liberal ethic has limited the ability for some groups – especially African Americans – 
to remedy continuing racial inequalities. The liberal ethic presumes that individuals rise 
                                                          
5 See Kim, C.J. 1999. “The Triangulation of Asian Americans.” Politics and Society 
27(1): 105-38.  
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and fall on their merit (see Zamudio and Rios, p. 487). According to Zamudio and Rios, 
liberalism “works to deny the existence of the structural disadvantage of people of color, 
while simultaneously obscuring the structural advantage or embedded privilege of whites 
(p. 487).” Thus, petitions to resolve inequality in American society are juxtaposed 
between two discourses: a discourse on multiculturalism that seeks to meet the needs of 
the nation’s diverse citizenry, and liberalism, which places limits on how claims of 
inequality are received by the mainstream. In this environment, groups who are 
successful at claiming oppressed statuses can attain moral and material capital (Song 
2004).  
Furthermore, Williams (2013) suggests that immigrants’ campaigns for inclusion 
are impacted by racialized images that are bound up with religious and cultural identity 
and a civil religious sense of who is ‘really’ American (p. 246). He argues that shifts in 
the nation’s demographics, along with events like 9/11 and the election of President 
Obama, disrupts an implicit assumption that American society is a place that is white and 
Christian. According to Williams, the solidification of the nation’s “cultural triangle” of 
race, religion, and national identity has resulted in the “tribal othering” of immigrants and 
new Americans perceived as non-white and non-Christian.  
Ethnic-specific organizations may serve as “free spaces” (see Evans and Boyte 
1986; Morris 1984; see also Faist 2000) for ethnic groups. That is, ethnic-specific 
organizations may provide ethnic actors with the space to cultivate and put forth a sense 
of identity that contradicts other storylines that are emanating in the American social 
context. Organizations may also provide groups with a means of playing the “politics of 
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recognition” in that organizational platforms can bring necessary resources to groups or 
explain how they contribute to the national collective. Studying ethnic-specific 
organizations may explain how positive valuations of ethnic groups are achieved in 
racialized environments. Studying organizations like the UICC and CCANE may give an 
opportunity to understand how petitions to resolve inequality are evaluated in a 
contradictory social context.   
By conducting this kind of analysis I intend to describe the maintenance or 
transformation of ethnic boundaries as they occur within ‘concrete, ongoing systems of 
social relations’ (Granovetter 1985:487). My study intends to provide a way to show how 
contextuality (i.e., social processes that are external to a group) and relationality (i.e., the 
responses a group has to their collective experiences within social contexts) inform 
conceptions of identity. Specifically, I advance an ecological framework that takes into 
account three factors: the geopolitical context in which American ethnics participate in, 
the national cultural climate that is shaped by geopolitical events, and content of the 
identity claims groups make when they petition for membership in spaces where they are 
absent or marginalized by either dominant or subordinated out-groups (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Ecological Model of American Ethnicity 
                        Cultural Climate 
 
 
                                    Content of Identity Claims 
 
 
                                        Geopolitical Context 
Using this ecological framework, I sought to answer three research questions. First, I 
considered how in ethnic-specific organizations, sites that confirm group boundaries 
(Moore 1996), the success of immigrant political projects may be impacted by dynamic 
social and cultural processes or events that occur in the U.S. and other places. Taking into 
account evidence that suggests that immigrant political projects are being carried out in 
an environment where the politics of representation are contingent upon continuing ties 
immigrants or ‘new’ Americans maintain to home countries and the collective position 
they occupy in American society, I consider which experiences of inequality are actually 
negotiated through organizational work. I ask whether work that focuses on experiences 
of inequality outside the U.S. may result in positive valuations of ethnic difference by 
others in American society. And lastly, I considered how the content of the identity 
claims organizational actors make in social interactions reflect larger social and cultural 
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processes, and how the content of claims predicts incorporation into the national 
collective.  
Research Methods 
I completed my fieldwork over the course of slightly more than one year. My 
work started in Detroit at the United Iraqi Christian Council (UICC) and its affiliated 
organizations in September 2011. I completed my research there in February 2013.  
My decision to study the UICC and CCANE was informed by a database I created 
that identified ethnic-specific organizations in the United States. Before beginning my 
fieldwork, I used Associations Unlimited, a database provided by the Gale Research 
Libraries, to identify a field of ethnic-specific organizations. My database included over 
300 non-profit (i.e., 501c3) organizations that primarily provided ethnic groups with a 
means of engaging in civic and political work, cultural and historical/archival work, or 
educational outreach. Organizations that were defined as primarily cultural, historical 
and/or educational were excluded from the analysis. Civic and political organizations that 
were not membership-based were also excluded from additional analysis.       
On average, I spent four days a week in the office, working at least five hours a 
day. Not unlike other researchers in my position, I volunteered in the office to express my 
gratitude for being given the opportunity to learn more about the organization and the 
people who worked within it. I also used my time in the field to get a better idea about 
what organizational work looks like on the ground in the day-to-day. Over the course of 
my research in Detroit, I did a number of tasks from copying and filing, to evaluating 
data on Iraqi Christian immigration statistics, to meeting with clients who sought support 
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after their resettlement aid ended. Spending time in the office gave me direct exposure to 
the faces of people the organization sought to help and the decision-makers who sat in the 
proverbial driver’s seat who intended to help them.  
I completed my research at the Coalition for Cuban American Nationals and 
Exiles (CCANE) over an eight month period beginning in April 2012. Initially, I spent 
one month in Miami followed by two additional trips that allowed me to complete six 
additional weeks of fieldwork and interviews. As was the case in Detroit, I spent part of 
my time in Miami helping in whatever way I felt might be useful to the staff there. And 
because of the long history of Cuban immigration to Miami, I also spent part of my time 
at two universities in Miami that maintained large archives of Cuban history in the US.  
Over the course of my fieldwork in Detroit and Miami I completed thirty-six 
formal interviews and twenty informal interviews with organization staff members, 
directors and board members. I used a semi-structured interview schedule at both 
research sites.  
The average interview lasted approximately 56 minutes. The longest interview 
lasted over two and a half hours. The shortest interview lasted approximately 25 minutes. 
In Detroit, the average age of my participants was 39. In Miami, my participants tended 
to be older (52-69 years old). And while the gender distribution in Detroit was largely 
equal, I only interviewed one woman in Miami. All of my participants in Detroit were 
white. The preponderance of my Cuban participants were also white, but two interviews 
(one formal, the other informal) were also completed with Afro-Cubans.  
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The interview schedule I used included over thirty questions. I began each 
interview by getting demographic information including age, marital status, and 
educational attainment. I also asked each respondent to describe the role they played in 
the organization where they worked and how long (s)he had been working there. 
Similarly, when I interviewed people who were members of the organization (not 
employees) I asked how long they were involved in the organization and what kind role 
they played in the organization. I also asked each respondent to explain to me how they 
understood the role of the organization and how it might benefit people in their respective 
communities, or even people from other groups.  
If a respondent’s experiences included migration from their homeland to the 
United States, I asked questions to learn more about their immigration experience. In 
order to learn more about how respondents may conceive identity, incorporation and 
inequality in reference to collective experiences, I also asked questions such as, “What do 
you think the average American knows about your country of origin?” and “Does the 
work of the [organization] make it easier for immigrants to advance in American 
society?” I also asked respondents questions about concepts such as ethnicity to see how 
ideas about identity may be informed by experiences that are thought to be specific to a 
particular group. If a respondent’s answers prompted additional questions or clarification, 
I included questions that were not on the interview schedule. The responses I received to 
unscheduled questions often gave me broader perspective on ongoing programs and 
organizational initiatives. For instance, additional questions helped me to understand how 
newly implemented programs differed from other programs or projects. Asking 
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additional questions therefore improved my knowledge of each organization’s history. 
The additional questions I asked also tended to provide me with more personal 
information about the people I interviewed. For instance, I found myself asking 
additional questions about migration experiences after the initial responses I received 
suggested outmigration was motivated by political events or war. Learning how specific 
experiences impacted people directly gave me a better sense of how they made identity 
claims that indicated ethnic difference.  
My interview response rate in Detroit was extremely high. Not one person 
declined my request for an interview. In fact, people continued to volunteer to be 
interviewed even after I completed my proposed number of interviews. My experience in 
Miami was completely different. Less than 30% of my interviews were completed based 
upon an initial request for an interview. The remainder of interviews were completed 
only after making at least one additional request. Several people, including those I came 
into contact with on a daily basis in Miami, chose not to complete a formal interview at 
all. They did, however, allow me to ask questions in informal interviews, knowing that 
their responses would inform my research. Because of the resistance I encountered in 
Miami, a large portion of my last trip to Miami was dedicated to completing interviews 
with organizational actors. 
It is difficult to attribute the differences I observed in Detroit and Miami to one 
particular factor – whether that factor is race, gender or perhaps age. I do however, 
believe that the exceptional interview compliance I experienced in Detroit was informed 
by the fact that Iraqi Christians have more familiarity with African Americans in general 
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than did the Cubans I encountered in Miami. High rates of Iraqi Christian 
entrepreneurship in inner-city Detroit require the group to establish ongoing relationships 
with black people. It is feasible that the relationships community members shared with 
African American Detroiters provided a point of reference for engagement with me as a 
researcher. Qualitative differences in the tasks I was assigned as a volunteer in both 
organizations also suggest that my role as a researcher was valued more in Detroit. 
Beyond these factors, I also believe that my presence in the organization may have 
provided them with social currency among blacks. For example, I can recall being asked 
to accompany the director of the organization to a couple of events meant to improve 
relationships between Iraqi Christian store owners and black community members. 
The relationships Iraqi Christians maintained with African American Detroiters 
seemed a tacit acknowledgement that they continue to negotiate membership in black 
space. The Cubans I encountered in Miami did not in any way have to address this kind 
of challenge. In fact, it seemed to me that the Cuban community claimed ownership over 
the city that Iraqi Christians could not assert in Detroit.  
It is also possible that the resistance I encountered in Miami was informed by a 
longer history that is partly defined by experiences of oppression in Cuba and political 
disappointments that occurred in United States in the early 1960s. These experiences may 
remain a part of the collective memory of many of the Cubans I encountered in Miami. 
They may also promote a suspicion of non-co-ethnics (or racial others) like me. 
Over the course of my fieldwork I also completed an archival analysis at each 
organization. I reviewed a range of documents and social media (e.g., organizational 
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webpages) with the purpose of using the knowledge I gained to evaluate organizational 
work in historical perspective. By doing so I could better determine how changing 
conditions in the social context impacted the strategies each organization employed. In 
total, the archival review at the UICC included over 1000 pages of information. The 
review at CCANE included approximately 200 pages. My review of university-
maintained archives included approximately 200 additional pages. All the documents I 
considered were written in English. Documents that were written either in Arabic or 
Spanish were excluded from my archival review.   
I have no ancestral or familial ties to either of the groups connected with the 
organizations I studied. I am neither Iraqi-Christian nor Cuban. Given the very obvious 
difference in my background, it would be disingenuous of me to suggest that my presence 
in both organizations was not a curiosity – especially in the beginning. As an African 
American woman, it was immediately clear to everyone I came in contact with in Detroit 
that I was not a member of the Iraqi Christian community. In addition to racial 
differences I would learn that Iraqi Christians are largely endogamous. To the extent that 
endogamy was not observed, community cohesion remained apparent along religious 
lines. Iraqi Christians who did not marry other Iraqi Christians tended to marry someone 
else who practiced Catholicism as they do. And while inter-racial marriages were not 
completely prohibitive, I was told they were a rare occurrence and that they were 
regarded in less regard when compared to other non-ethnic unions. So to the extent that I 
could even theoretically be Iraqi Christian, my status as an outsider may not fully go 
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away. Chances are I would likely retain a marginalized position in the community that 
prohibited my access to some of its inner circles.  
My racial identity did not limit me in the same way in Miami. In fact, I was often 
mistaken as ‘Cuban’ when I attended public events the organization sponsored. Cuban-
ness was also attributed to me in the day-to-day during my time in Miami. Indeed, 
revealing the fact that I was not Cuban to those I encountered almost always sparked 
other discussions that sought to put me into another ethnic group – be that Dominican, 
Puerto Rican or sometimes Haitian. It was always interesting to me to see a kind of 
bewilderment or even deflation that would come over the faces of those I met when they 
learned that I was simply African-American. Apparently in Miami it is easier to 
understand people, easier to interact with them, knowing that they are bound to a Latin or 
Caribbean ethnic identity – or at least what people understood as a non-American one. If 
my racial identity somehow allowed me to perpetrate Cuban-ness in CCANE or Miami 
more generally, revealing my inability to speak Spanish immediately identified me as an 
ethnic (and sometimes racial) other to the Cubans I met.6 It seemed that speaking Spanish 
                                                          
6 While not speaking Spanish certainly signaled my status as an outsider to the Cubans I 
interacted with at CCANE, I do not think my inability to speak Spanish interfered with 
my ability to study the organization itself. English is the language the organization uses 
to communicate in the organizational and institutional fields it participates within. I will 
make a similar disclaimer about the time I spent in Detroit. While it was highly typical 
for me to hear Arabic or Aramaic on a daily basis in the space of the UICC, English was 
the language the organization used to conduct its business. I believe that my inability to 
engage people in their native language would have been prohibitive if it were my 
intention to study a place or a group of people directly as opposed to using organizations 
as a unit of analysis. My intention here is to study the organizations themselves.  
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was held up as the hallmark signifier of Cuban-ness in the same way practicing 
Catholicism was for Iraqi Christians I encountered in Detroit.  
Because of these complex nuances, I chose to make race (and my non co-ethnic-
ness) a matter for open dialogue. Choosing to do otherwise seemed to me to ignore the 
elephant in the room that takes a chair at a very small table hoping for a good outcome. In 
Detroit and Miami, reconciling racial difference was sometimes revealed in the course of 
conversations I had with members of the Iraqi Christian and Cuban community 
respectively. I always engaged in these dialogues openly and honestly. I was careful not 
to make claims that sought to explain African Americans as a monolithic group, even 
though that sometimes seemed to be the expectation. Instead I tried to describe how my 
particular experiences as a black woman in American society informed who I was as a 
person, and perhaps even as a researcher. There were times when common ground was 
gained when I could confirm my understanding of something by saying that was how 
‘we’ did things too – the ‘we’ being African Americans as a collective group.7 And there 
were other times when dialogues introduced different starting points for having 
discussions about the intersections between ‘them’ and ‘me’.  
                                                          
7 I also sometimes was able to convey a sense of sameness based off the experience I 
have living in a relatively rural place. That I could understand that people owned their 
own livestock for instance often boded well for me in conversations I had with Iraqi 
Christians who actually lived in small villages in Iraq. Similarly, the fact that I could 
understand the opinion that small towns performed community in a way that is different 
from the sense of community that emerges in urban spaces drew me closer to Iraqi 
Christians who could recall living in Iraq and Cubans who once lived in neighborhoods in 
Havana and other places in Cuba. The fact that I am familiar with some Catholic rituals 
like praying the Rosary and taking communion also seemed to demonstrate a sense of 
sameness to people I encountered in both organizations.  
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For instance, in one of my field notes I recount a conversation I had with a 
member of the Iraqi Christian organization in Detroit who remarked to me that ‘back 
home’ (in Iraq) it wasn’t unusual for Iraqi Christians to have contact with Africans. He 
also noted the close (relative to the US) proximity of Africa to Iraq. I took this 
conversation as his attempt to reduce the social distance between us. His discussion of 
Iraq’s proximity to Africa and social relationships Iraqi Christians maintained with 
Africans in Iraq seems to serve as a means of reconciling racial differences between 
blacks and whites that continue to be a part of American society. I got the impression that 
the context he provided allowed him to better understand how we could relate to each 
other. Similarly, in Miami I found myself sometimes participating in conversations that 
promoted the idea that Cuba was a racial democracy – at least prior to the election of 
Fidel Castro. Stories people (both Afro-Cubans and white Cubans) shared with me about 
[pre-Castro] Cuba emphasized the idea that there was no history of racial animosity, as 
there is in American society. These conversations seemed to serve the purpose of locating 
people in American discourses on racial difference that they ostensibly rejected. As was 
the case in Detroit, describing Cuba as a place that naturally supported engagement with 
racial others seemed to be offered for the purpose of reducing social distance between me 
and them. The way in which both groups used conceptions of homeland as a way of 
establishing themselves here in American society is a pattern I will return to at other 
points of my analysis. That said, I am not convinced that my racial identity was somehow 
neutralized in the space of these organizations – especially as it relates to my fieldwork in 
Miami where the relationships between blacks and Cubans have been particularly hostile 
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historically, and where there continue to be fewer opportunities for social interactions 
between the two groups (I will discuss the racial histories of the cities where the 
organizations are located in more detail below). 
Race came up in less obvious ways as well. Over the course of my fieldwork in 
Detroit I noticed that there was often a distinction made between ‘whites’ and Iraqi 
Christians, and ‘Americans,’ and ‘blacks’. I found that people could not easily explain 
these distinctions, however. The distinction between ‘whites’ and Iraqi Christians seemed 
to be grounded in differences in cultural practices and social expectations. That is, while 
Iraqi Christians accepted that they were “white by law” and even white phenotypically 
(indeed, whiteness was a taken for granted assumption among the Iraqi Christians I met), 
they had particular experiences and practices that others who occupied that racial 
category did not. Discussions on Americanism, or being ‘American,’ were just as 
interesting in that conceptions of Americanism, or ‘Americans’ were often offered as a 
way of affirming ethnic difference. But it also substituted as a way of making racial 
claims. The racial connotation that seemed to underlie conceptions of Americanism was 
made more distinct when ‘Americanism’ was held up against blackness in conversation 
with me. I found it interesting that despite my experience as a native born African 
American, who’s family history in this country extends all the way back to the 
enslavement of Africans, did not seem to qualify me for inclusion in conceptions of 
Americanism. Rather Americans were spoken of as a group that did not include me. 
Conceptions of Americanism were not just defined by nationality or being born in the 
US. Invoking Americanism in conversation also spoke to membership in an aspired-to 
25 
 
 
 
social category. Perhaps it also served as a kind of tacit acknowledgement of differences 
in social incorporation.  In other words, while blackness was not totally removed from 
conceptions of Americanism, it seemed to be understood as a bracketed identity that is 
integrated parenthetically, if at all, into a kind of imagined national collective.  
I also found that reconciling difference also meant explaining to me, an ethnic 
outsider, what it meant to be Iraqi Christian or Cuban. In an effort to educate me in this 
regard in Detroit, I was invited into the community in a way that allowed me to observe 
the everyday things Iraqi Christians do that make them different from other people or 
groups. Often this meant enjoying particular kinds of foods or listening (and trying to 
learn) to their native language. I was also given the opportunity to learn more about Iraqi 
Christians through oral history projects that emphasized the group’s long history in Iraq 
and its foundational ties to Christianity. If I was gently educated on matters like this, at 
times I was schooled more blatantly on others. Despite the fact that my blackness 
apparently limited my inclusion in conceptions of Americanism, there were times when I 
felt decidedly self-conscious about possessing privilege that may be unique to American 
society. For me, being American in the space of the organizations I studied meant not 
having to acknowledge how all of our experiences were actively shaped by geopolitics 
and war. That said, while I could never fully understand events that I did not experience 
directly, as a racial other in American society I could understand the feelings of 
marginalization and disenfranchisement that were associated with them. I believe that 
shared sense of isolation became apparent in my interactions with the people I met in 
Detroit.  
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I was similarly challenged in Miami to simultaneously shed any American 
privilege I may have possessed and to demonstrate my ability to commiserate on 
experiences of systematic inequality. From my first day in Miami I recognized that I was 
the anomaly. To use a literary analogy it seemed as though I had fallen down the rabbit 
hole and up was now down and down was now up. Coming from Chicago I was certainly 
used to experiencing a variety of cultures and witnessing adherence to many different 
languages besides English. While Chicago may have a number of Polish, Mexican, 
Puerto Rican, Arab or African enclaves, leaving those spaces seemingly introduces a 
social expectation for the use of English. Not only did I not witness the same kind of 
depth and breadth of diversity in the time I was in Miami, I also did not see the same 
commitment to speaking English. In fact, people like me who didn’t speak Spanish 
fluently were accommodated in ways non-English speakers tend to be accommodated in 
places like Chicago. Without question, speaking Spanish was the social expectation in the 
areas of Miami I came to know. The experience of Anglo-European, at least when it 
came to language, was not a part of my experience in Miami.   
If not being able to speak Spanish somehow made me more conspicuous in 
Miami, the idea that I was African American seemed to give me some currency when it 
came down to understanding the organization’s mission. In my field notes I recount 
conversations where a sense of camaraderie was built around shared histories of 
disenfranchisement and the civic actions taken to challenge those experiences. Perhaps 
for some (but not all) people in CCANE, the fact that I was African American meant that 
I somehow valued civic engagement in a way that someone who was not black might not.   
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Opportunity to reconcile difference also occurred in other ways that I did not 
anticipate. In Detroit, the majority of the staff in the organizations were American-born, 
and most of them were a similar age as I. That there was a dominant age cohort 
contributed to conversations about aspects of popular culture like music and television, 
shopping or even more personal things like whether or not someone had a tattoo. These 
conversations also seemed to reduce the social distance between us.  
The fact that I was attending a Catholic university and that I had family ties to 
Catholicism (the maternal side of my family practices Catholicism) bought additional 
kinds of capital in Detroit and Miami. Interestingly, I found that my Chicago-ness also 
seemed to provoke interest, if not more willingness to forge a relationship with me, 
especially in Detroit. Invariably, when I was introduced to someone the fact that I was a 
researcher from Chicago was always part of the introductory script. Chicago seemed to 
be held up in a very positive light. I understood the reaction I received about my Chicago 
location as being informed by Detroit’s relative state of economic decline. Chicago was 
what Detroit could be if only things were different.  
My presence as an outsider also seemed to be mediated by the fact that I was 
pursuing my doctorate. In two communities that expressed a strong value for education, 
the pursuit of my doctorate degree seemed to speak something about my character and 
my personal values.  
Beyond being able to build camaraderie in these ways, I also came to Detroit with 
some previous knowledge of the city. Because I have a host of extended family in 
Detroit, I spent a great deal of time there as a child. In fact, I can recall becoming familiar 
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with Iraqi Christians because I patronized Iraqi Christian-owned corner stores that were 
near my grandmother’s house in Detroit’s “Boston-Chicago” neighborhood. Acting as a 
researcher, it provided hindsight into my experiences as a child. Back then, it always 
seemed odd to me that when I would visit my grandmother, Iraqi Christians were the only 
non-black people I would see. Over the course of my research at the UICC, I learned 
there were reasons why Iraqi Christians owned businesses in neighborhoods like my 
grandmother’s. It also became clearer how their presence in inner city space contributed 
to Detroit’s racial dynamics and its local economy.  
Miami is a very different city from Detroit. Miami is not experiencing the 
monumental economic crisis that faces Detroit. In fact, investments in the city have been 
on the rise over the last thirty years. The relative economic success the city continues to 
experience is due at least in some part to the success of Cuban entrepreneurship and the 
group’s gradual insinuation into global marketplaces – especially those marketplaces that 
focus upon expanding trade relationships between the United States and countries in 
South America. The entrance of Cubans’ into global marketplaces stands in great contrast 
to the commitment Iraqi Christian entrepreneurs continue to maintain in Detroit’s local 
economy. The divergent economic qualities of each city indirectly shape racial dynamics. 
Iraqi Christians ongoing embeddedness within inner city space encourages, if not 
demands, social interaction with African Americans in Detroit. Cubans’ embeddedness in 
global marketplaces do not require the same attention to local relationships – with 
African Americans or any other racial group. The continuing commitment Iraqi 
Christians have to achieving local incorporation and the increasing level of involvement 
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Cubans maintain in global marketplaces mirror critical differences I observed in the 
organizational work each group conducts in response to crises that impact them.  
The experiences I had with Iraqi Christians as a young girl partly informed my 
choice to pursue my research in Detroit. Because Iraqi Christians had a strong presence in 
Detroit, I felt certain that important global events including the war in Iraq and the end of 
the Saddam Hussein regime provided an opportunity to better understand what 
organizational work that is conducted in the name of ethnicity looked like. Although I did 
not have the same personal frame of reference for the Cuban exile community, I felt that 
studying CCANE provided an opportunity to compare how a relatively new immigrant 
political project like the Iraqi Christian case compared to a longer standing one. By the 
time the war in Iraq began Cuban exiles in Miami were engaged in efforts to introduce 
democracy in Cuba for almost thirty years. Beyond these factors, my choice to study an 
organization serving the political and civic interests of Cuban exiles was additionally 
informed by my fieldwork in Detroit. The archival analysis included a review of a 
number of documents from state and federal agencies that provided statistics and 
migration histories of refugee groups to the U.S. Over the course of the review I found 
that I was drawing parallels and discontinuities between the Iraqi Christians in Detroit 
and the population of Cuban exiles in Miami. These similarities and distinctions lead me 
to ask more informed questions about the kinds of organizational work that was ongoing 
in Miami. Thus, my decision to study Cubans was ultimately partly informed by the 
knowledge I gained in my research site in Detroit and the subsequent understanding I 
gathered about the work CCANE was conducting in Miami.  
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Description of the UICC and its affiliates 
The United Iraqi Christian Council (UICC) is located in Cypress Grove, 
Michigan, an affluent suburban community approximately twenty miles northwest of 
downtown Detroit. The organization’s offices are housed in the same building as one of 
its affiliates, the Iraqi Christian Business Association (ICBA). Staff members of the 
community newspaper, the Iraqi Christian Gazette, and the Iraqi Christian Council on 
Health and Wellness (ICCHW) also have offices in the building. The building itself is 
impressive. The newly constructed four-story brick building seems a suitable component 
of an area of the Cypress Grove that is primarily dedicated to commercial endeavors. The 
offices sit alongside a four lane highway that serves as one of the main thoroughfares for 
Cypress Grove, providing local access to other businesses, shopping, and entertainment 
venues. Stores and restaurants like Whole Foods and Panera Bread are located within a 
one mile radius of the office. Semi-hidden entrances into comfortable residential enclaves 
are located directly off the expansive highway where the organizations’ offices are 
located. From the street it is easy for passersby and those seeking to do business with any 
of the organizations to locate the building in that the ICBAs name is prominently affixed 
to its exterior.  
The UICC was founded in 1981. It is a “grass roots” community, non-profit 
umbrella organization that seeks to establish community based charitable, educational, 
and humanitarian relief to Iraqi Christians living in Iraq and other places around the 
world. Several different organizations are affiliated with the UICC including the ICBA, 
the ICCHW and seven others. While the UICC is the “umbrella” organization for all 
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affiliated organizations in the community, it receives some of its funding from the ICBA. 
In fact, the ICBA not only provides funding to the UICC, it also provides the majority of 
the financial support for the services the ICCHW offers. Historically, financial shortfalls 
in the UICC or ICCHW have been addressed with state and federal funding. Membership 
dues and other membership related fees including advertising and fees associated with 
attending organizational events support the majority of the ICBA’s efforts. Additional 
support is provided from corporate donations and state and federal grants. Two 
professional organizations that support Iraqi Christian attorneys and physicians in the 
Detroit area are also included under the UICCs umbrella. There is also a women’s 
charitable organization that provides assistance to the community’s refugee population by 
sponsoring fundraisers and hosting other events. For instance, in 2012 the women’s 
organization published a cookbook that included a wide selection of Iraqi Christian 
staples. All of the profits from the cookbook went directly to the refugee community. In 
2010 the community also started a cultural center in the Rolling Hills Country Club. 
Rolling Hills, which is also located in Cypress Grove, is approximately three miles away 
from the UICCs offices. While the club is open to non-Iraqi Christians, the 
preponderance of the membership comes from the community. The community cultural 
center is the Iraqi Christian community’s effort to document its ethnic history in Iraq and 
American society. The group of affiliated organizations also includes a social service 
agency that is based in San Diego, California, where another sizable population of Iraqi 
Christians resides.  
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Figure 2. Organizational Structure of the United Iraqi Christian Council (UICC)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Description of CCANE and its Affiliates 
CCANE was founded in 1981 in Miami, Florida. Its mission is to “advance the 
interests and values of the Cuban people, both on the island and in exile, protect human 
rights, promote Cuban cultural traditions, and help bring freedom and democracy to the 
Cuban people.” The offices of the organization are located in one of Miami’s largest and 
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It blends almost seamlessly into the background of the neighborhood. Unlike the building 
that houses the UICC and the ICBA in Detroit, there is no signage on the exterior 
announcing the organization’s presence. In fact, it is the kind of building one might pass 
one hundred times without truly noticing it – without stopping to give thoughtful 
consideration as to what might be inside. It is a simple and non-descript three-story 
structure that sits quietly off the street. The lack of hustle and bustle that generally 
defines the neighborhood where CCANE is located serves only to make the offices 
somehow more obscure.  
Currently, CCANE shares the building with one organization called the Cuban 
Human Rights Project (CHRP). CHRP has a similar mission as CCANE and the staff of 
both organizations frequently work together. CHRP mission does differ slightly from 
CCANE’s, however, in that it is more directly focused upon providing support and 
assistance to Cubans living in Cuba. Another organization affiliated with CCANE, the 
Coalition for a Free and Democratic Cuba (CFDC), is now defunct. During the 1980s and 
1990s, the Coalition acted as a political action committee. CFCDs work was based out of 
Washington, D.C.  
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Figure 3. Organizational Structure of the Coalition for Cuban American Nationals and 
Exiles (CCANE)  
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when members of the organization needed to respond to city-sponsored raids on their 
business establishments. Lastly, I consider the organization’s response to the introduction 
of two national grocery franchises into the city of Detroit. I argue that the ICBA is a free 
space that provides Iraqi Christians in Detroit the opportunity to contradict other 
storylines about the group that challenge their assertions of ethnic authenticity. 
Specifically, I find that organizational work provides the opportunity to challenge 
potentially harmful conceptions of Iraqi Christians emanating in the public sphere. 
Taking into account events that occur over the course of the organization’s work, I also 
conclude that there is a relationship between the transactional context in which identity 
claims are made and the viability of those claims.  
Chapter three takes a similar look at the work CCANE conducts in Miami. Taking 
into account important political crises such as the Mariel Boatlift of 1981 and the end of 
the Cold War in 1990, I consider how events support organizational actor’s claims of 
ethnic authenticity. I describe how events allow organizational actors to contradict 
storylines that understand the group as immigrants to another version that gives primacy 
to their experiences in exile and experiences of political oppression.   
In chapters four and five I take into account how the rhetorical strategies each 
organization employs allow them to meet their respective organizational aims. First, I 
explain how each organization uses the idea of ethnic authenticity as an organizational 
logic. In chapter four I describe how the UICC’s efforts to resettle Iraqi Christian 
refugees in Detroit are informed by three aspects of the group’s ethnic history: its 
indigenous ties to Iraq; its foundational association to Christianity; and social 
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differentiation of local Christians that resulted from living in a predominately Muslim 
society. Similarly, in chapter five I describe how CCANE’s efforts to bring about a civil 
society in Cuba rely upon claims of authenticity that describe Cubans’ collective 
experience with political oppression. 
I then consider how organizational rhetoric is shared in social interactions with 
outgroups in ways that encourage cultural citizenship in the American mainstream and 
institutional belonging in other forums where organizational work occurs. In chapter four 
I describe how the UICC and ICBA’s participation in “emplotted stories” on “the west” 
and Americanism in interactions with U.S. lawmakers, federal agencies encourages 
incorporation. I also explain how the use of rhetoric on religious exodus or displacement 
and allows the ICBA to build important local collaborations in Detroit that bring 
resources to resettled Iraqi Christian refugees. In chapter five I describe how CCANE’s 
participation in culturally accepted narratives Americanism, democracy and human rights 
achieves incorporation in the American mainstream and international forums on human 
rights.       
My data and analysis encourage the use of an ecological model for studying 
American ethnicity. The final chapter explains how adopting an ecological approach 
provides the opportunity to evaluate the identity claims ethnic groups make in light of 
ongoing geopolitical changes that impact them, and the cultural imprint those events have 
on the American mainstream. By focusing on these factors I hope to add dimension to 
existing analyses of American ethnicity that identify how intergroup dynamics predict 
distinctiveness. Instead of determining how identities are formed in relation to other 
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groups that participate in American society, I prioritize the content of identity claims 
themselves, as they emerge in the space of ethnic-specific organizations. I find that 
claims of ethnic distinctiveness are substantiated within organizations by specific 
histories and events that determine shared experiences within an ethnic group, and 
simultaneously reinforce boundaries of exclusion with other out-groups.  
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CHAPTER II 
MANUFACTURING DETROIT: 
CHALLENGING THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF PLACE THROUGH 
ORGANIZATIONAL ACTION 
Historically, entrepreneurship has provided immigrants with a means of achieving 
socioeconomic incorporation into American society (Bonacich 1973; Gold 2010; Logan, 
Alba and McNulty 1994; Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Jenson 1989). Many 
“middleman” entrepreneurs establish their businesses in predominately black 
neighborhoods that do not include supermarkets and other chain stores. Gold (2010) 
argues that tension and hostility between merchants and patrons is common in these 
communities. Black customers, who have limited economic resources, can harbor 
resentment for store owners who they feel do not offer low-cost goods and services that 
are available in the suburbs. And in an effort to safeguard their investments, merchants 
“harden their shops and remain vigilant against theft (Gold 2011:3)” In this environment, 
routine business transactions can lead to violence and humiliation (Abelman and Lie 
1995; David 2000; Gold 2010).   
 For the last forty years, Iraqi Christians business owners have maintained a large 
presence in Detroit, a city that is over eighty percent African American. In this chapter I 
describe how the Iraqi Christian Business Association (ICBA), one of the affiliated 
organizations of the UICC, provides Iraqi Christians with opportunities to respond to 
crises that challenge their position as entrepreneurs in inner city neighborhoods. 
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Migration, Economics and Politics in the Motor City 
 
Once during the course of my fieldwork at the UICC I had the opportunity to 
travel from Chicago to Detroit by way of Amtrak. The train wound its way through many 
picturesque lakeside Michigan towns, providing a glimpse of what life might be like for 
some people who live there. Those picturesque scenes stood in contrast to the images that 
welcomed me and other passengers upon arriving to Detroit. Gritty storefronts, along 
with shells of burned out buildings that somehow managed to remain standing on the 
edges of sparsely traveled city streets, and neglected vacant lots filled with discarded 
aluminum cans and paper, betrayed the storied image of a once thriving American 
industrial city.   
The scenes of urban blight were however, strong evidence of the pervasive 
economic problems the city has experienced over the last fifty years. Economic 
disinvestment in Detroit has been a pattern since the 1960s when it and other major U.S. 
cities began experiencing unparalleled suburban growth. Then, not only did perennial 
urban dwellers leave the city in favor of assuming residence in pristine suburban 
enclaves, so too did businesses and large corporations.  
The city’s social problems seem to have worsened since then also. Unprecedented 
gang and drug violence during the 1980s and 1990s earned Detroit the infamous title of 
‘Murder Capital of the U.S.A.’ But illicit crime was not Detroit’s only problem. 
Corruption in the city’s government did nothing to encourage economic reinvestment or 
public confidence. All of these issues seemed to come to a head in March of 2013 when 
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Governor Rick Snyder declared the city in a ‘state of financial emergency’– effectively 
signaling the city’s imminent filing for bankruptcy.1  
Detroit’s racial makeup has been impacted by the simultaneous experiences of 
urban disinvestment and suburban expansion occurring since the 1960s. The outmigration 
of mostly white groups and the continued occupation of city space by mostly African 
Americans, created contrasting neighborhoods and communities. ‘Whitopias’ emerged 
miles away from a rapidly declining ‘Chocolate City’.2 For Detroit’s mostly African 
American population, who remained within the city limits, the pattern of disinvestment 
and expansion meant that livable-wage employment options were limited. African 
Americans were also first-hand witnesses to failed policies meant to reconcile urban 
inequality; ineffective city management, along with apparent limitations of federal 
policies (e.g. urban renewal), and the budgets that accompanied them, left little 
opportunity for progressive urban development plans to come to fruition.  
Geographic sprawl and economic investment in suburban areas also introduced 
consequences for other groups as well. By the 1960s, Jewish Americans, who once were 
a tremendous presence in the city – especially in its local economy, began leveraging 
their entrepreneurial success to buy homes in the developing suburbs. The group’s 
economic success also encouraged them to begin new endeavors in professional 
                                                        
1 http://nation.time.com/2013/03/01/governor-declares-financial-emergency-in-detroit/ 
 
2 In the book Searching for Whitopia: An Improbable Journey to the Heart of White 
America journalist Rich Benjamin defines whitopias as predominantly or extremely white 
suburban or exurban enclaves. The term Chocolate City is an urban colloquialism 
referencing the geographical separation of whites and blacks in suburban and inner city 
spaces respectively.  
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occupations. The migration of Detroit’s Jewish community to points northwest of the 
city, along with their matriculation from the merchant class, meant the closing of many 
small businesses in the inner city over time – beginning with businesses in the Hastings 
Street neighborhood to the east in the early part of the 20th century, to those in the Dexter 
Boulevard area on the Westside of Detroit in the 1960s. It also brought about 
neighborhood racial change in many of the same areas. African Americans replaced Jews 
and other white ethnics who were leaving for suburban destinations. By the 1980s many 
of Detroit’s Jewish community had settled in affluent suburban areas.3  
While expansion and disinvestment instigated the migration of Jewish Americans 
over time, Arab groups – especially Lebanese and Syrian immigrants, who began arriving 
in Detroit after WWI, have maintained a consistent presence on the western outskirts of 
the city. Arriving mostly in search of economic opportunities, many early Arab 
immigrants attained jobs with the Ford Motor Company, who made their headquarters in 
Dearborn, Michigan. High matriculation of Arab groups into manual labor positions at 
Ford in the 1930s and 1940s encouraged the emergence of a distinctive Arab community 
in the Detroit metropolitan area.4 The persistence of the enclave has supported the 
subsequent migration of other Arab groups west of Detroit’s border since the 1960s. In 
fact, the first wave of Arab immigration, along with immigration that occurred thereafter, 
                                                        
3 Jewish history in Detroit obtained from the Jewish Virtual Library, a project of the 
American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise: 
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/vjw/Detroit.html. Website accessed on May 
3, 2014.   
 
4 For an expanded discussion of Arab immigration to Detroit see Laurel D. Wigle (1974); 
Sameer Y. Abraham (1983); Kim Schopmeyer (2011) 
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brought into existence an Arab American enclave that is unrivaled by most others in the 
United States.5  
Still other groups remained closer to the city center despite suburban development 
and economic disinvestment processes. For instance, the city of Hamtramck, Michigan, 
whose boundaries are actually etched inside Detroit’s borders, remains an active enclave 
for Polish Americans. While German immigrants initially occupied the area at the turn of 
the 20th century, the arrival of the Dodge manufacturing plant in 1914 encouraged the 
settlement of a large contingency of new Polish immigrants.6 In recent years Hamtramck 
has been an appealing settlement site for immigrants from Southeast Asia, especially 
those from Bangladesh. But the city’s main thoroughfares, which include a host of Polish 
bakeries, restaurants and Catholic churches, continue to reflect the historic presence of 
early Polish immigrants to the metropolitan Detroit area.7    
                                                        
5 According to the Center for Immigration Studies, the state of Michigan had one of the 
largest Middle Eastern immigrant populations in the nation in 2000. Also, Michigan was 
one of two states that received the highest number of Arab immigrants. 
http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/back902.html  
 
6 See JoEllen McNergney Vinyard. 1998. For Faith and Fortune: The Education of 
Catholic Immigrants in Detroit, 1805-1925. Urbana: University of Illinois, pp. 182-184. 
See also the website for the City of Hamtramck, Michigan. 
http://www.hamtramck.us/about/history.php. Website accessed May 3, 2014. 
 
7 Website for the City of Hamtramck, Michigan: 
http://www.hamtramck.us/about/history.php. Website accessed May 3, 2014.  
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Figure 4. Map of Detroit Metropolitan Area
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Iraqi Christians in Detroit 
 
The same processes that shaped Detroit’s social landscape and economic structure 
also impacted Iraqi Christian migration in the city. The aims and the strategies the UICC 
and its partners adopted were determined in this complex social and economic terrain.  
Iraqi Christians have maintained a substantive presence in Detroit for over 100 
years. Not unlike other ethnic groups, Iraqi Christian immigrants began arriving to the 
U.S. in the early 20th century – coinciding with the first wave of Arab immigration by 
Lebanese and Syrians. By the turn of the century the population was on the rise in 
Detroit, due in part to the city’s burgeoning auto industry.8 The population expanded 
again between the 1970s and 1990s when a second wave of voluntary immigrants arrived 
from Iraq.9 While revisions to census policy make it difficult to accurately chronicle 
population growth over time, the most recent population estimates place the number of 
Iraqi Christians in Detroit at well over 30,000 people.10 Currently, Detroit has the largest 
population of Iraqi Christians outside of Iraq. Furthermore, expectations for population 
                                                        
8 See Sameer Y. Abraham (1983) 
 
9 See Kim Schopmeyer (2011:31) 
 
10 This total population of Iraqi Christians estimated by the Census is strongly disputed 
by the UICC and its affiliated partners, who place the number of Iraqi Christians in the 
Detroit area to over 100,000 people. See http://www.arabamerica.com/news.php?id=291. 
Schopmeyer (201l: 32) suggest that undercounting of Iraqi Christians and other Arab 
groups in the US Census results from sampling effects, mistrust of government surveys, 
and faulty methods for identifying Arab groups. Schopmeyer reports adjusted Census 
data that yields a population estimate (i.e., 129,296) that is consistent with the estimates 
reported by other sources.   
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growth are high, in that the majority of the Iraqi Christian refugee population is 
anticipated to resettle in the Detroit area.11 
The immigration of the first Iraqi Christians to Detroit was instigated by the 
economic opportunities the auto manufacturing industry brought. However, unlike 
Lebanese and Syrian immigrants, Iraqi Christians were largely unable to attain jobs in the 
manufacturing industry upon their arrival.12 The limited access the group had to jobs in 
the auto industry meant that other sources of employment needed to be found. 
Entrepreneurism held the most promise for many in the emerging community. Acting as 
merchants was not a role that was unfamiliar to the group. Iraqi Christians have 
historically acted as merchants in Iraq – opening stores in urban hubs like Baghdad and 
Mosul where the crops of Iraqi Christian farmers could be sold. And as one of the few 
purveyors of alcohol in Iraq, many Iraqi Christian merchants also owned liquor stores 
(Bailey and Bailey 2003; Sengstock 2005). 
The Iraqi Christian American ethnic economy in Detroit grew dramatically in the 
1950s and 1960s when ‘white flight’ not only began to affect the city’s neighborhoods, 
                                                        
11 Since the war in Iraq began in 2003 Christians living there have become increasingly 
susceptible to violence and social reprisals. In 2007 the U.S. Congress recognized the 
group’s vulnerability with the passage of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act. Under the law 
Iraqi Christians and other minority populations are provided with special immigration 
status. The existing Iraqi Christian population in Detroit, along with the ongoing 
organizational work being conducted on the group’s behalf has encouraged high rates of 
resettlement in the metropolitan Detroit area. The vulnerabilities confronting Christians 
living in Iraq as a consequence of war are also discussed in more detail in Chapter four. 
See also Schopmeyer (2011:50) 
 
12 See Chaldean American Chamber of Commerce website: 
http://chaldeanchamber.com/community-overview. Website accessed May 4, 2014. 
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but also its local economy. Then, when small businesses operated by independent 
storekeepers (mostly owned by Jewish Americans) and large corporate-owned 
supermarkets started to move out of the inner city, Iraqi Christian entrepreneurs began 
moving in. Since that time entrepreneurism has remained a defining socio-economic 
characteristic of the group in Detroit. Today, sixty percent of Iraqi Christian Americans 
in Detroit own at least one business, and 39 percent own two or more.13 Not unlike some 
other ethnic groups, the entrepreneurial acumen of Iraqi Christians is most apparent in 
small business enterprise, especially grocery and liquor stores (Bonacich 1973; Bonacich 
and Modell 1980; Light 1984; Logan, Alba and McNulty 1994; See also Sanders 2002). 
However, in recent years, the group’s economy has diversified. More and more, 
businesses are being located in affluent suburban areas in the metropolitan region.14 And 
Iraqi Christians now also own a wider range of businesses than those traditionally 
associated with the group. 
The pattern of expansion and development that characterized Detroit after the 
1960s was also revealed in the group’s migration pattern in the city. Like Jewish 
Americans in Detroit, Iraqi Christians initially lived in the city. And like Jewish 
Americans the migration of Iraqi Christians in metropolitan Detroit also progressed 
northwest – moving from communal enclaves located on the city’s east side to those on 
the far west side. By the 1970s the group found itself in areas west of 7 and 8 Mile Roads 
                                                        
13 Source: 2008 survey of Iraqi Christian households conducted by the Iraqi Christian 
Business Association  
 
14 This pattern is not unprecedented. See Min Zhou (2004).  
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and Royal Oak, a suburban community located just beyond the city’s northernmost 
boundary. By the 1980s, largely due to their entrepreneurial success, the group began 
living in the same areas as Jewish Americans in Detroit. In fact, Cypress Grove15, the 
area where the preponderance of the Iraqi Christian population currently resides 
maintains a sizable concentration of both Jewish and Iraqi Christian Americans.16  
The progressive northwest migration of Iraqi Christians to Cypress Grove stood in 
geographical contrast to the stable western enclave Arab groups established in Dearborn. 
The physical separation of the two groups is compounded by the development of 
Detroit’s interstate highway system. Suburban expansion in Detroit brought about the 
corresponding growth of the federal interstate highway system over time.17 The 
concentration of Iraqi Christians in the northwest suburbs and Arab Americans in the 
western suburbs is separated by two major interstates: I-94 and I-96 – highways that run 
in opposing directions. The introduction of these manmade barriers makes direct access 
to either community infeasible. It also eliminates any possibility for the two communities 
to have social interaction in residential space.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
15 Cypress Grove is a pseudonym  
 
16 For an expanded discussion of Iraqi Christian residential patterns in Detroit see Sameer 
Y. Abraham (1983); see also Schopmeyer (2011:39-41) 
 
17 For an expanded discussion of how the evolution of the federal highway system 
transformed American cities see Kenneth T. Jackson’s Crabgrass Frontier: The 
Suburbanization of the United States.  
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The Construction of Black Space in Detroit  
 
A host of economic and social processes that began in the 1960s created an 
undeniable black space in the city of Detroit.18 Since then the maintenance of that space 
has been supported within a number of city institutions. Culturally, black space has been 
defined by the city’s association with Motown Music and the black artists that created the 
‘Motown Sound’ – an era of music, when at its height, managed to break the color barrier 
on radio stations across the nation – despite racial hostilities, which were motivating a 
growing Civil Rights Movement. Black neighborhoods were also created by other 
processes, including the ‘redlining’ of the real estate market in Detroit.   
City politics also fortified black space in Detroit. Not unlike other major U.S. 
cities, Detroit was a racially contested space prior to the exodus of most white groups to 
the suburbs beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s. During the time when whites 
were still living in Detroit, black city residents alleged that racial discrimination created 
unequal opportunities. Despite their large share of the population, blacks living in Detroit 
from the 1930s through the 1960s had little access to equal housing or employment 
                                                        
18 Fainstein and Fainstein (1986) understand the city of Detroit as a city in relative 
decline compared to other Western cities that implemented more effective restructuring 
plans like Denver and San Francisco. According to Fainstein and Fainstein, the creation 
of black space in Detroit was facilitated by the loss of jobs and income – especially in 
manufacturing – by the city’s residents, population out-migration to the suburbs, 
restructuring efforts including the development of the federal interstate system, housing 
policy and failed redevelopment and human renewal efforts. In the same volume Child-
Hill notes that the suburban expansion and urban disinvestment occurred simultaneously 
with politicized uprisings of black Detroiters – further consigning the space to blackness. 
Still other processes like the construction of suburban manufacturing plants in the late 
1940s and early 1950s further encouraged racial exclusionary geographic boundaries.   
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opportunities in some of the city’s public works departments, including the police 
department and city hall.   
The absence of black workers from these areas of city government, coupled with 
ongoing incidents of brutality, especially instances of violence by city police officers, 
contributed to divergent political opinions. Support for liberalism and the social programs 
implemented under the New Deal resonated with white and black progressives in the city, 
while the idea of liberalizing opportunity inflamed the political and social sensibilities of 
white conservatives. Still other groups in Detroit intended to advance the political 
strategies of black militants, which held little faith in the good intentions of liberal 
policies and utter disdain for the prejudicial viewpoint of white conservative groups.19  
Coleman Young, Detroit’s first African American mayor rose to power in this 
challenging political climate. A friend to liberals, including John Kennedy, Young 
entered office in 1973 with the intention of advancing New Deal and Civil Rights 
policies. However, because of his inability to strike mutually beneficial public-private 
contracts, along with his unapologetic commitment to the black community and 
intolerance for white political conservatives, Young racially polarized Detroit politics 
instead.20 The public perception that ‘black’ politics meant more than ‘white’ politics 
                                                        
19 For an expanded discussion on the politicized battle lines that were developing in 
Detroit in the 1960s, see Thompson (2001:232).  
 
20 See Thompson (2001:242). Wheeler (1994) also argues that Young himself created 
racialized boundaries that the white establishment had never before encountered. 
Young’s profane language, which was often on public display (for instance Young had an 
office nameplate that read, ‘MFIC’, which stood for Mother Fucker In Charge) seemed to 
lessen his credibility with whites, and his overall ability to strike beneficial political 
relationships with white-led companies – including the auto-manufacturers. Wheeler 
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overshadowed Young’s ability to address economic inequality through the introduction of 
liberal policies.  
Over the course of his tenure in office the color of politics in Detroit also 
changed. Young’s election created black space in City Hall, one of Detroit’s most vital 
institutions.21 The city also hired an unprecedented number of blacks to civil service 
positions, including those hired into the police force. For some white Detroiters the 
emergence of these black spaces in Detroit signaled the end of their civic participation in 
the city.  
The ICBA: Transforming Institutional, Geographical and Organizational Places in 
Detroit through Organizational Work  
 
By the 1980s, Iraqi Christians no longer resided within the city limits but they 
continued to run businesses in black neighborhoods. Recent estimates indicate that Iraqi 
Christians currently own 86% of the grocery stores in the inner city and 90% of its liquor 
stores.22 The group’s prominence in Detroit’s local economy is made more evident by the 
virtual absence of national supermarket chains like Meijer, Kroger and Whole Foods.  
                                                        
notes that Young’s insinuation into Detroit politics was, “perceived as encroachment 
upon territory already spoken for, a social trespass that many suburbanites not only 
appl[ied] to Coleman Young but extend generically to all of the black people who have 
unofficially annexed Detroit (p. xiii).” 
 
21 On the idea of Detroit as black city, Lonnie Wheeler writes, “In a country still 
fundamentally white, a black city stands self-consciously underdressed and frightfully 
isolated amid surroundings that it cannot assimilate … within the greater society; a 
tangent and, to some, a terrifying culture. The city’s overwhelming color identification 
suggests to those white former Detroiters that it has been snatched from their dominion 
(1994: x).”  
 
22 Source: 2008 survey of Iraqi Christian households conducted by the Iraqi Christian 
Business Association  
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The Detroit metropolitan area not only contains the largest population of Iraqi 
Christians outside of the Middle East, it also has one of the largest populations of Arab-
Muslim groups outside of the Middle East. Just as in other cities, the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
inflamed prejudicial attitudes against Muslims living in the Detroit area. And while there 
are tremendous cultural differences between Iraqi Christians and other Middle Eastern 
groups – religion and (native) language perhaps being the most significant – those 
distinctions were largely lost on people who were apparently primed for retribution. As a 
consequence, Iraqi Christians, including business owners in Detroit, found themselves on 
the receiving end of racist antagonisms. The failure to bring about effective case-by-case 
resolutions for the negative sentiment the group was experiencing contributed to the 
establishment the ICBA.  
After the attacks of September 11th, Middle Eastern incorporation into the 
national collective was contested. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
the number of hate crimes against Middle Eastern groups increased by 1700 percent after 
the tragic events occurred (see Sheridan and Gillett 2005). Arab-Muslims also reported 
increasing levels of direct and indirect discrimination following September 11th.23 
Because of their Middle Eastern background, Iraqi Christian business owners were also 
susceptible to these hostilities. Public identity claims the organization made distanced 
them from Arab-Muslims. For instance, the following account was offered on the 
organization’s website in 2003 after its founding:  
                                                        
23 Self-reports from Arab-Muslims in the U.K. found that levels of indirect discrimination 
increased by 83% following the events of September 11th. Levels of direct discrimination 
increased by over 70% (Sheridan 2006) 
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[Iraqi Christians] are the indigenous people of Iraq who speak a form of Aramaic, 
the language spoken by Jesus Christ… [Iraqi Christians] are Eastern Rite 
Catholic, led by the Patriarch of Babylon and affiliated with the Roman Catholic 
Church …The population enjoys steady growth thanks to a constant influx of 
Christian refugees who have fled Iraq in the face of religious persecution. The 
community feels a deep kinship to these victims of war and helps them in many 
ways… (UICC website) 
 
By invoking a foundational association to Jesus Christ, the organization and its members 
locate themselves in a narrative on Christianity that is fundamental to American society, 
as Judeo-Christian nation. The group’s practice of Catholicism further illustrates their 
close association with other Americans who are Christian. The website additionally 
implies that since the start of the War in Iraq (a consequence of 9/11), local Christians 
have been susceptible to religious persecution. That religious persecution against 
Christians in Iraq was increasing at a time when the United States and its allies were at 
war there suggest that they share commonalities, and even political allegiances, with 
Americans (or Westerners) that other non-Christian Middle Easterners may not.     
After its founding in 2003, the ICBA also began participating in inter-
organizational forums that sought to address racial and ethnic antagonisms in Detroit. 
The ICBA’s participation in these spaces provided additional opportunities to introduce 
alternate storylines about the Iraqi Christian community that countered perceptions that 
conceded Arab Americans in Detroit were a monolithic group.  
During an interview Eli, the President and Executive Director of the ICBA, 
described the role the organization plays in mediating public perception in the Detroit. 
While the ICBA has only been in existence for approximately ten years, other Iraqi 
Christian organizations provided the group with a blueprint for conducting organizational 
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work. For instance, Eli recalls participating in two young-Iraqi Christian organizations as 
a college student in the 1990s. One of the main goals of both organizations was to work 
on the “image” of the community. He describes how the early organizations he 
participated in as a college student worked: 
Eli: One of the things that I realized [back then] is that I think we have an image 
problem - which still occurs today.  
 
CJ: With whom? 
 
Eli: We have an image problem to the general community. [Iraqi Christians] are 
just the stereotype…because if you talk about [Iraqi Christians] you assume party 
storeowner. So we had to tell our story…you know that the party store owners ... 
there's always been a perception, they don't pay taxes. They [outgroups] don't 
understand how they own so many businesses. So they assume that they have a 
seven-year tax [break] ... It's crazy! 
 
In the days following September 11th, Iraqi Christian business owners in Detroit were 
susceptible to prejudicial attitudes about people from the Middle East. Much of the 
antagonism was informed by the idea that Middle Easterners not only practiced a religion 
that was different from most Americans, but that that religion encouraged radical actions 
that could harm them.  
At that point, social differences between Iraqi Christians and other Middle 
Easterners in Detroit, including religion, were lost in public dialogues in Detroit. Within 
this context, hostilities between Iraqi Christian merchants and black patrons increased. 
Eli’s comments suggest that the ICBA provides Iraqi Christian business owners with a 
means of neutralizing harmful characterizations the “general community” may have had 
about them. The identity claims the ICBA put forth, which emphasized their Christian 
identity, revealed commonalities that could potentially decrease the social distance 
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between them and most other Detroiters – including black patrons of Iraqi Christian-
owned stores.  
Olivia, the executive administrator at the ICBA, also explained how correcting 
stereotypes that are associated with the group is part of her job. According to Olivia, the 
need to manage the community’s image often becomes apparent in community forums 
that are sponsored by the City of Detroit or other non-profit agencies. Diverse Detroit or 
D2, the main forum the ICBA participates in, is a citywide organization whose goal is to 
provide the Metropolitan community with opportunities to learn about other cultures. It is 
also a site where people come together to devise plans that can aid in the city’s growth. 
For the city’s Middle Eastern groups, the open dialogues that occurred in forums like D2 
created the opportunity to reconcile antagonisms that emerged after September 11th.  
Olivia routinely participates in forum roundtables. During the meetings she is 
sometimes called upon to address some of the same misconceptions Eli mentioned, 
including the assumption that Iraqi Christian store owners receive tax exemptions. During 
an interview she described how forums like Diverse Detroit, and even the ICBA, whose 
membership is not limited to Iraqi Christians, are “branding” opportunities. 
Olivia: We always ... We're not selling a specific product. We're selling us, you 
know? 
 
CJ: It's like a brand? 
 
Olivia: Exactly. We're selling a brand! I'm not selling you a recorder [taking note 
of my recorder], a telephone or something. But, I'm like, “Come in!” This is what 
we do. And you'll come. You need to impress people. And if people aren't 
impressed, they will not come to you. It's just basic. To me it’s common sense. 
Think about what we do. Think about how [you can] get the same thing from 
Sears, but we have to get it from Nordstrom ...  or I had to go buy it at Saks.  
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So for Olivia part of managing the community’s image entails combating storylines such 
as the one that suggest Iraqi Christian store owners do not pay taxes. But another 
component of organizational work includes advancing the idea that the group has 
expertise that is of value to others. Therefore, the organization not only puts forth the idea 
that Iraqi Christians share commonalities with dominant groups (i.e., Christian 
Americans), they also explain how they contribute to the city in ways that other groups 
cannot do as effectively.  
The organization’s participation in inter-organizational forums also provided a 
means of achieving other organizational goals. The ICBA is the primary funding arm of 
the affiliated organizations of Iraqi Christians in Detroit. For the last five years, one of 
the main organizational concerns has been to generate revenue to meet the needs of Iraqi 
Christian refugees, who have resettled in Detroit due to deteriorating conditions in Iraq.  
In order to meet this imperative, the ICBA is represented on a number of 
committees sponsored by the Governor’s office and other citywide initiatives. These 
forums intend to address issues of diversity and equal opportunity, and to create programs 
that respond to social and economic disparities. When the ICBA began participating in 
these forums they encountered difficulty explaining how the needs of Iraqi Christian 
community differed from other Middle Eastern groups in Detroit. Their Middle Eastern 
background often led to solicitations to serve on state and city committees that attempted 
to resolve Arab-Muslim antagonisms in the city. Eli explains how the organization’s 
membership on these committees didn’t allow them to address issues like the ones 
confronting the group’s refugee community:   
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Eli: This is [an] ongoing debate, you know? Yes, we're from the Arab World. We 
share a lot in common. We speak Arabic. So to the outside – you’re Arabs. And 
so we need to tell our story.  We don't think that they [other Middle Easterners] 
have our [same] interests. You know?  We're different ... I served on a committee 
appointed by the previous governor on Arab and [Iraqi Christian] affairs. And 
most of the issues were about [racial] profiling. I wanted to talk about other issues 
and not necessarily [about profiling] ... The new governor asked me to be 
appointed again and I told him I'd do away with the commission. We don't need a 
token committee for Arab or [Iraqi Christians]. We just wanna participate in the 
general committees, you know? 
 
Eli’s comments suggest that although they are “from the Arab World,” Iraqi Christians 
were not in search of solutions to issues such as racial profiling. That those differences 
weren’t being recognized in inter-organizational forums meant that ICBA goals, 
including providing support to refugees, weren’t being met.  
Olivia compared the difficulty the organization faced by recalling conversations 
she had when she was a young girl: 
Olivia: You know even when I was growing up, everyone’s like, “There's no 
difference between an Arab and [an Iraqi Christian].” And I said no, I'm [Iraqi 
Christian]. You know – I’m Catholic. I said all [Iraqi Christians] are Catholic. All 
Arabs are not Catholic ... I wasn't insulted. It just wasn't what I was. It's like 
saying [to someone] OK ... you're Chinese. No, I'm Japanese. No. It's the same 
thing.  
 
The failure to recognize group differences held implications. Demonstrating specific 
needs tended to lead to the receipt of state-sponsored grants. In an effort to put the needs 
of Iraqi Christians in the forefront, the ICBA started a PAC (Political Action Committee) 
in 2008. Eli describes the PACs objective:    
So the PAC helps with those things. ... A lot of the folks in Lansing [don’t know 
about Iraqi Christians]. [We] educat[e] them, [so they will] give us funding for 
our Foundation – for the refugee crisis that we're facing ... If you look at our 
counterparts in the Jewish community, the Arab community ... you know their 
organizations are getting $8 to $10 million – sometimes $12 million a year. So I 
think we have a lot of opportunity.  
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After 9/11 state and city-sponsored committees in Detroit attempted to reconcile 
perceived differences between Arab Muslims and Westerners (or non-Arabs). Early on in 
their participation in these forums, the ICBA was included in dialogues that did not allow 
them to pursue their specific interests. By establishing a PAC, the ICBA hoped to counter 
the idea that Iraqi Christians were a part of an undifferentiated group of Middle Eastern 
Americans.  
In 2004 the ICBA confronted another challenge to their membership in Detroit’s 
local economy. At that time, Detroit’s now disgraced mayor, Kwame Kilpatrick, began 
raiding Iraqi Christian-owned stores in the name of protecting citizens against a number 
of health and safety violations presumed to contribute to neighborhood decline. The raids 
came on the heels of moratorium issued by the City of Detroit in 2003 that prevented the 
opening of new stores that sought to sell beer and liquor. The stings targeted irresponsible 
store owners thought to sell expired products or allow minors to purchase alcohol. The 
city also intended to identify store owners who turned a blind eye to drug sales that 
occurred on their property. By 2004, the Detroit Police Department had inspected over 
300 stores, most of which were owned by Iraqi Christians.  
Race played a role in the public dialogues that ensued about the raids. Some black 
Detroiters took issue with the fact that Iraqi Christian-owned stores rarely hired black 
employees. Other black Detroiters took exception to the idea that store profits were taken 
away from Detroit and invested in suburban communities where Iraqi Christian store 
owners resided. Still others, including members of the city’s government, took the 
opportunity to contest the fact that few stores in Detroit were black-owned. The Detroit 
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News quoted one black Detroiter who suggested that the number of stores owned by Iraqi 
Christians in the city promoted differences between the city and suburban life: “There’s 
too many stores in one block. There’s one at this corner, one on the next and one up the 
street. You see this in black neighborhoods; you don’t see this in the suburbs.”24    
The ICBA had two responses to these claims. The first response focused upon 
how Iraqi Christians remained in the inner city while other people and businesses moved 
to the suburbs. Presenting the opinion of Iraqi Christian-store owners, Judy Lin of the 
Detroit News wrote, “Store owners and other residents say the stores provide a much-
needed service to the residents [who lack] transportation to make it to big chain grocery 
stores in the suburbs.” In an online forum Eli argued similarly noting that,  
For over forty years the [Iraqi Christian] community … has worked in and with 
the city. It is clear the mayor wants these stores out of Detroit. Why? What will 
replace them? While chain stores have left the city in droves – despite tax 
abatements and subsidies – Detroit’s party store owners have stuck it out, time 
and time again. 
 
During an interview with me, Eli confirmed this position:  
Eli: It has to do with [taking] ownership. And so ... a lot of the work [of the 
ICBA] has been focused on talking about our contributions to this region. Not just 
as [Iraqi Christians]. We're not an insular group, but rather contributing to the 
overall economy. 
 
When the raids on Iraqi Christian-owned stores began in 2004, the ICBA responded by 
countering racialized storylines that jeopardized the group’s membership in Detroit’s 
local economy. One of the ways they addressed the crisis they faced was to explain how 
                                                        
24 Party Store Crackdown Creates Rift: Tensions among Chaldeans, blacks rise during 
yearlong raids in Detroit by Judy Lin, Detroit News, February 14, 2005. 
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Iraqi Christians continued to contribute to the city. Unlike other people and businesses 
that moved to the suburbs, they had not abandoned Detroit.  
The second response challenged the storyline that Iraqi Christian store owners 
were self-serving and took advantage of blacks in Detroit. To challenge the idea that Iraqi 
Christian-owned stores carried unhealthy or low-quality products, the organization 
introduced a website that patrons could use to make informed decisions. Eli explained to 
me how the website served the community: 
Eli: We talked about image. You always hear these stories: “Detroit's a food 
desert, there's no place to buy fresh foods”. It can't be any further from the truth. 
And so we're launching [a website]. It’s going to be for the general public. If you 
type in an address in the city, it will take you to a store that has fresh fruits and 
vegetables, a supermarket ... there's photos of each of these supermarkets, 
customer testimonials, sales papers … I mean just last week there [was] a story 
that's negative. And all the media picks it up. We're constantly combating [that]. 
The website dispels a lot of the myths or the stereotypes: How many African 
Americans they employ at their stores, how long they've been in business, the 
types of food that they carry – ‘cuz they say, “Oh, there's no organic products.” 
Again, we have photos of it all.  
 
The organization also countered the challenges they faced by liberalizing 
storylines that seemed to pit black Detroiters against Iraqi Christian business owners. In 
this regard, the ICBA publically questioned the city’s ability to create an environment 
that promoted social and economic success for everyone.  
For instance, in online forums and the local news outlets, the ICBA maintained 
that Kilpatrick’s indiscriminate and repetitive raids stymied the city’s already struggling 
business economy. The organization contended that money allocated to the raids could be 
spent on programs to address other issues such as crime and unemployment, instead of 
turning up minor health violations and legal breaches in Iraqi Christian-owned stores.  
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The organization also claimed that the actions the city took against Iraqi 
Christians were discriminatory. They argued that the stings disproportionately impacted 
Iraqi Christian businesses and not large franchise chains such as CVS drug store, who 
also sold alcohol and perishable items. And lastly, the ICBA asserted that despite the 
continued service of Iraqi Christians to the city, the mayor had yet to appoint a member 
of their community to a position in his administration.   
In 2005 when the raids ended, the Mayor’s Office issued a statement that read in 
part,  
We are, like never before, fortifying efforts to attract and retain businesses to the 
city, especially middle market businesses… Based upon the needs of the [Iraqi 
Christian] business community, we will do what we can to serve those needs… If 
we don’t reach out and stand up to support those who are here and support their 
success, the city won’t be successful. We talk about the financial health of 
Detroit. We have to support the financial health of the businesses in Detroit. We 
are 100 percent committed to working with the [Iraqi Christians]. 
 
In an environment where racial belonging in black space was being used to challenge 
Iraqi Christians’ continued participation in Detroit’s economy, the ICBA introduced 
alternate storylines that protected their business interests. First, the organization 
explained how Iraqi Christians were perennial contributors to the city’s economy, unlike 
other groups and businesses that abandoned the city. Second, they challenged the 
assertion that the social and economic position of black Detroiters would be improved by 
closing Iraqi Christian businesses.  
 In 2009, the ICBA found itself defending the presence of Iraqi Christian grocers 
in the inner city again. But this time, the defense was not just mounted against the city 
and a renegade mayor. It was also aimed at the state of Michigan and two of the nation’s 
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largest grocery chains, Whole Foods Market and Meijer. Under a plan the state of 
Michigan implemented, which intended address the absence of healthy food options in 
Detroit, one Whole Foods and one Meijer store would be opened within the city limits by 
2013.  
While the addition of two grocery stores may not drastically alter the buying 
habits or the food options of most Detroit residents – a population of 700,000 people – 
the announcement of their arrival was a sign of a changing economic landscape. For 
Detroiters the arrival of both stores ended a long exodus of national grocery chains from 
the city limits. The announcement also impacted members of the Iraqi Christian business 
community, who had long maintained a veritable monopoly over the city’s food sources. 
The addition of Whole Foods and Meijer meant that Iraqi Christian grocers would have 
new competition for the patronage of some of the city’s residents.   
Not long after the city announced the development plans for both stores in 2009, 
the ICBA started a campaign explaining the disadvantages of the Whole Foods and 
Meijer deals. The position the ICBA took was made part of the public dialogue in many 
of Detroit’s local presses, including Crain’s Detroit Business. The organization’s 
campaign advanced two major points. The first point conveyed the idea that they, as 
independent grocers of Detroit, had remained in the city when no one else wanted to be 
there. Articles appearing in local press reinforced the fact that they have been around the 
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city for over 30 years. They also described how Iraqi Christians remained present even in 
underserved areas that chain stores long abandoned.25  
The deal struck between the city of Detroit and Meijer and Whole Foods 
responded to recent state legislation that sought to create a healthier community in 
Detroit. Under Public Act 231, implemented in 2008, the city and the State of Michigan 
intended to bring Detroit its first ‘real’ full-service grocery stores (i.e., those with at least 
10,000 square feet of aisles, and dedicated meat, dairy, produce and frozen food sections) 
– a claim Iraqi Christian grocers disputed based upon their own estimations. Under the 
proposed plan a Whole Foods store would open in June of 2013 in Detroit’s Midtown 
neighborhood, which includes the Detroit Medical Center and Wayne State University. 
The Meijer store planned to open in May of 2013 at 8 Mile and Woodward – along the 
border the city shares with the more affluent suburban communities of Royal Oak and 
Birmingham. The proximity of each store therefore held little potential to rectify the 
access most Detroiters had to national grocery stores. Rather the stores would mostly 
serve to increase the resources in two of the city’s more resource rich communities. 
                                                        
25 The following articles are given as examples of the public discussion brought forth by 
organizational actors: http://metrotimes.com/columns/the-whole-truth-
1.1315684?pgno=2 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203961204577269723768076382
?mg=reno64-
wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB1000142405297020396120
4577269723768076382.html 
http://www.freep.com/article/20120514/BUSINESS06/120514018/Whole-Foods-
Midtown-Detroit 
http://mydetroitgrocers.com/the-detroit-news-local-grocers-snubbed-for-whole-foods/ 
http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20110727/FREE/110729897/-4-2-million-in-
incentives-key-to-whole-foods-deal 
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Detroiters living in underserved communities stood to receive little to no direct benefit 
from the introduction of the flagship stores.  
During an interview Myron, an executive staff member at the ICBA, explained his 
objection to the state’s initiative. Myron cast doubt on the genuineness of the proposal’s 
aim of improving access to healthier and broader food options to underserved 
neighborhoods in Detroit: 
Myron: Where are you putting them really? They're putting one in Midtown - 
which is - kind of like ... a more affluent part of Detroit, where it's kind of 
yuppies, who live and work for the hospital system. And then the other one that 
they're putting on 8 mile and Woodward – right on border of Royal Oak ... So 
they're trying to get really the Ferndale, Royal Oak demographic ... Oh so you're 
really thinking about the city? It's crap... they don't care about the city. 
   
Myron’s comments suggest that the strategic placement of the proposed stores fails to 
meet the state’s objective of alleviating the poor access Detroiters have to full-service 
grocers. His comments also pose a contrast between the two national chains and Iraqi 
Christian-owned stores. By locating in the city’s more stable and middle-class 
communities, Whole Foods and Meijer failed to demonstrate the same commitment to the 
city as Iraqi Christians. Contrasting the ideas of community health and access with 
commitment to the community provided Iraqi Christian business owners the opportunity 
to remind Detroiters of their long-standing membership in Detroit.  
The ICBA emphasized both of these limitations in press and public hearings 
repeatedly from 2009 to 2011. For instance, the organization’s website provided the 
following historical point of reference: 
Metro Detroit has the world’s largest population outside of Iraq, with an estimated 
121,000 people…Like many ethnic groups, [Iraqi Christians] began immigrating 
to the Metropolitan Detroit area in the 1920s in search of better economic, 
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religious and political freedom and opportunities. While some were lured by 
Henry Ford’s famous $5-a-day working wage, in true [Iraqi Christian] fashion 
entrepreneurial endeavors quickly took hold – particularly mom and pop food 
markets. Today, an estimated 9of 10 food stores in Detroit are owned by [Iraqi 
Christians]. (ICBA website) 
 
The history the website offers explains the group’s membership in the city of Detroit and 
likens their experiences to a host of other immigrating groups that are part of its local 
collective. They also call upon a longer ethnic history of the group that began in Iraq to 
qualify their participation in the city’s local economy as entrepreneurs. That the group 
experienced entrepreneurial success in their home-country explains their position within 
Detroit’s local economy.  
The ICBA also sought to make public the financial details of the deal surrounding 
the development plans. Under Public Act 231, financial incentives, in the form of 
property tax deductions, would be awarded to retail food companies who established 
stores that expanded, improved, or opened in underserved areas in Detroit.26 The 
economic benefit of the Act was estimated to have the potential for $852 million in sales 
and to enable the creation of over 3000 additional jobs in Michigan. According to Crain’s 
Detroit Business the deals struck between the City of Detroit, the State of Michigan and 
the federal government on one end, and Whole Foods and Meijer corporations on the 
other, included almost $5 million dollars in financial incentives.27 For Iraqi Christian 
                                                        
26 http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mda/FINALPA231FactSheet_290187_7.pdf  
 
27 In September 2009 CBS Money Watch reported that, “the Michigan departments of 
Agriculture and Treasury have developed Public Act 231, which provides incentives for 
retail food businesses that expand, improve, or open in underserved areas”, creating the 
potential for $852 million in sales and over 3000 additional jobs in Michigan. 
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business owners the idea that Whole Foods – a store that billed itself as ‘the world’s 
largest natural and organic grocery store’ – and Meijer – a financially comparable 
company – would receive financial incentives to build stores in Detroit deserved public 
outcry. Iraqi Christian grocers wanted to promote the idea that such support encouraged 
an uneven playing field that disadvantaged independent grocers in the city of Detroit. 
That companies who had not demonstrated the same commitment to Detroit that Iraqi 
Christian grocers had, despite never receiving similar incentives to open stores, was a fact 
that needed to be shared with Detroit residents.  
The ICBA also wanted to counter the argument put forth by the city, Whole 
Foods and Meijer that the development of the stores would provide Detroiters with much-
needed livable wage jobs. The ICBA responded this argument suggesting that the city’s 
support of these deals over others, which feasibly could bring better jobs, failed to meet 
the real needs of Detroiters. In an interview Myron described how the organization 
worked to combat the development plans as it related to financial incentives and 
employment: 
Myron: …For example when Meijer and Whole Foods got government subsidies 
to open stores in Detroit – you know – no one knew. There's tons of [independent] 
grocery stores in the city of Detroit - where they receive nothing. They're just all 
out on their own ... So we did a FOIA, and [said] let's see what the real story is. 
So we [learn they] have ... I mean tons of subsidy money ... multimillion-dollar 
subsidies to these groups – to Whole Foods and to Meijer ... and no one [else] gets 
nothing. So we published it. It went national. It went everywhere…And just the 
subsidy that these groups are getting and local businesses don't get anything – 
especially a private organization like Meijer ... I mean you could look up Whole 
Foods tax returns. They profit like $90 million. I mean do you really want to be in 
Detroit then if you need that kind of subsidy to put a store there?  
 
[CJ: Did a Whole Foods, Meijer, anything like that ... open in Detroit?] 
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Myron: Not yet. But they will. I mean they're still going through with it. But there 
was a lot of backlash. You know from state representatives in Michigan ... the 
government put a freeze on their money. So it ... a lot of good things happen. And 
it's not just [good] for people who own grocery stores... they're giving away the 
small tax dollars that everyone's giving in the city of Detroit to give to large 
organizations. They can afford to build it if they want. If you really want to be 
there, you don't need the people's money. Are you gonna pay back to the 
community what you've taken? No, I guess not. [He goes on to talk about the 
prospect of bringing jobs to the city] Oh, well we're [Meijer and Whole Foods] 
providing jobs. - Oh, who cares [his response to that argument] Take that 9 to shit 
somewhere else. Yeah. Hey, we're hiring people! At eight dollars an hour? ... I'm 
pretty sure they could find them someplace else really...  
 
The public responses the ICBA had to the deal to bring Whole Foods and Meijer 
to Detroit suggested that the deal would not level the economic playing field for anyone 
in Detroit. Black Detroiters in need of livable-wage jobs were not going to benefit from 
the addition of minimum-wage job opportunities. The ICBA maintained that the deal 
stood mostly to benefit corporations that were disengaged from the city and its people.  
The organization intended to explain how the interests of people committed to Detroit, 
including Iraqi Christian store owners, were being overshadowed by unfair corporate 
contracts.  The organization’s work seemed to produce results. By May of 2012 the 
Detroit Economic Growth Corporation (DEGC) awarded three Iraqi Christian 
storeowners low-interest loans to update their facilities.  
Conclusion 
 
Between 2001 and 2009 Iraqi Christian business owners in Detroit experienced 
three crises that challenged their ability to participate in the local economy as inner city 
entrepreneurs. The first crisis arose after September 11th. In an environment that created 
“us” and “them” categories that separated “Americans” from Middle Easterners, Iraqi 
Christian business owners became susceptible to anti-Arab hostilities. The second crisis 
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occurred when the city of Detroit began raiding Iraqi Christian-owned businesses in the 
name of protecting the health and safety of Detroit residents. The third crisis began when 
the state of Michigan approved Public Law 231, which paved the way for two national 
supermarket chains to open in Detroit.  
As a voice for Iraqi Christian business owners, the organization implemented 
strategies to protect the group’s business interests. In response to each crisis, the ICBA 
introduced alternate social understandings about Iraqi Christians and the role they played 
in Detroit. One of the strategies involved explaining to Detroiters who Iraqi Christians 
were as a people. In public forums and in inter-organizational space, the organization 
described the group’s religious practice. They also explained how local Christians in Iraq 
were vulnerable to religious persecution from members of majority groups. The 
organization made these claims as challenges to Middle Eastern incorporation were 
occurring in Detroit. Zulema Valdez (2011) argues that in order to avoid association with 
racially marginalized identities like Latino or Hispanic, people use ethnic identities as 
anchoring or primary identities. After September 11th Arab (or Middle Eastern) groups in 
Detroit were more susceptible to racial hostilities. The identity-work the organization 
conducted in this environment challenged the assumption that people of Middle Eastern 
descent were a monolithic group defined by shared interests and beliefs that differed from 
the beliefs of other Americans.  
The work the ICBA conducted in response to the city-sponsored raids on Iraqi 
Christian-owned businesses occurred in an environment that was defined by racial 
divisions between whites and blacks. To Kilpatrick proponents, the raids were an attempt 
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to resolve a long-standing pattern of exploitive practices that reinforced differences 
between the city and the suburbs – or black and white Detroiters. Opponents of the ICBA 
suggested that Iraqi Christian-owned stores in Detroit were harmful to city residents. 
Public dialogues also concluded that stores owned by Iraqi Christians were inferior to 
stores located in suburban areas.  
In response, the ICBA put forth campaigns which maintained that Iraqi Christians 
worked with the city in a way that other groups had not. The ICBA also asserted that 
while big business left the city, they had remained. By doing so, the organization drew a 
line between Iraqi Christians and whites who lived in the suburbs and the businesses that 
served them. The work the ICBA conducted when the raids occurred suggests that ethnic 
groups, like Iraqi Christians, that presumably receive the benefits of whiteness (e.g., 
suburbanization) can set aside their achieved racial status to assume others that are 
positively valued in multicultural environments. Not only can ethnic groups reject their 
assignment into racially marginalized categories (Valdez 2011), they can set aside their 
membership in dominant groups as well. 
The ICBA also played a role in ongoing public dialogues about the arrival of two 
national grocery stores in inner city Detroit. Entering into these dialogues provided the 
opportunity to challenge the idea that the public-private partnerships between the city of 
Detroit, the state of Michigan and corporate actors truly benefitted the needs of 
Detroiters. The organization focused upon explaining how the deals that were in place did 
nothing to resolve economic inequality for all Detroiters, including black Detroiters 
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living in underserved areas and Iraqi Christians who continued to own businesses in inner 
city neighborhoods despite urban blight and white flight.   
Analysts (Evans and Boyte 1986; McAdam 1985; Morris 1984) that consider 
voice and processes of change suggest that places such as the ICBA are “free spaces” that 
allow groups to learn “…a deeper and more assertive group identity, public skills, and 
values of cooperation and civic virtue (Evans and Boyte 1986:17).” Voice allows groups 
to challenge objectionable states of affairs (Hirschman 1970:30). That organizational 
efforts provided Iraqi Christians with the means to introduce storylines that challenged 
the business proposals the state of Michigan and its partners advanced suggests that 
spaces like the ICBA also act as “horizons of expectation” (Griswold 1993), where social 
understandings about Iraqi Christians are the product of local constructions of meaning 
between ethnic and non-ethnic actors (e.g., stakeholders and institutions). The 
organizational work the ICBA conducts shows how group identities not only reflect 
internal processes that give ethnic actors voice, but also how social understandings about 
groups emerge from complex social negotiations between different actors. Organizational 
action provides Iraqi Christians with the opportunity to forward their perspective on what 
distinguishes them as a collective. It also provides the opportunity for non-co-ethnic 
actors to accept new, contrasting or alternate social understandings of a group.  
In her consideration of race and civility in urban cities, Lee (2002) contends that 
race can impact merchant-customer relations in different ways. Interactions may be 
polarizing and even spark protest that leads to intergroup conflict. She writes that in these 
social interactions, “Groups constantly jockey for position in America’s racially and 
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ethnically stratified society (p. 143).” Fong and Shibuya (2005) write that, “today’s urban 
structures and processes reflect relations among various racial and ethnic groups in the 
city … these structures and processes are shaped by the presence of various racial and 
ethnic groups and the groups’ preferences [and] the urban structures and processes, 
reflecting various minority group relations, in turn shape urban structures and processes 
involving whites and minority groups (p. 298).”  
Objections to Iraqi Christians occupying black space in Detroit were made at a 
time when Middle Easterners were conspicuous identities in American society. Song 
(2004) argues that whites engage in “civic ostracism” by constructing Asian Americans 
as alien and unassimilable (p. 863).” In that calls for the closure of Iraqi Christian stores 
occurred at a time when Middle Eastern presence was being contested in Detroit and 
other places in the U.S., suggests that the claims black city stakeholders leveraged against 
Iraqi Christians had a similar impact. Thus, while Iraqi Christians, as a collective in 
Detroit, were recognized as white (by the relative economic position they maintained in 
reference to blacks and their proximity to “white” Detroit suburbanites), their cultural 
citizenship in the American collective (in Detroit) was at stake. To the extent that the 
political and social context allowed Iraqi Christians’ membership in the national 
[cultural] collective to be questioned suggest that cultural citizenship is a mediating factor 
that partly determines how groups experience incorporation.  
Lee (2002) also argues that black communities are rare places that symbolize 
black culture, pride, and autonomy. She writes that, “African Americans recognize that 
they are American in terms of nationality, but they stipulate that regardless of their 
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American citizenship, they feel they are not accorded the same privileges and status as 
other racial and ethnic groups in America (p. 158). Black communities provide refuge 
from the feeling that they are not completely American. The negotiations for black space 
that occurred in Detroit highlight may reflect a desire to maintain control over a part of 
the social world that is not culturally impacted by racial strife. In this light, opposition to 
Iraqi Christians may serve as a way of preserving a kind of autonomy that is largely 
unavailable to blacks in other social realms they are required to inhabit.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
PARA CUBA LIBERTE!: 
 
NEGOTIATING THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL IN A CONTEXT OF POLITICAL 
 
CHANGE AND CONTESTED CITIZENSHIP 
 
People in Cuba look at Miami like … I don’t know … as what Cuba could be. 
And that’s the idea. People have this kind of legend about Miami. For example, 
they believe that Calle Ocho is a magical place. … [Cuban] people from 
everywhere – and I’ve met Cubans in Bulgaria, Bolivia, Poland, The Czech 
Republic – they always dream about Miami. They always dream about coming to 
Miami. And even some of them who are married, and have children and have 
good jobs … and they are doing good in this country [where they are living]… 
but they have this image of Miami. There is this idea that if you are outside Cuba 
– if you live outside Cuba – you have to come to Miami at least once in your life. 
… I would say [Miami is] some sort of beacon of freedom for the Cubans inside 
Cuba because they look at Miami and say, ‘That’s Cuba with freedom.’ … It’s a 
very powerful symbol for the Cuban community. 
 – Armando, CCANE Director of Human Rights  
Writing on the Cuban influence in the city of Miami, David Rieff of the New 
Yorker wrote that, “In Miami Cuba is everywhere… Indeed, many tourists seem to act as 
if they landed not in a provincial American resort city but in the capital of a foreign 
country… Cubans in Miami sometimes behave as if they never left their island. It is one 
of the odder aspects of the Cuban exile… that parks and monuments in Miami often bear 
the same names as similar parks and monuments in Havana or Santiago de Cuba.” Reiff’s 
commentary suggests that unlike the Iraqi Christians in Detroit, Cubans in CCANE were 
not challenged to find ways to enter into city space in Miami. In fact, by 1981, when 
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CCANE was founded, the ‘Cubanization’ of Miami was quite discernible, especially in 
the city’s various business sectors. Beginning in the 1970s, many of the early Cuban 
emigrants who arrived to Miami seeking political refuge from the Castro regime started 
what would become a thriving business community (Portes 1987; Portes and Bach 1985; 
see also Perez p.91).  
Thus, while CCANE would provide Cuban Americans in South Florida with 
similar opportunities to pursue their interests through political and civic engagement, the 
organization emerged under quite different social circumstances than Detroit. And while 
the ICBA’s work focused upon democratizing local space (e.g., Detroit), CCANE worked 
in other forums where national and international politics, and fundamental human rights 
were actively being negotiated.  
In this chapter, I describe the environment in which CCANE was founded. I then 
describe the forums in which organizational work occurred. Taking into account the 
organization’s work in the last thirty years, I also consider how organizational logic 
changes over time. Specifically, I describe how changing historical conditions encourage 
CCANE to adopt different approaches to reconcile experiences of inequality.  
Cultivating a Politics of Exile in Miami 
 
The insinuation of Cuban emigrants into the city of Miami and the development 
of their business enclave seemed to mark a new period in Miami’s history. Prior to the 
influx of Cubans Miami received in the early 1960s, the city’s local economy was largely 
limited to tourism. A large portion of its population was also composed of retirees from 
points north and east, whose move to South Florida was prompted by the city’s warm 
74 
 
 
 
climate and largely unhurried lifestyle. While initially the business enclave that emerged 
catered mostly to the cultural needs of the city’s growing Cuban population, by the 1980s 
Cuban business owners also entered into ‘non-ethnic’ markets. Then, as the impact of 
global expansion was being made apparent in many South American countries, Miami 
became a natural hub for businesses seeking stronger ties in the United States. Sheila 
Croucher (1997) argues that many of Miami’s Cuban business elite recognized the 
strategic role they could play in an increasingly global economy. During this time, many 
Cuban business owners became gateway agents enabling more international business 
relationships to develop. Their participation in both local and international markets 
effectively transformed the city of Miami. Over the course of approximately twenty 
years, Miami had transitioned from a city whose blighted downtown evoked images of 
economic disinvestment, to one that was characterized as the “gateway city to Latin 
America (See Croucher 1997, p. 114, 130-131).” Unlike the Iraqi Christians of Detroit, 
who were challenged to enter into an existing business community, Cubans business 
owners seemed to occupy the city’s only business community.  
The tremendous presence of Cuban business and industry throughout the 1980s 
impacted the city’s local economy. It also shaped the lived experiences of Cuban 
entrepreneurs themselves.1 By the end of the decade, Cuban emigrants comprised the 
                                                        
1 According to Portes and Bach (1985), the first wave of Cuban immigrants included 
much of Cuba’s “entrepreneurial class.” Cubans who arrived to the U.S. in the early 
1960s included people who possessed a wide variety of skills that could be successfully 
applied to self-employment in American society (Portes 1987; see Perez p.91).  
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largest ethnic group in South Florida and Cuban-owned businesses had become perennial 
contributors to the local economy.2  
The negative commentary on Cuba, along with U.S. insistence that their political 
stance was correct, gave way to an environment that promoted the incorporation of 
“worthy” Cuban refugees into American society. Providing a safe haven and opportunity 
to Cuban immigrants was understood as a moral imperative (Croucher p. 108).3 Croucher 
writes that, 
The Cuban revolution dealt a serious blow to the United States in its ideological 
struggle with the Soviet Union, and the exodus of Cuban refugees from the island 
provided the United States with potent material for an ideological counterattack. 
Widely publicized accounts of Cubans risking their lives to escape tyranny served 
to discredit the revolution and the ideological principles upon which it was 
founded, and photographs of Cubans kneeling to kiss the ground in Miami 
portrayed the United States, and the principles for which it professed to stand, as 
an option superior to communism. (p.129) 
 
Croucher’s analysis suggests that Cubans who arrived to the United States after 1959, 
entered American society already occupying a political space. That space was defined by 
                                                        
2 While out-migration of Cubans to American society may not have started with Castro, it 
impacted it far more than any other political or economic vacillations had done. 
According to Portes and Stepick (1993) 135,000 Cubans arrived to the U.S. between 
January 1959 and April 1961. By 1965 the total had grown to 210,000. And by 1973 
another 340,000 Cubans arrived seeking political asylum. The Cuban diaspora expanded 
again in 1980 during the Mariel boatlift, which ultimately brought an additional 125,000 
emigrants to the U.S. or to South Florida more specifically.  
 
3 Croucher (1997) notes that the director of the Cuban Emergency Relief Center stated, 
“This is one of the largest and most generous refugee programs any nation has ever 
organized. There are several reasons for this. One is the fact that the Communists for the 
first time have established themselves close to our shores and we have been touched by 
the plight of its victims. We have felt a need to demonstrate the freedom that we profess 
and opened our hearts to these dispossessed (p. 108).”  
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the nation’s commitment to anticommunism and its collective objection to the Castro 
regime’s version of it.  
Furthermore, the notion of the ‘Cuban Miracle’ allowed the group to fit nicely 
into a long-standing narrative on the Immigrant – as a person who comes to the U.S. and 
makes his way through hard work and sacrifice, only to achieve the American Dream in 
the end.  The success Cubans experienced in business and industry and other professional 
endeavors squared with two accepted cultural ideas. First, Cubans’ experience in Miami 
validated the idea that the American social context held opportunities for immigrants that 
were not easily afforded in other nations.4 And perhaps equally important the group’s 
successful business endeavors confirmed the common understanding that incorporation 
into the mainstream was both the desired outcome and the predictable result of hard 
work.   
In fact, Croucher (1997) argues that the geopolitical contest between the United 
States and Cuba encouraged a particular understanding of Cubans living in American 
society. She maintains that this understanding “served well the foreign and domestic 
policy interests of the United States and simultaneously helped to transform Cuban exiles 
from a refugee population in South Florida to a powerful political and economic force… 
(p. 108).”  
                                                        
4 Similarly Robert Smith (2001) and his colleagues take note of the ‘immigrant analogy’. 
They write that the, “immigrant analogy compares the socioeconomic fates of African 
Americans and non-black immigrants and uses the greater historical success of the latter 
group to infer the moral culpability of native minorities and exonerate the larger society 
of any responsibility for structuring those different trajectories (p.3).” Taking into 
account the discrepant outcomes between racial groups in American society in the post-
civil rights era, Jennifer Hochschild (1995) argues similarly.  
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But the fact that some Cuban emigrants had “made it” was not the story that 
people in Miami’s exile community wished to put forth. They wanted to forward a 
different immigration story that was less about their successful in American society and 
more about their continued absence from Cuban society. They wanted to explain that 
despite the group’s entrepreneurial success in South Florida, many Cubans remained 
concerned about conditions in Cuba.  
During an interview with me, Alfonso, a former executive director of CCANE, 
explained how he understood the exile community in Miami then. Alfonso came to the 
United States in the early 1960s not long after Castro came to power. Soon after his 
arrival, he began studying for his doctorate in political science. After completing his 
studies, he worked for a number of Cuban-owned private firms before focusing his time 
in CCANE. Alfonso is soft-spoken and mild-mannered, but his reputation for making 
even-handed decisions and his thoughtful approach to organizational work gains him 
tremendous respect in CCANE: 
Alfonso: … Many of us had had a very formal education. And others had 
participated also in industry and in the military and all sorts … And we were 
becoming proficient in working and understanding the [U.S.] system and 
somehow we adapted to the system. We adapted very well. But still we didn’t. 
We were not able to effect, or realize the potential or the power that we saw 
developing in our community. People were talking about us and all of that. But 
still our main concern at [that] time was Cuba (and continues to be for a very long 
time for our community). Because different from other exiles – European exile 
communities during the Cold War and all of that, and of course other immigrants 
… The Cubans at that time – of the 60s and 70s came with a conviction that this 
was temporary. That we were really not going to establish ourselves here. To 
some extent I believe was a reason why we didn’t dedicate ourselves to really 
develop political power here – in the United States. And we realized we have to 
use this time without forgetting what we have to do back in Cuba for our people. 
We have to use this time to see how we can advance our profession[al] skills, and 
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educate ourselves and create a family … and we were doing that. We were going 
ahead.  
 
Alfonso’s comments suggest that in the early 1980s Cubans remained tied to political life 
in Cuba in a way that European and other immigrating groups did not remain tied to their 
homelands. He also suggests that despite the group’s relative economic and social 
success, the migration experience of Cuban emigrants differed from the experiences of 
other emigrants. Unlike other immigrating groups, full incorporation into American 
society was not the end goal of the Cubans living in Miami in 1981. Returning to their 
homeland was the expectation. From Alfonso’s point of view, Cubans were temporary 
residents, not permanent ones. They were exiles, as opposed to immigrants.   
The more prominent the group became in business and industry, the more able 
they were to effectively convey their story of contested migration from their homeland. 
The unprecedented emigration of the Cuban elite, along with their relative success and 
growing influence in South Florida enabled a powerful mindset to emerge (Croucher 
1997). This mindset countered ideas of what it meant to be an immigrant in American 
society. It took into account what Cuban emigrants considered as their involuntary 
emigration and the non-democratic system of government in Cuba that allowed it to 
happen. Unlike some other immigrating groups who ostensibly sought full incorporation 
into American society, Cuban exiles evaluated their plight in the United States as one that 
was defined by the experience of exodus and the expectation of return.5  
                                                        
5 Croucher (1997) discusses the formation of the exile identity as it contrasts with the 
notion of the immigrant. She maintains that while some immigrants came to the United 
States in search of opportunity, Cubans considered their incorporation as temporary. The 
United States was a place that could provide refuge until they could return to their 
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The Mariel Boatlift of 1980 reinforced the exile ideology that was forming in 
Miami’s Cuban community. At that time over 125,000 Cuban refugees arrived in South 
Florida.6 The arrival of the Marielitos prompted delicate discussions by Washington 
lawmakers, including President Carter, on how best to handle the influx of Cubans 
arriving to South Florida. The incident called for the Carter administration to craft an 
effective potential response to an unprecedented domestic situation. The response also 
had to be consistent with other decisions that were made in regard to U.S.-Cuba relations.  
The Mariel event occurred one year before CCANE started. Among CCANE 
founders, the arrival of the Marieletos was received with mixed emotions. On one hand, 
the Mariel event allowed thousands of their brethren a degree of security and opportunity 
that was not afforded on the homeland. On the other, the arrival of the refugees had 
                                                        
homeland. She notes that in Miami, Cuban immigrants held mock elections for the future 
president of Cuba and started campaigns (i.e., El Primero en Regresar [The first to 
return]. It was in this environment that la causa (the cause) was also cemented into the 
identity of Cubans living in America and even some U.S. political advocates, including 
the CIA. Perez also talks about the ‘exile ideology’ that defines Cubans in Miami. She 
defines the ideology by four principles and interrelated characteristics that include: (1) 
The primacy of issues and concerns that deal with the political status of the homeland, (2) 
Uncompromising struggle against and hostility toward the current Cuban government, (3) 
Lack of debate allowed about the “exile” ideology within the community, (4) 
Overwhelming support for the Republican party among Cubans in Miami. For additional 
discussion of the Cuban exile experience in the United States see also Aviva Chomsky 
(2011), A History of the Cuban Revolution. 
  
6In April 1980 in response to an unprecedented act of collective defiance, Fidel Castro 
declared that the Port of Mariel, located twenty-five miles west of Havana, open to any 
Cuban wishing to leave so long as (s)he had someone to pick him up. The Castro 
regime’s decision led to a mass exodus of Cubans that lasted over four months. By the 
time Castro closed the port to those wishing to leave over 125,000 Cubans arrived to the 
US.   
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alleviated the kind of momentum that could have led to monumental changes in Cuban 
political life. They believed that with tens of thousands of disenchanted Cubans now gone 
from the island, the likelihood that the Castro regime would implement favorable changes 
– or possibly even experience its downfall – was greatly reduced.  
Calls to start the organization became stronger as political dialogues on Mariel 
continued in Washington. CCANE founders believed that Washington lawmakers failed 
to take into account important factors about ongoing struggles in Cuba that they believed 
were brought on by the nation’s oppressive government and the absence of vital social 
institutions. The founders of the organization thought that the political conditions that 
motivated the mass exodus of the Marieletos were reminiscent of their own experiences 
in Cuba. They felt that the same set of political circumstances that caused their 
emigration, also caused the outmigration of the Marieletos. They also believed that 
addressing the issues that promoted exodus required different interventions than those 
being put forth by political actors in Washington. CCANE founders felt that while the 
situation of the exile community was included in public dialogues, political wisdoms in 
Washington did not acknowledge the story of Cuban emigration from the point of view of 
the exile.  
Despite their contribution to Miami’s economic and social landscape, and the 
emergence of a dominant mindset on Cuba, Cubans living in South Florida remained 
largely absent from local, state and national political arenas. In the early 1970s less than 
20% of the Cuban population in Miami was United States citizens. Cubans in South 
Florida also held no local political office (Croucher 1997, p.133). But by the end of the 
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decade and through the 1980s, a powerful Cuban political bloc emerged that proved 
capable of demonstrating important effects on Miami’s industry, and its political 
practices. The political power Cubans eventually attained in Miami’s political landscape 
is reflected in the city’s decision in 1992 to prohibit Dade County from awarding a 
contract to any U.S. corporation whose foreign subsidiaries traded with Cuba for instance 
(Croucher, p. 112). The clout that Cubans attained in business and industry, along with 
the group’s growing political power, provided a backdrop for CCANE to work on behalf 
of the city’s growing exile community. Acknowledging the group’s initial period of 
political abstinence, during an interview Alfonso stated: 
Alfonso: But then suddenly we started to realize that there was something 
missing. And that was that we were not having a real impact in both in our 
community and also with our concern toward the situation in Cuba. And perhaps a 
watershed of that was the Mariel Boatlift. Cause in the Mariel Boatlift we saw 
that … again that decisions were made that didn’t make sense whatsoever. 
 
CJ: Decisions on this [U.S.] side and that side [Cuba]? 
 
Alfonso: Yeah. Specifically on this side. On the United States side. We knew 
what Castro was trying to do. We understood very well … But then we saw that 
again the United States was making a lot of mistakes – the same mistakes that had 
been done before during the invasion – [clarifying] The Bay of Pigs Invasion – 
and the [Missile] Crisis and all these times. 
 
CJ: Well what did they do specifically with Mariel that was … that you all felt 
was inadequate? 
 
Alfonso: Well the response to it… the response to Fidel Castro was not only 
inadequate but totally wrong. Uh, Carter at that time said that uh … I will open 
the arms and receive everybody that wants to come in. And that was the message. 
And that was totally wrong message for Fidel Castro because Fidel Castro – that 
was exactly what he wanted. He wanted to use that escape for the pressure … for 
the pressure valve. For the pressure that was building inside the island. … Of 
course. So we [thought] this is not what you should be doing. We realize[d] that 
uh … a million people [were] going to come, or 2 million people [were] going to 
come. But we also realize that Fidel Castro was going to use it as propaganda. 
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And also to try to destroy the image of the exile community in the... because we 
had been very successful economically and professionally. And all of that. But not 
as um… in political terms. So at that point we recognized that even if our station 
in the United States was not going to be a permanent thing – it was going to take a 
long, long time to really change things back in Cuba and therefore we better look 
at how to try to gain some political power so we could be a part of the decision 
making and the solutions because they were going to affect us directly. 
 
From Alfonso’s point of view the Carter Administration’s decision on Mariel was another 
bad decision in a series of inadequate responses Washington had to Cuba. Alfonso 
suggests that CCANE believed Carter and other U.S. lawmakers failed to recognize the 
effects an open door policy could have on Cuba. Allowing the Marieletos to come to the 
United States ended growing political pressure that could have introduced real political 
changes in Cuba. The political decision that allowed the Marieletos to stay, and others 
that preceded it, meant prolonging the exile community’s temporary exodus from their 
homeland.  
Alfonso’s comments also suggest that CCANE’s founding coincided with a 
general trend that found the Cuban exile community taking greater interest in American 
politics. His comments indicate that Cuban exiles could harness their growing economic 
power and status in ways that could support their interests through political participation.  
 In 1981, in an effort to have a voice in Washington and to build partnerships with 
lawmakers, the organization began lobbying on its own behalf. Early on in its political 
work, CCANE found common ground with Reagan-era Republicans.7 Although the 
                                                        
7 Perez (1997) Perez notes that the 1980s saw an increase in the number of Cubans 
becoming US citizens and registering to vote. She argues that the insinuation of Cubans 
into electoral politics in this way did not signal their abandonment of exile politics. 
Rather it acknowledged shared political visioning on matters of foreign policy that were 
being put forward by the Republican Party – especially Ronald Reagan. She writes that, 
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Republican Party’s strict anti-communism viewpoint resonated in CCANE, the steps each 
group thought necessary to alleviate the situation in Cuba differed greatly. For instance, 
CCANE viewed the Cuban embargo as an important mechanism that effectively reduced 
the power of the Cuban government. In their opinion, prohibiting any form of trade with 
Cuba pressured the Castro regime into adopting more democratic laws and policies. But 
by end of the 1980s, some congressional lawmakers were proposing new legislation that 
would significantly loosen the existing regulations. As CCANE saw it, the chasm 
separating Washington and Havana could not be sufficiently evaluated and acted upon 
without intervention from the exile community.  
In an interview Alfonso explained the organization’s objectives in its inaugural 
years. He recalled that in the years preceding the formation of the organization how he 
and others in the exile community – many of whom were founding members of CCANE 
– discussed the best way to proceed. According to Alfonso, one of the things they 
realized was that they didn’t know “how the system worked”: 
Alfonso: At the beginning we didn’t know. The only … understanding of the 
system that we had is the American movies we were used to seeing ... would 
portray. Which was completely different … totally different from the reality 
[laughing a little at the comparison] so this is what created a sort of … virtual 
reality for us. And we were playing without knowing really what exactly where to 
move … So out of that … came out the conception that we have get out of the 
ghetto! We have to project ourselves outside this … relationship that we have 
established within Miami in which we think that by talking on the radio to 
ourselves and doing all these things – we are going to change things. NO! So the 
conception that in order to be effective we had to have political power …We have 
                                                        
“The ideology of the Republican candidate on foreign policy was appealing to many 
Cubans, and this ideology caused Cuban exiles to register and vote in the United States. 
Participation in the U.S. political system, therefore, is not necessarily an abandonment of 
the concern with the political status of the homeland, but may actually be an extension of 
those exile concerns (p. 102).”  
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to get out of the ghetto… We need to actually convert that into something very 
palpable. 
 
Thus, as Alfonso and other founding members of CCANE saw it, political involvement 
was the most effective way of making their voice heard. Effective political action meant 
supplementing local work that had been in progress for years in Miami with work that 
brought their message to a broader audience that included federal lawmakers.  
CCANE felt that in order to have the voice of the Cuban exile community heard, 
it needed to leverage the political relationships they nurtured to gain entry into the 
political arena in Washington. So in 1981, the Coalition for Free and Democratic Cuba 
(CFDC), a CCANE affiliated Political Action Committee (PAC), was established. CFDC, 
whose members worked directly from Washington, provided CCANE with an outlet to 
distribute research it had collected on Cuba to members of Congress.  
Throughout the 1980s, CCANE and its affiliated partners published a series of 
books that made the case for their position on Cuba and U.S. foreign policy on Cuba. By 
doing so they hoped to leverage enough support to bring about political and economic 
change in Cuba that allowed for the return of the exile community, and the creation of 
viable opportunities for those who remained on the island. 
The organization had two primary objectives. The first objective was to 
demonstrate an impact on the Cuban government. Through organizational work CCANE 
intended to provide a strategic response to what it saw as an oppressive system of 
government in Cuba. The organization wanted to challenge the current political regime 
and introduce the possibility for a new democratic government. The organization 
intended to make known to people outside the Cuban community the repercussions that 
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inadequate government and non-existent civil institutions had on Cubans. Organizational 
actors intended to explain how Cuba’s oppressive government prevented Cubans who 
were living on the island from benefitting from the virtues of a true democracy. 
The second objective, which was indirectly related to the first, was to demonstrate 
an impact on the American popular imaginary about Cuba. The island nation’s ongoing 
association with communism promoted a storyline that was antithetical to American 
values and beliefs. CCANE wanted to combat this conception by describing how Cuba 
actually shared values and beliefs with America, but that achieving those goals had been 
interrupted by an inadequate and oppressive government. By garnering support for both 
objectives, CCANE hoped to change conditions on the island in ways that benefitted 
people living there and Cubans who were living in exile in the United States.   
By the early 1990s relationships the organization built in Washington seemed to 
aid the achievement of the first goal. CCANE and the CFDC participated in dialogues 
that led to the implementation of two new laws, which strengthened the power of the 
embargo. The first law, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, supported CCANEs efforts 
by prohibiting foreign-based subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba. The 
law also prohibited United States citizens from traveling to Cuba and made illegal the 
transfer of family remittances to Cuba. The second law, the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, 
placed further restrictions on trade with Cuba by extending the embargo to apply to 
foreign countries that had trade agreements with Cuba.     
CCANE also wanted to convince lawmakers that providing Cubans living on the 
island with information that was not filtered by the state’s government was an important 
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step in realizing a free and democratic Cuba. In 1981, the organization proposed to 
establish a South Florida-based radio broadcast to Cuba. Similar to the intentions of 
Radio Free Europe, the proposed station would give Cubans in Cuba access to news and 
information that was not government-sponsored. 
CCANE and the CFDC gained the support of a number of lawmakers including 
Senators Jesse Helms of North Carolina and Paula Hawkins of Florida, who regarded the 
radio station as “an important foreign policy initiative.” In a speech to Congress Assistant 
Secretary of State Thomas Enders noted the proposed station would “give Cubans the 
means they now lack to know what kind of society has been imposed on them; to have a 
source of news that is not manipulated by the state; to find out what is really happening in 
their country…” In August 1981, only seven months after the founding of CCANE and 
its partnered affiliates, the House voted to authorize the new radio station. By September 
the Senate had also approved the bill.  
CCANE’s second objective involved explaining how the persistence of the 
Cuba’s current system of government precluded the nation from claiming its rightful 
membership in economic projects that were underway in the U.S. and other Western 
nations. According to CCANE, Fidel Castro’s regime was the primary reason Cubans 
living in Cuba continued to experience debilitating economic and social conditions there. 
The nation’s system of government was also the reason that kept those in its diaspora 
from returning so that they might contribute to the nation’s growth and success. 
According to CCANE, Castro’s “totalitarian regime” was the reason twenty percent of 
Cubans were living outside of Cuba by the 1990s.  
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The political momentum of the day and the prevailing economic sentiment that 
supported it were reflected in publications the organization distributed in Washington. 
For instance, a mission statement published in 1992 asserted that:   
… the vision of a nation based on human freedom and participatory democracy 
within a free-market environment capable of achieving for all of the Cuban people 
the prosperity that Castro has denied them for 33 years…Those of us in exile must 
promote peaceful change in Cuba by gaining consensus among Cuban exiles and 
international leaders in favor of isolating Castro’s repressive regime and 
delivering a message of hope to Cubans on the island for a peaceful transition to a 
new era of democracy, prosperity and self-determination. (CCANE) 
 
Similarly, another document indicated that the key to assuring growth in a post-Castro 
Cuba involved,   
Liberalizing the economies by opening trade and market opportunities. This 
means allowing competitive market prices to prevail in the economy and 
permitting the formation and operation of new enterprises. Growth typically 
comes through expansion of the private sector and reform and significant 
privatization of state enterprises. (CCANE)  
 
CCANE’s messages on economic participation and those that invoke membership in a 
larger democratic collective were read during a time when Cold War antagonisms were 
heightened and when the nation’s political economy was changing to accommodate the 
goals of Reaganomics and neoliberal policies, more generally. That CCANE’s goals 
coincided with those of the Republican president and many of the nation’s lawmakers 
gave the organization momentum to achieve its objective of creating a democratic society 
in Cuba.  
CCANE’s work in Washington during the 1980s and early part of the 1990s 
unfolded in a political environment that was capable of supporting many of the 
organization’s goals. CCANE’s stance against communism and its intention to bring 
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democracy (i.e., the Free Market) to Cuba reflected presiding political and economic 
ideologies in Washington. Sharing political views and conceding common interests 
allowed CCANE to enter into dialogues with powerful political actors. Within this 
advantageous context, CCANE became a site where the interests of Cuban exiles could 
be pursued. 
The end of the Cold War seemed to bring about new political understandings of 
Cuba. The elimination of the communist threat after 1991, along with the introduction of 
a new enemy in the form of Islamic radicalism, seemed to render discussions on U.S.-
Cuba relations to the political background. Beyond these apparent shifts in political 
attention, a new dialogue on the issue of immigration was also emerging. The dialogue 
sparked public debates that seemed to question the viability of immigration as a vehicle 
for incorporation for some groups, especially immigrants from Latin America.  
The forums on Latin American immigration to the United States were not forums 
CCANE actively participated in. After all, the organization’s focus was never upon 
gaining political favor to come to the U.S. CCANE was committed was to instigating a 
politics of return. Dialogues on immigration that were emerging in the late 1990s were 
engaging different histories and experiences than those that informed Cuban exiles in 
Miami. The Latin American groups that were seeking access to the United States, 
especially Mexicans, did not share Cubans experience of exile. Similarly, Cubans did not 
share the economic experiences that resulted from the introduction of NAFTA, which 
some analysts reasoned to be the driving force behind outmigration from Mexico (see 
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Fernandez-Kelly and Massey 2007). Additionally, Cubans had never been subjected to 
the intense scrutiny that ‘illegal’ aliens were experiencing.  
Changes in the political climate coincided with changes in CCANE’s strategies. 
Instead of using American politics to bring about a democracy in Cuba, CCANE began 
supporting the efforts of grassroots activists in Cuba. The change in strategy was 
reflected in programming implemented on Freedom Radio, the Miami-based radio station 
that broadcast to Cuba, as well as other island-based initiatives the organization supports.  
Since 1982 Freedom Radio has successfully aired daily broadcasts from Miami.  
However, CCANE actors maintain that how Freedom Radio has served the organization’s 
mission changed over the years. While initially the station primarily served as a means to 
provide Cubans on the island with information that did not come from the government, 
over the years it has moved toward providing dissidents in Cuba with a way to publically 
promote their activism.  
According to actors in CCANE, more recently, the station has also provided 
people with a means of describing everyday experiences that contradict the opinion of the 
Cuban government. As activism on the island has increased, Freedom Radio has become 
a place where dissidents can discuss their ongoing efforts and perhaps gain support from 
others on the island.  
Armando, CCANE’s human rights director, came to the United States in 1992 as 
a political dissident. His arrival marked the end to a seemingly infinite number of arrests 
and detentions in Cuban jails for speaking against the government and organizing around 
ongoing human rights violations on the island. Armando, an Afro-Cuban in his early 50s, 
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was one of the founding members of a human rights movement that started in Cuba in 
1988.  The movement he and others led then coincided with sanctions the United Nations 
initiated against Cuba in 1988. 
His work with the movement was informed by his own experiences growing up in 
Havana, especially during his time at university in the 1970s. He described the 
environment at the University of Havana where he attended school as “politically charged 
and repressive.” His work with the human rights movement in Cuba sought to rectify 
what he considered fundamental violations of human rights in Cuba, including being 
denied the right to free speech, and rights associated with freedom of movement and 
residence within the borders of each state.  According to Armando, the absence of these 
and other essential human rights shaped all aspects of life in Cuba then, and they continue 
to create a culture of fear on the island. For example, during an interview with me 
Armando explained how today university students run the risk of being expelled if they 
express ideas that contradict those of the Cuban government. He also contended that 
receiving approval for travel in and out of Cuba is almost impossible for most Cubans. 
According to Armando, having unregulated access to internet is unlikely. Armando 
described how this image of Cuba contrasts with other conceptions that imply Cuban 
society is defined by far less restrictive laws and practices. Armando explained that the 
broadcasts that focus upon Cuban politics often feature interviews with dissidents on the 
island. He stated that the interviews served the purpose of conveying information about 
activist’s efforts to listeners in Cuba.  
Armando: And it is a powerful vehicle I’ll just say. Probably most of the 
dissidents that are alive right now – like [names a CCANE employee] said, they 
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all, even myself – relied [on] the assistance of [Freedom Radio]. Because it 
changed the whole game, you know? People outside Cuba knew about the 
dissidents. People inside Cuba knew about the dissidents… it was a powerful 
vehicle to demonstrate what was going on inside of Cuba… And we know that 
that show is being heard by a lot of people in Cuba because a lot of dissidents 
always call [and say] I want to be on the show because we know that people are 
listening. So we want people in Cuba to listen.    
 
Armando’s comments suggest that Freedom Radio is a site where the common efforts of 
Cuban exiles in Miami and activists on the island merge. As a medium of 
communication, the radio station can facilitate an exchange of dialogue and information 
each feels to be important in bringing about changes in political life in Cuba.  
 CCANE has also been instrumental in supporting the efforts of Cuba-based 
organizations that engage in non-violent opposition to the government. One of the most 
public organizations they support is Women for Peace in Cuba. Women for Peace in 
Cuba is an organization of Cuban women of diverse backgrounds who are relatives of 
political prisoners in Cuba. The women began their protest of what they saw as unjust 
incarcerations of dissidents in Cuba by gathering together for mass, dressed in white to 
symbolize their solidarity with jailed family members. Over time, the group’s protest has 
expanded to include more public displays of peaceful protest, where they request the 
release of people who have been incarcerated for political reasons.   
During an informal interview, Caridad, age 69, described the work the 
organization has done in Cuba over the last ten years. Caridad is an Afro-Cuban who 
arrived to the U.S. as a political refugee in 2007. Before coming to Miami, Caridad spent 
over twenty years fighting against the Castro regime. She has been jailed numerous times 
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for her political work. She was even separated from her children for over twenty years as 
a consequence of speaking out as a counterrevolutionary.  
During the interview she first described how her life changed after Castro 
assumed power. According to Caridad, before Castro, life in Cuba was a ‘paradise.’ She 
described how her father was able to own and operate a small grocery store and she was 
able to attend private school. Acknowledging her middle-class status, Caridad notes that 
even most poor children had similar opportunities.  
Caridad: I was 17 when Castro got to power. [Before that] our life was good, with 
certain limitations. We were an underdeveloped country. We were just starting 
about after about 50 years of independence… from my point of view, Cuba was a 
paradise because I never had any problems. 
 
So for Caridad, although Cuban society may not have been egalitarian it provided people 
with enough opportunities to achieve a problem-free life – a life where one’s daily needs 
could be met. Her account suggests that after Castro came to power, everyday life in 
Cuba changed. She recalled how Castro began to “govern by force.” For instance, 
Caridad notes that going to mass became problematic because Castro condemned it.  
More broadly, Caridad adds that the regime changed the way people interacted 
with each other. Before Castro came to power, she explained the most important thing 
one could do in a community was to be “honest and decent.” It didn’t matter if someone 
was black or white, or if they were wealthy or poor. After Castro came to power 
however, the differences that ostensibly separated them socially – economic and racial 
differences in particular – created palpable divisions between families and neighbors. 
Caridad, a member of Women for Peace in Cuba, explained that the power of 
organization lies in its ability to put a public face on the wrongful incarcerations that 
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continue to occur in Cuba. The group’s first public event came on the anniversary of what 
she referred to as Black Spring in 2004. One year prior the State Security Police sent 
seventy-five dissidents to prison. Their detentions occurred over a three day period in 
2003. On the anniversary of the incarcerations in 2004 Women for Peace in Cuba 
planned activities to voice their disapproval of the government. On the last day they 
planned a public march that was to end at the Cuban National Assembly (the Parliament). 
Upon arriving at the Assembly the women presented a state official with a letter 
demanding the release of the seventy-five dissidents who had been incarcerated a year 
before. Caridad remarked that the most important thing was not the petition itself, but the 
people on the streets seeing those ladies – Women for Peace in Cuba – walking in the 
street, going to the National Assembly shouting for the freedom of their relatives.  
Esteban also offered his impressions of Women for Peace in Cuba: 
Esteban: Because I believe they’re doing a great job. When their husbands were in 
jail they stood very regularly and go to church every Sunday with flowers in their 
hand – dressed in white. And that created an image of … of a non-violent 
movement. They’re even winners of the Sakharov award and others because they 
kept … And now that most of their husbands are out of the country or out in the 
street, they remain a powerful message. They send a powerful message. Because 
now they’re doing it for the rest of the people, you know? They [are] doing 
protest.  
 
Since 2004, the women in the organization hold regular public protest in opposition to the 
Cuban government. CCANE works directly with Women for Peace in Cuba, mostly by 
providing the group with resources and logistical support that enable them to continue 
their activism in Cuba.  
Esteban also described another activist initiative CCANE supports in Cuba. The 
initiative seeks to address what actors in Cuba understood to be bad economic policy. 
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The grassroots movement challenges the established monetary system that uses two 
different kinds of currencies: CUCs and CUPs. CUCs refer to the ‘convertible peso’. It is 
the currency used by tourists and elite members of Cuban society. The CUP is the Cuban 
peso. The CUP is the currency that workers are paid in but holds less monetary value in 
Cuba. CUCs are a rough equivalent of a US dollar, while CUPs are worth $.24 to every 
U.S. dollar (or CUC). And while CUCs are almost universally accepted everywhere in 
Cuba, CUPs are not. For instance, if an average Cuban worker intends to patronize a 
restaurant in Cuba, (s)he must plan to pay in CUC’s. The requirement to pay in CUC’s 
means converting the monies in their possession, which is not an equitable transaction. 
The difference in the conversion rates means that the costs for many good and services in 
Cuba are prohibitive for the average person.8 Describing how CCANE supports the 
grassroots effort that seeks to address this disparity Esteban explained:  
Esteban: [We support] any activist or organization that proves themselves to play 
a role [in bringing about democracy] …We’re trying to create a culture of non-
violence through training. We have sent people inside Cuba for training. And 
there are others that come out of Cuba and spend a few weeks outside [of Cuba] 
[by] invitation. And they get trained out of the United States in non-violent 
programs. They want changes [in Cuba]. They want changes and to create a civil 
society. And eventually [to have] different parties and have elections. That’s their 
goal. 
 
                                                        
8 Public dialogues on this issue are ongoing. See http://voxxi.com/2014/03/06/cuba-dual-
currency-system/ 
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/opinion/2014/03/03/opinion-even-all-dolled-up-two-
faces-cuba-are-all-too-easy-to-see/ 
http://www.tripadvisor.ca/Travel-g147270-
c109329/Cuba:Caribbean:Money.Exchange.html 
http://thecubaneconomy.com/articles/tag/monetary-system/ 
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For CCANE, the movement to support emerging movements in Cuba meant bringing 
about a civil society that provided the protections and benefits of democracy. Despite the 
fact that they remained ‘in their station’ in American society, the goal was to remedy 
those conditions that encouraged out-migration by directly intervening in social and 
political life in Cuba. Referring directly to the movement to alleviate the inequitable 
monetary system Esteban stated: 
  Esteban: It’s a program that we sponsor. Because they [the Cuban government] 
have different currencies in Cuba, you know. They pay the street guy with Cuban 
pesos – which ain’t worth nothing.  
 
CJ: They have to pay a higher rate [to convert to the other currency]? 
 
Esteban: (Nodding in response) That creates an upper height of standards you 
know. So we supported a program in Cuba that was very successful in which the 
people were – let’s say they go to a restaurant and after they get the bill they will 
pay in pesos. And they say [at the restaurant], “No, no, no, no … here you have to 
pay in hard currency.” 
 
CJ: That’s the CUC?  
 
Esteban: (Nodding affirmatively to my question) [continuing his example as 
though the restaurant customer is responding to the restaurateur’s request] “No, 
no, no. I get paid in pesos. That’s the currency that I get paid.” And that started… 
The government was actually forced to accept … uh, to create some restaurants 
that will take pesos. Because it has nothing to do with politics, got it? It’s 
something that affects my [referring to the average Cuban] personal life.  
 
Esteban’s comment regarding the ‘upper height of standards’ implies that a two-tiered 
system exist in Cuba that effectively disadvantages average Cuban citizens. Esteban also 
suggests that the program is aimed at delivering an impact upon everyday life in Cuba as 
opposed to its political order. By supporting the movement to address the discrepancy in 
the country’s monetary system, CCANE can make an impact that affects the lives of 
Cubans directly. The support CCANE provides to Women for Peace in Cuba is another 
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example of the ways that the organizational efforts of Cuban exiles in Miami and activists 
on the island merge.  
Conclusion 
 
Organizational action in the ICBA focused upon resolving local crises that 
prevented Iraqi Christian business owners from participating in Detroit’s economy. 
CCANE’s actions were not concerned with addressing experiences of inequality that 
were unfolding in Miami. Instead, the organization focused upon resolving crises of 
democracy and oppression that occurred in Cuba.  
In the early years of its’ founding, CCANE wanted to address what it saw as 
Cuba’s failure to establish a civil society by working with U.S lawmakers. By doing so, it 
hoped to create conditions that allowed Cubans in the exile community to return to their 
homeland. This work was occurring at a time when Washington actors understood Cuba 
as an ally of the Soviet Union and when the political and cultural assumption of 
permanent migration of Cubans to the United States was reflected in laws and policies.  
In order to gain support for its organizational aims, CCANE advanced different 
understandings about Cuba and its people. The organization pointed to the arrival of the 
Mariel refugees to explain how poor conditions in Cuba continued to promote 
involuntary opposed to voluntary immigration. The organization also challenged Cuba’s 
association with the Soviet Union by describing it as a nation that shared the same values 
for freedom and the same commitment to expanding the free market. The introduction of 
these alternate storylines created political opportunities to address experiences of 
inequality in Cuba. During the 1980s and the 1990s, the organization was successful at 
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working with U.S. lawmakers in ways it felt put more pressure on the Cuban government 
to adopt democratic laws and policies.   
Changing political conditions in the United States coincided with new efforts that 
involved CCANE collaborating with grassroots activists in Cuba. At that time, instead of 
explaining experiences of as a failure of democracy, a storyline of shared oppression 
emerged between activists in Cuba and CCANE. The new storyline encouraged 
grassroots activists to understand CCANE as fellow Cubans engaged in the same struggle 
for political freedom, and not as American immigrants detached from their experience.  
In chapters two and three I described the forums each organization participates in, 
and how organizational work provided both groups with a means of mediating experience 
of inequality. In the following two chapters, I consider the rhetorical strategies the UICC, 
ICBA and CCANE employ to achieve their organizational aims. I describe how the 
notions of ethnic authenticity become organizational logic, and how social 
understandings about each group are affirmed in the identity claims that are made 
through organizational work.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESOLVING CHALLENGES TO INCORPORATION THROUGH 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL RHETORIC IN THE UICC AND ICBA 
Snap Judgment is a weekly broadcast aired on National Public Radio. Each 
broadcast, the show’s host, Glynn Washington, guides his audience on a journey that 
provokes consideration of an issue of social importance through storytelling. Throughout 
the show storytellers from diverse backgrounds captivate listeners, drawing the audience 
further and further into their lives by artfully conveying their personal experiences. The 
ways in which the show’s contributors, seemingly with little effort at all, weave powerful 
and sometimes painful life experiences into tellable tales to be shared, intrigues listeners. 
The stories temporarily transport them into lives that are not their own. On the show, 
spoken words seek to persuade (or dissuade) the audience, compelling them to 
understand or have empathy or enthusiasm. For some listeners, the stories may even alter 
opinions or fundamental understandings of social issues that confront us as a society.  
Without fail, Washington opens the show with a story of his own. On a 2012 
edition entitled “Toxic,” which informed listeners of the ways toxins impacted the lives 
of others, he began the broadcast by offering a story from his youth.1 The story was 
simple, witty and profound at the same time. It was the tale of his first fishing excursion
                                                        
1 A link to this broadcast (episode: Toxic – Snap #222) can be found at 
http://snapjudgment.org/radio-show.   
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with his grandfather. He began the story by recalling how he anticipated the trip, hoping 
that it would be the kind of outing he’d seen on television or read about in books, despite 
the fact that the trip was to take place in his hometown of Detroit, on the Detroit River – a 
less than idyllic site according to Washington. The trip did not disappoint, however. 
Through evocative imagery and dialogue he recalled his “first catch,” what to a child 
seemed to be a catfish sure to impress any experienced angler. He described the great 
sense of accomplishment he had after pulling the fish from the waters. In the same 
youthful exuberance he recounted how he then suggested to his grandfather that the fish 
would make a fine meal for them later that day. To his surprise, however, this suggestion 
was met with the grandfather’s strong opposition. “Boy! What you talkin’ ‘bout?! We 
ain’t eatin’ this fish!” The grandfather’s sobering explanation continued, “Boy that fish 
came out the D’troit River. That fish for the catchin’, not for the eatin’. ”At this point in 
the story Washington describes how the grandfather unceremoniously unhooked the fish 
and then to his horror and disappointment, cast it back into the water. He goes on to tell 
how the excursion ended. He notes how, upon returning to shore, he sees a man 
barbequing a catfish – the same kind of catfish he had been ordered to cast overboard. In 
an effort to plead his case, perhaps for the future, Washington drew his grandfather’s 
attention to the man, “See Granddaddy. Look!” The man overhearing the ensuing 
discussion calmly replied, “Eh, you gonna die of something. Ima die from barbequed 
catfish.”  
The story is important to the show for a couple of reasons. Most generally, it does 
a good job of investing listeners. It effectively orients them to the topic of discussion in a 
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humorous and entertaining way. But perhaps more importantly the story is pertinent 
because of what it contains: commentary on a larger cultural and social narrative on 
biohazards and their risk to health safety. In other words, the story is relevant (and 
perhaps humorous) as it relates to larger social processes. The grandfather’s reaction to 
Washington’s efforts reveals his location in a cultural discourse. It explains how social 
actions, like those that increase biohazards in the atmosphere, inform his practices and his 
ideological points of view.   
In chapters four and five, I consider the rhetorical strategies the UICC and 
CCANE employ in pursuit of their organizational goals. I describe how these strategies 
allow each group to gain cultural citizenship in American society, and institutional 
belonging in the forums where organizational work occurs by engaging accepted political 
and social wisdoms. I argue that the more each organization participates in a series of 
“emplotted stories” (Somers and Gibson 1994), the more incorporated each becomes in 
the American mainstream and institutional spaces that have excluded them historically. In 
chapter four I begin by discussing the organizational work the UICC and ICBA 
conducted in response to a series of crises that impacted Iraqi Christians living in Detroit 
beginning in the early 1980s. I describe the rhetorical strategies the organization 
employed during these times, and how the strategies allowed the organizations to achieve 
their imperatives.  
Crises of Migration and Politics 
 
In September 1980 Iraqi forces, led by the nation’s Ba’athist President, Saddam 
Hussein invaded Iran. The attack was motivated by a number of factors including 
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guarding against the potential insurrection of the Iraq’s Shi’a majority, and assuring 
control over the Shatt Al-Arab waterway.2 It started a war that was ultimately brought to 
an end by a Unite Nations-brokered ceasefire in 1988. But the end of the war would come 
at the cost of over a half million Iraqi and Iranian soldier and civilian lives.  
The political, social and economic upheavals brought on by the eight-year long 
war caused Iraqi Christians living in the Detroit to have concern for local Christians in 
Iraq. Historically, conflict made religious minority groups in Iraqi society vulnerable to 
social reprisals, including the possibility of death.3 The unfavorable environment in Iraq 
motivated Iraqi Christians living in Detroit – including religious and business leaders in 
the community – to take action. The founding of the UICC in 1981 was evidence of the 
group’s intention to address the needs of their counterparts who remained in their war-
torn homeland.  
During the earliest years of the UICC’s founding, the main goal was to assist 
Christians living in Iraq who were displaced or otherwise made vulnerable by the Iran-
Iraq War. The organization provided them with safe passage to American society – or 
Detroit more specifically. The UICC aimed to provide Iraqi Christians living in Detroit 
                                                        
2 The Shatt Al-Arab waterway maintains importance in Iraq because it is the nation’s 
only thoroughfare to the sea. Iraq claims the waterway on one side. Iran claims the 
waterway on the other. The degree of contestation of the waterway is even reflected in its 
naming. Iraqis call the waterway Shatt Al-Arab. Iranians call the waterway Arvand Roud.  
 
3 For instance, after the Gulf War ended in 1991, The New York Times reported that large 
numbers of Christians in Iraq wished to immigrate to other countries, including the 
United States. The article describes how Christians are characterized as “disloyal” to Iraq. 
The article reports that many [non-Christian] Iraqis accuse Christians of identifying with 
American-led coalition forces. In this environment discrimination against local Christians 
increased.   
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with valuable assistance coordinating family-based migration. Instead of negotiating 
United States and Iraqi immigration policy on their own, the organization provided 
families with a centralized and formal means of completing visa applications that were 
filed on behalf of family members living in Iraq. Increasing instability in Iraq that was 
brought on by subsequent wars – including the Invasion of Kuwait (1990-1991) and 
Operation Desert Storm (1991) – encouraged more organizational action through the 
1990s.  
However, the work the organization conducted through the 1990s paled in 
comparison to the challenges it and Detroit’s Iraqi Christian community would face in 
2003 when the War in Iraq (i.e., the War on Terror) began. The war caused 
unprecedented disruptions to everyday life for all Iraqis in Iraq. But the presence of 
American coalition forces, along with the toppling of the Hussein regime, seemed to 
impact Iraqi Christians living in Iraq in particularly unfavorable ways.4 The absence of a 
national government helped to create an environment that aggravated tensions between 
Sunnis and Shi’as living in Iraq. Sectarian and nation-state instability also introduced 
more opportunities for violence to be perpetuated against minority groups, who were 
made to be scapegoats in campaigns that wanted to bring about an Islamic state. Between 
2003 and 2009 attacks against Christians in Iraq increased in number and scope. The 
                                                        
4 An archival review of several newspapers, such as the Chicago Tribune, New York 
Times, and Christian Science Monitor found over sixty articles detailing disproportionate 
rates of discrimination and violence leveled at local Christians in Iraq between 2002 and 
2012. 
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relentlessness of the attacks against Christians led many to the conclusion that the only 
real option they had was to leave Iraq.  
The exodus of Christians out of Iraq was a rallying call for the UICC back in 
Detroit. While advocating on the behalf of Christians wishing to leave Iraq was nothing 
new to the organization, the War in Iraq marked a shift in organizational efforts in two 
important ways. First of all, the increasing number of Christians wishing to leave Iraq 
challenged the organization’s established practice of specifically aiding in family-based 
immigration. While this type of advocacy remained an instrumental aspect of the 
organization’s work, the new circumstances in Iraq also required giving support to a 
broader contingency of the local Christian population in Iraq. The crisis also meant that 
the organization would serve less as a liaison between applicants, sponsors and 
immigration officials, and more as an advocate-at-large that sought to rectify human 
rights violations in Iraq.   
Authenticity as Organizational Logic 
The increasing need for immigration assistance and advocacy was occurring at a 
pivotal time in American society. The events of September 11th helped to create an 
environment of suspicion toward people of Middle Eastern background. After the attacks, 
people perceived as Middle Eastern were being associated with anti-Americanism and in 
the worst of cases, terrorism.  
This cultural understanding of Middle Easterners was evidenced in immigration 
policy. Soon after September 11th the possibility of immigration from some countries in 
the Middle East was halted or only allowed to occur on a limited basis and under narrow 
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specifications.5 At the same time the exodus of local Christians from Iraq was occurring 
at an unprecedented rate. The circumstances of the group’s departure from Iraq often 
meant seeking refuge in countries of first transit such as Syria, which ostensibly offered 
refugees a chance to negotiate the immigration process under more favorable conditions 
than in Iraq. Thus, after September 11th, the UICC’s work occurred in a culturally and 
politically contested environment in the U.S., and under less than ideal circumstances in 
countries outside of Iraq.   
The experiences local Christians had in Iraq after September 11th informed 
organizational action in the UICC. At that time, the organization’s primary objective was 
to resettle Iraqi Christian refugees in Detroit. To counter recent challenges to Middle 
Eastern immigration, the organization took the position that the refugee crisis was one 
experience in a longer series of experiences that distinguished Iraqi Christians from other 
groups in Iraq and the United States. To meet the goal of resettling displaced local 
Christians in Detroit, the UICC incorporated three aspects of the group’s history in Iraq 
into organizational rhetoric: its indigenous ties to the country; its foundational association 
to Christianity; and social differentiation of local Christians that resulted from living in a 
predominately Muslim society.  
Indigenous Ties to Iraq 
 
Because their presence Iraq dates back to as many as six thousand years ago to 
civilizations that preceded the formation of Iraqi nation-state, Iraqi Christians in the 
                                                        
5 See the Department of Homeland Security Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2004, 
Nonimmigrant Admissions tables at http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-
2004-1  
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UICC regard themselves as the “indigenous people of Iraq.”6 Indeed historians and 
archaeologists suggest that in the area that now constitutes northern Iraq, the ancestors of 
today’s Iraqi Christians created advanced societies that valued science, math and 
industry.7 For instance at the height of its greatness, the ancient city of Nineveh, regarded 
as the ancestral city for Iraqi Christians, boasted a population of 100,000 people and 
extraordinary castles and palaces. Even the city’s downfall, brought on by a battle with 
King Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon, allows Iraqi Christians to lay claim to some of the 
ancient world’s most remarkable accomplishments, including the Hanging Gardens of 
Babylon, early irrigation systems and astrology. This history is reflected in an interview 
with Lucas, a past director of the UICC: 
Lucas: … In the homeland itself ... in the ancestral land, [we] are the descendants 
of the first civilization in Mesopotamia – in the land of Mesopotamia (the land of 
Mesopotamia is the land between the two rivers)… [Our] ancestry goes back to 
about three to four thousand years before Christ. [Then we] were very, very active 
in science, in the trade business, merchandising, commerce issues and other stuff. 
And these are the guys who came up with The Hanging Gardens – which is 
considered one of the Seven Wonders [of] the [ancient] World.  
 
Aaron, a sales consultant at the ICBA, conveyed a similar history to me during an 
interview.   
Aaron: Well, we are considered Middle Eastern of course. [But] if you look at the 
history, we were around before anybody was around…We were part of the Cradle 
of Civilization, you know. Astronomy, math, all those laws – those are all derived 
                                                        
6 For instance, in the organization it was common for Iraqi Christians to compare their 
history to the plight of Native Americans in American society. Just as Native Americans 
suffered unjustifiable losses due to European encroachment, Iraqi Christians understood 
themselves to have suffered at the hands of groups that subsequently entered Iraq.   
 
7 For an expanded discussion of the history of Christians in Iraq, please see A. Leo 
Oppenheim’s (1964) Ancient Mesopotamia: Portrait of a Dead City; Jane McIntosh’s 
(2005) Ancient Mesopotamia: New Perspectives; and Georges Roux (1964) Ancient Iraq. 
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from Babylon. Babylon is the [Iraqi Christian ancestors]. You can read about the 
Babylonian kings and stuff like that. Hammurabi, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a 
tooth - that's where that came from. That's from Babylon.  
 
Continuing to describe the history of Christians in Iraq more contemporarily, Aaron 
explains: 
Aaron: Well the [Iraqi Christian ancestors] were conquered by the Persians, OK ... 
Cyrus the Great was his name. He's the king who conquered [them]. And there 
[were] other invasions. You know, there's constant invasions, invasions, 
invasion ... and then eventually um ... Iraq ... you know was invaded by the 
Ottomans. And they came in, and the Muslim conquest spread over. And then, I 
wanna say England came over and took over Iraq and modernized it. And they put 
a king in there. Not theirs, but an Arabic king. And you know, the [Iraqi 
Christians] were always there, but they were scattered around – mainly in the 
north. Babylon was in the south, but [Iraqi Christians] migrated to the north a 
little bit. So you have other people coming from other countries, migrating in our 
villages and becoming [Iraqi Christian] of sorts. 
 
The group’s association with ancient Mesopotamia is also chronicled on the ICBA’s 
website:  
[Iraqi Christians] are the indigenous people of Iraq who speak a form of Aramaic, 
the language spoken by Jesus Christ. Many also speak Arabic and English. [Iraqi 
Christians] are Eastern Rite Catholic, led by the Patriarch of Babylon and 
affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church but maintain their own separate 
Bishops and Dioceses. … The origins of the [Iraqi Christian] people of today are 
the descendants of the ancient Assyrian and Babylonian civilizations and the 
Aramean legacy of Mesopotamia. The contributions of Mesopotamia to the 
civilized world are well-documented. … After the fall of Persia to the Arabs, and 
Byzantium to the Turks, Islamic domination overtook the [Iraqi Christian] people 
and subjected them to periodic waves of persecutions and a new status as second-
class citizens, although the new conquerors also discovered early on the 
invaluable service the Christian ChaldoAssyrians rendered to society as artisans, 
physicians, merchants, scholars and tax collectors… (UICC website) 
 
History of Iraq that considers Mesopotamian civilizations stand in contrast to other 
accounts that emphasize the country’s role in the Arab World and its commitment to 
Islam. That Aaron, Lucas and others in the UICC and ICBA trace their ancestry to some 
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of the earliest known civilizations in the world, locates their collective experiences in 
dialogues on “the West” and progress. Invoking storylines that differ from more recent 
conceptions of Iraq may disassociate Iraqi Christians from ways of life that presumably 
contrast with Western beliefs and practices.  
Foundational Association to Christianity 
 
While alternate versions of Iraqi Christian history exist, there is organizational 
consensus that Iraqi Christians are intricately associated with the very beginnings of 
Christianity.8 According to actors in the UICC and the ICBA, the group’s association 
with Christianity extends to the days when the apostles of Jesus Christ proselytized to 
non-Christians. According to ethnic history, which continues to be passed on within the 
community through formal and informal oral history projects, it was the disciple Thomas 
who brought the group’s ancestors into Christianity from paganism. Aaron provided 
background on the group’s introduction to Christianity.  
Aaron: Our faith is one of one of the things that we hold true, you know. St. 
Thomas was our patron saint. St. Thomas the apostle – you know – Doubting 
Thomas, they call him. St. Thomas, he came to Babylon. And he had students 
who he taught, and those are our patron saints. 
 
According to organizational actors, the group’s early association to Christianity is also 
affirmed in some well-known stories in the Bible. For instance, Iraqi Christians I 
encountered discussed the group’s association to Abraham, a biblical character whose 
                                                        
8 Chaldean history as reported by St. Chaldean suggests that the group’s belief in God 
predates the arrival of Christ, while scholars like Attwater (1947) and Sengstock (1982) 
suggest that the group were pagans prior to being converted to Christianity by either the 
Apostle Paul or the Apostle Thomas during one of their missionary journeys.  
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story is chronicled in the book of Genesis, and to Lazarus, another biblical character 
whose story is chronicled in the book of John. Iraqi Christians, who are strict Eastern Rite 
Catholics, also claim a direct association between themselves and the biblical story of 
Jonah and the Whale. Also, while all Catholics (and some other Christian groups) 
observe Lent, Iraqi Christians additionally observe the Fast of Ba’utha. The Fast of 
Ba’utha is a devotional that is observed three weeks prior to the beginning of the Lenten 
season and is meant as a time of repentance. The fast is one example of how the identity 
of the group is intricately sewn within the tradition of Christianity. The devotion reflects 
upon the story of Jonah, whom Iraqi Christians understand to be one of their ancestors, 
and his refusal to ‘prophesy’ to the people of Nineveh. The devotion therefore takes into 
account the role they believe their ancestors play in revealing what is considered to be the 
redemptive power of God.9 
The group’s foundational association to Christianity is also revealed in their 
native language. They, like Jesus Christ, speak the Aramaic language. While some Iraqi 
Christians, especially those born in the United States, do not speak the language (or 
perhaps do not speak it fluently), the way in which the language defines the group’s 
ethnic history plays an important role in the community and in the organization more 
specifically. During an interview with me, Farah described the importance the language 
                                                        
9 According to the Book of Jonah, because Jonah disobeys God by choosing not to go to 
Nineveh he is cast into the sea only to be saved by being swallowed by a large whale sent 
by God. It is after this event that Jonah repents and carries out the will of God and goes to 
Nineveh to prophesize. The Fast of Ba’utha is a time where Iraqi Christians seek 
repentance for their own failings by fasting for three days (the same number of days 
Jonah spends in the belly of the whale).    
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has in the community. Farah, age 40, has been working for the ICBA for two years in the 
charitable division. She is largely responsible for providing case management services to 
clients who are receiving mental health services through the Chaldean Council on Health 
and Wellness (CCHW). Farah arrived to the U.S. from Baghdad ten years ago. Prior to 
emigrating, she completed college in Iraq and worked for several years as a banker.  
Farah: … always my parents stressed that we are a civilization of 7000 years old. 
You have to be proud of yourself. [Recounting the words of her parents] You 
should speak the language that Jesus Christ spoke. I always speak the language, 
even over the phone… My colleagues used to [say] when they hear the language 
(most of them didn't know what this language is) ... so they waited until I finished 
the call to ask me, “What you are speak[ing]? What language is that?” And I tell 
them, it's Aramaic and it's over 7000 years old. They say, “Can you read and write 
it?” It's amazing! So at that time I just open up and talk about our history...” 
 
Farah’s comments suggest that the historical connection the group maintains to the 
Aramaic language is a point of pride and a distinguishing feature that separates them 
from other Iraqis and even other Christians. The language’s intimate association with 
Christianity and Jesus Christ locate the group in a longer narrative of faith that defines 
the belief system of millions around the world. The language is also a tangible and 
objective link to people who are understood to have shaped the historical trajectory of 
Christianity. Thus, it is not just that language serves as a uniting socio-cultural element 
for this group of people, but it is a symbolic tie to a past that continues to be evoked 
today – even among those outside the group. The ways that Biblical history overlaps with 
Iraqi Christian history accomplishes important identity-work for the group. Associating 
their linguistic and religious traditions to the earliest days of Christianity reinforces the 
idea that Iraqi Christians are a distinct ethnic group.  
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Social Differentiation of Christians in Iraq (Experiences of Religious Persecution) 
 
While not all of the Christian population of Iraq is Catholic, the preponderance of 
the Christian population is.10 Since the early part of the twentieth century, the group’s ties 
to the Catholic Church have been reinforced by a number of social processes including 
the building of Catholic schools and churches, and Western political processes that 
established governmental protectorates, especially after WWI.11 According to the Iraqi 
Christians in the UICC and ICBA, these relationships created a two-tier social system 
that segregated local Christians from the Muslim majority, especially in work and 
                                                        
10 Andrea Pacini (1998) estimates the number of Christians in the Middle East at 8 to 11 
million people. She identifies eight Middle Eastern Christian groups: Assyrians, 
Armenians, Melkites, Maronites, Syrian Orthodox, Chaldean, Syrian Catholics, and 
Copts. According to Pacini, Assyrians constitute the largest group across the diaspora. 
The population of Christians in Iraq prior to the most recent refugee crisis is estimated 
between 500,000 and 1 million (Pacini 1998; Bailey and Bailey 2003). Chaldean 
Catholics make up more than two-thirds of all Christians in Iraq. Small populations of 
Syriac Catholics, Armenians and Melkites also reside in Iraq.   
 
11 For instance Betty Bailey and J. Martin Bailey (2003) suggest that social differences 
between Christians and Muslims in the Middle East are due in part to the political 
relationships Christian populations maintained under imperial rule historically. In the 
seventh century the protective but submissive status of dhimmi was afforded under 
Islamic rule. The group’s second-class status was maintained through the Crusades. The 
authors additionally note that it was the insinuation of Western Christianity that 
encouraged Muslims to begin associating local Christians with Western hostilities. While 
Christians maintained a subjugated status under the millet system introduced under the 
Ottoman Empire, emerging European commercial relationships in the Middle East sought 
protection for trading clients who were often Christian. The authors write that, “Different 
governments ‘protected’ different churches, which frequently tied Middle Eastern 
churches to European political centers and feuds (p. 140).” They additionally argue that 
while Christians have historically maintained a relatively comfortable economic status 
and are permitted to practice their religion in Iraqi society, the state’s political system, 
which is dominated by Muslims, largely prohibits Christian participation. These factors, 
along with local Christian’s association with the Catholic Church, introduce social 
differences between Christians and Muslims in Iraq and other places in the Middle East. 
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education. From their point of view, it also made them vulnerable to reprisals in times of 
political upheaval.  
For instance, UICC and ICBA actors described how practicing Christianity or 
identifying as Christian under the Saddam Hussein regime was susceptible to political 
vacillations in the country. While Hussein’s secular government tended to provide 
Christians with a measure of protection, it also restricted what they were able to do in 
Iraqi society. Reflecting on her own experiences growing up in Baghdad, Bethany, an 
administrator for the UICC described how being Christian could at once pose no real 
problem, while at the same time impose significant social and economic limitations.  
Bethany: None of my neighbors ever made me feel that I wasn't one of them – 
none of them. I mean when ... it came time for their prayer they went and prayed. 
And every Sunday when they saw us dressing up and leaving to church you 
know ... [saying what they would say] “God Bless.” All that stuff. They knew 
more about my religion and I knew more about their religion. Nobody ever said a 
word to me. Or said why do you have a cross hanging in your family room or why 
are you wearing a cross? Or why do you have a Christmas tree or Christmas lights 
outside? 
 
At the same time, Bethany also suggests that a glass ceiling is very much a part of the 
lived experiences of Christians in Iraq.  
Bethany: If you worked for the government, you just didn't move up... [at work] 
 
CJ: It's like a glass ceiling? 
 
Bethany: Exactly. So back home, it was just … (offering an analogy from 
American society) If you have a business, would you hire someone from your 
own people or somebody from a different race? It's just [that] you would trust 
them more. Well, what's the difference?      
 
For Bethany, the fact that Christians in Iraq did not advance in the same way that other 
groups did is not a substantial point of debate. Her argument may sound counterintuitive 
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in American society. But her opinion was juxtaposed against different forms of 
discrimination and hardship that occurred in Iraq, including periods of religious 
persecution of Christians.  
According to the UICC, Christians have been a vulnerable population in Iraq 
since the emergence of Islam. Then, Christians and other religious minorities were forced 
to convert by the power of the sword. In fact, several employees at the UICC have family 
members who were victims of religious persecution. For instance, Aaron described how 
state authorities hung his grandfather in a public square in the Christian village where he 
lived in Iraq, while his son (Aaron’s father) was made to watch. Aaron explained that his 
grandfather, a small businessman, had not broken any laws. His hanging was meant as a 
show of force – reinforcing the subordinate position Christians held in Iraqi society.  
Farah conveyed similar experiences that suggested everyday living could be 
interrupted at any time during times of social upheaval. She described how her family 
moved to Kuwait in the 1980s when she was a young woman in order to pursue 
opportunities there. Describing her life in Kuwait before and after the war the country 
entered with Iraq in 1990 Farah explained: 
Farah: ‘Twas nice [in Kuwait]. I mean our life was good and nice. But we had to 
leave it because of the war. And we left. 
 
CJ: And that was the only reason? 
 
Farah: Mhm.[In] 1990, we left. Oh, it was devastating [saying this with great 
emotion] because [it was] the only country we knew. We used to go to Baghdad 
for a visit, only during the summer. We escaped [from Kuwait] actually. We just 
escaped. We left everything over there.  
 
CJ: Everything you owned?  
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Farah: Everything. We left an apartment – nice apartment. We left everything. 
And we just took our clothes and um ... and we left.  
 
Farah’s family was uprooted again in Baghdad during the first Gulf War later in 1990. 
Commenting on how the war changed her family, Farah stated, “I've seen two wars. And 
I've seen devastating circumstances in Kuwait. Everything is gone. My work. My 
workplace – no more. Our money is gone.” 
According to Farah and other people in the UICC, the segregated work 
experiences and even the traumatic experiences Christian groups experienced in Iraq 
differentiate them from other Iraqis. The comments from Bethany, Aaron and Farah 
suggest that Iraqi Christians have a different history and collective experience in Iraq 
than other groups. The accounts organizational actors offer suggests that while Christians 
in Iraq are a ‘part’ of Iraqi society they are not truly ‘of’ it. On many levels, their way of 
life in Iraq is different from that of Muslims and other non-Christian groups. Christians 
are a group that is partly defined by their overall position in society and their tenuous 
acceptance by the members of majority groups.  
 The UICC maintained that the war in Iraq has had staggering effects on the local 
Christians in Iraq. Just as the events of September 11th brought out laden prejudices in the 
U.S., the War in Iraq was an impetus for extremists to commit atrocious acts against 
Christians in Iraq. The organization contended that for almost ten years, Christians living 
in Iraq were subject to religious persecution, including violent acts against women, 
children and the elderly.  
By 2006 the number of Iraqi Christians taking asylum in countries that neighbor 
Iraq had grown into the thousands. While leaving Iraq had brought a degree of protection 
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that was absent in their homeland, the livelihoods of displaced Christians were 
compromised by their citizenship status. In neighboring countries refugees were provided 
the right to work and live, but they were not given other rights of citizenship, despite the 
fact that for many the period of asylum had persisted for several years. 
In the UICC, the displacement of local Christians that was occurring during the 
war in Iraq was another episode in a longer history that distinguished them from other 
groups in the Middle East. In two separate interviews, Lucas and Mr. Samuels, a 
founding member and current executive board member of the UICC, explained how the 
refugee crisis continued to reinforce differences between Christians in Iraq and other 
groups.  
Mr. Samuels, age 80, was regarded as one of the most respected members of the 
Iraqi Christian community by staffers at the UICC. Over the course of my interview with 
him, his calm demeanor was sometimes interrupted by a kind of Mid-Western brashness 
that seemed to acknowledge his membership in a city that valued its reputation for hard 
work, while also recognizing his personal struggle to ‘make it’ as an entrepreneur in 
Detroit during the 1960s, 70s and 80s. He described his background as a ‘second-
generation, American-born-Iraqi Christian’, whose father had also supported his family 
through entrepreneurism. Over the course the interview, Mr. Samuels informed me that 
he had owned a number of successful grocery stores, which he eventually sold. After 
selling the stores he went on to build another successful business that distributed dairy 
and produce to most – if not all – of the Iraqi Christian-owned stores in the Detroit area. 
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At one point in our interview he described how the Iraqi Christian refugees, many of 
whom remained trapped in countries of first transit, were  
Mr. Samuels: And so they were stuck in Jordan and Syria and Turkey and all 
those places. And of course in those countries you can't get any schooling. You 
can't get any welfare … 
 
CJ: No citizenship, right? 
 
Mr. Samuels: Exactly. And they [are] being penalized for overstaying their visas. 
In Turkey you couldn't leave there until you paid this penalty, which was in the 
tens of thousands of dollars…  
 
Mr. Samuels’s comments suggest that the experiences associated with the refugee crisis 
continue to create different experiences for Christians and other groups in the Middle 
East. Since the crisis, local Christians from Iraq shared the experience of exile and the 
denial of rights to citizenship in the countries where they sought protection. For Mr. 
Samuels the forced migration Christians endured after the war in Iraq started was 
additional evidence that verified differences between them and other groups. The idea 
that this most recent war reinforced important differences between Christians and other 
groups was echoed in an interview with Lucas. 
Lucas: These three wars produced a lot of casualties among both sides. And also 
they produced a lot of people who are persecuted … [or who] become targets for 
persecution. Because you know in the war people get to be hurt and hurt badly. 
And the people who get hurt the most are the weak among the weakest. These 
people are the minorities. OK? … So our role at the [UICC] is to help these 
people. This is how we started our project here. I myself have been working with 
the refugees for the last thirty-one or thirty-two years. … But in the last six or 
seven years the problem got very much intensified. So we start planning... We 
became very innovative and making many, many type of pilot studies and projects 
in order to support them and help these refugees, because the numbers are to 
increase.  
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When the UICC began its campaign to bring displaced Christians to Detroit, the idea that 
they were different from other Middle Eastern groups figured prominently in its 
strategies. The organization maintained that applications for immigration to the U.S. from 
Christians should be approved, despite the fact that immigration from the Middle East 
was being scrutinized. It also sought support from organizations like the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) based on the fact that Christians in Iraq 
were susceptible to forced migration from their homeland and other Middle Eastern 
groups were not.  
The group’s tenuous status in countries of first transit only increased the UICC’s 
resolve to bring Iraqi Christian refugees to the United States. In the organization, efforts 
to bring about this outcome often meant providing U.S. lawmakers, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and organizations like the UNHCR, who was responsible for 
processing the immigration applications of displaced Iraqi Christians, with information 
that demonstrated the urgency of their plight. 
The UICC informed all parties of the inhumane suffering Iraqi Christians had 
endured while in Iraq. They also conveyed the idea to American lawmakers and 
immigration authorities that their recent exodus from their home country – which had 
netted a host of new trials and adverse circumstances – was a decision of last resort.  
Indigenousness and Christianity as Rhetorical Strategies in the UICC 
To support their position that displaced Christians should be allowed to resettle in 
Detroit, the UICC argued that although different groups have lived in Iraq historically, 
current conditions were most directly impacting local Christians. It maintained that 
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political and social changes in Iraq were hastening the disappearance of the country’s 
Christian population, a group that lived in Iraq thousands of years before the arrival of 
Islam. The UICC contended that an exodus process that started in the 1980s during the 
Iran-Iraq War was now occurring more rapidly without any real hope of stemming the 
tide of outmigration.  
According to the UICC these dire circumstances called for the development of 
innovative programming on their part. New programming focused upon the four ‘R’s: 
Research, Relief, Resettlement and Re-Empowerment. Research focused upon collecting 
and providing lawmakers with empirical evidence on the growing refugee population. 
Resettlement and relief focused upon providing refugees with a pathway to citizenship in 
American society. Re-Empowerment called for addressing the physical and emotional 
injuries associated with the refugee experience.  
The research component of the organization’s initiative was largely carried out in 
work it conducted with Senator Carl Levin’s office and the office of Congressman Gary 
Peters of Michigan’s 14th Congressional District. By 2010 both lawmakers were 
receiving updates of the number of Iraqi Christians whose immigration statuses remained 
in limbo somewhere in one of the countries that neighbored Iraq.  
 The relationships the group established with the lawmakers brought about 
progress toward organizational goals in 2007 when Congress passed the Refugee Crisis in 
Iraq Act. The law, which was championed by Senators Ted Kennedy, Carl Levin and five 
other U.S. senators, intended in part to provide “special immigration” status for 
Christians from Iraq who sought asylum. Specifically, the law meant to benefit, “Iraqis 
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who have worked in critical positions in direct support of the United States Government 
in Iraq, [those who] have been killed or injured in reprisals for their support of the 
American effort [and] Many more Iraqis associated with the United States have fled Iraq 
in fear of being killed or injured”. While the law acknowledged that,  
Although the United States cannot resettle all of Iraq’s refugees in the United 
States, the United States has a fundamental obligation to help the vast number of 
Iraqis displaced in Iraq and throughout the region by the war and the associated 
chaos, especially those who have supported America's efforts in Iraq. It is 
essential for the United States to develop a comprehensive and effective approach 
to support host governments and to meet the needs of Iraq’s refugees and 
internally displaced persons, especially those who are associated with the United 
States.12  
 
In essence, the law was the U.S. government’s response to what appeared to be a 
humanitarian tragedy. The passage of the act required that those Iraqis who were 
considered socially vulnerable – including groups who faced religious persecution, like 
Iraqi Christians – be provided with assistance that supported resettlement in the United 
States.  
The passage of the law provided the UICC with renewed initiative to continue the 
work it took on with the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies like the 
UNHCR.  It used the opportunity to introduce programming that could bring about 
favorable immigration decisions. This effort took on special importance after learning 
that refugee petitions to immigration agencies were being denied based upon immigration 
criteria that predated the implementation of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act. For example, 
the organization learned that the Department of Homeland Security was still denying 
                                                        
12 Parameters as defined by Public Law 110-181, Div A, Title XII, Subtitle C 
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applications it received based upon the petitioner’s country of origin. Statistics which 
indicated high denial rates were passed along from the UICC to their congressional 
liaisons with the hope of resolving outstanding applications and avoiding similar issues 
with pending or newly opened cases.   
 Advocating on behalf of cases that failed to acknowledge the parameters of the 
new law often involved informing immigration decision-makers about the persecution 
refugees experienced. Conveying the experiences of denied applicants meant describing 
instances including the rape of children and women, the murder of spouses or parents, 
and the arson of Christian-owned businesses. The rhetoric of persecution the organization 
invoked meant to convey the idea that applicants who were not approved remained at risk 
in their homeland. 
 The Relief and Resettlement components of the organization’s work involved 
negotiating with agencies like the DHS and UNHCR, who were responsible for 
approving immigration applications. For workers in the UICC, the recent episodes of 
persecution, including the arson of Christian churches, businesses, and the murders of 
Christian people, were all matters that met the UNHCR’s mandate to safeguard the rights 
and well-being of refugees and fostering the resettlement of stateless people.  
The UICC had empirical evidence to verify that applications of Iraqi Christian 
refugees continued to be denied despite changes in American policy. The high rate of 
denials signaled to the organization that differences between Christians and other Middle 
Easterners were not being acknowledged. The organization set out to address the high 
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denial rate by focusing upon how the current environment in Iraq did not allow for 
religious freedom.    
Lucas explains how organizational efforts around the religious persecution that 
was occurring in Iraq were put into place: 
Lucas: Now at that time the U.S. was unable to admit Iraqis refugees because of 
the September event – you know the painful events. So we had to do the 
advocacy. So that’s where I started doing my advocacy for refugee issues … In 
last six or seven years as I [worked] with the United States government – both 
Houses – the Senate and Congress – and also the White House. We managed to 
get their attention. I kept knocking on the doors, kept pounding on the doors, kept 
screaming until we got heard.”  
 
Later Lucas described how advocacy occurs with one vital organization that determines 
refugee admittance, the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program: 
Lucas: Every year the president of the United States declares that there should be 
80,000 refugees from all over the world admitted to the United States. …Based on 
the presidential declaration they [Iraqi Christian refugees] qualify for that. So they 
come to the United States as refugees.”  
 
Lucas’s comments suggest that Iraqi Christians occupy a specific space in ongoing 
dialogues on immigration. The space shields them from being associated with other 
groups that likely experience a less receptive environment when it comes to petitions for 
immigration. John O’Reilly, the director of a free immigration clinic held at the UICC 
each week, verifies this conclusion. The clinic is affiliated with Blessed Mary College, 
the local Jesuit College, where O’Reilly is a law professor. The clinic’s main goal is to 
assist clients seeking assistance with either immigration or those who desire assistance 
with attaining citizenship after a period of asylum. During an interview, O’Reilly 
recognized how the group is less susceptible to “profiling” than other immigrant groups 
in Detroit.  
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John: [If you are Mexican) you don’t wanna call attention to yourself. You don’t 
know who the person is across the desk from you when you go to ask for benefits 
…Are they gonna you know call ICE or whatever? …This community is less 
susceptible to being profiled. 
 
That Iraqi Christians can call attention to themselves in forums where decisions about 
immigration are made is notable to O’Reilly. Their status as refugees distances from 
some other immigrating groups from the Middle East and Mexican immigrants, whose 
campaigns for membership in the U.S. have been vigorously contested. Their status as 
Christian refugees conveys the idea that they are ‘supposed’ to be here, whereas others 
ostensibly are not. Their presence in the U.S. is made socially acceptable in a way that 
eludes some other groups. 
Social Differentiation as a Rhetorical Strategy in the ICBA 
 
The UICC’s intention to bring refugees to the United States coincided with other 
work the ICBA was conducting on behalf of Iraqi Christian business owners in Detroit. 
In 2003 the ICBA was founded to quell tensions between Iraqi Christian entrepreneurs, 
other Detroiters, and corporate and political stakeholders who maintained interests in the 
city’s local economy. The attempts some black Detroiters and national supermarket 
franchises made to disrupt the veritable monopoly Iraqi Christian grocers maintained for 
years in the city prompted a series of responses from the ICBA (see chapter two).  
But the ICBA’s work was not limited to resolving issues that threatened their 
businesses. The organization also worked to meet the needs of newly arrived refugees. 
Assuring the substantive inclusion of new arrivals was important to the ICBA after 2007 
when almost all new arrivals came to the Iraqi Christian community in Detroit as 
involuntary emigrants. As the financial arm of the affiliated network of Iraqi Christian 
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organizations in Detroit, the ICBA was responsible for providing funds and resources for 
resettled refugees. The fact that many refugees arrived after suffering traumas or lacking 
essential skills to assist them in adapting to American society introduced a new 
imperative for the ICBA. The organization’s charitable events and membership dues 
helped support the Iraqi Christian community’s efforts to integrate new arrivals into 
American life in Detroit. 
The organization’s efforts to address the needs of the refugee population involved 
a great deal of fundraising. It also meant developing innovative programming that 
addressed the emergent needs of the refugees. The ICBA, the UICC, and its affiliated 
partner, the Iraqi Christian Council on Health and Wellness (ICCHW) believed it was 
essential to create a means to address the negative effects of persecution many refugees 
suffered prior to their arrival in the U.S. One of the ways they sought to do this was by 
building local coalitions that provided them with the ability to meet the needs of the 
refugees. One of the local partnerships they struck was with actors in Detroit’s Jewish 
community. Sarah, a leader in Detroit’s Jewish community, also serves on the ICBA’s 
Board of Directors. In fact, in 2012 she was the only woman and one of only two people 
who were not Iraqi Christian to serve on the board.  
Sarah has been involved in a number of Jewish organizations in Detroit for over 
twenty years. She was once a teacher, but she currently works in the healthcare industry. 
During an interview, she mentioned how she and a delegation of Jewish leaders 
accompanied members of the Iraqi Christian community to the airport when the first 
refugees arrived from Iraq in 2007. Sarah described the event as a time to reflect on the 
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shared understanding that “temporal limitations” may hamper each group’s ability to stay 
in a particular place (e.g. the Middle East). The forced migration that Christians in Iraq 
were experiencing motivated the Jewish community in Detroit to forge a relationship 
with the Iraqi Christians in the UICC and the ICBA. Sarah described how the Jewish 
community’s relationship with Iraqi Christians aided them in meeting the challenges 
related to the refugee population.  
Sarah: When they were looking at … the very beginning part of how to … lobby 
and how to even meet some of the needs, or to get refugees to come to America. 
The Jewish community was instrumental to helping to set up the whole 
mechanism. 
 
CJ: … So they called you and said, “What’s the best way? … 
 
Sarah: Yes, and I introduced them to our institutions – our Jewish family service, 
who got them hooked up with …the national immigration advocacy program, just 
multitudes of things… so that to this day many of their programs and projects are 
basically modeled after the Jewish community… They now have … Project Jonah 
[which is modeled after a Jewish program]. And our Hebrew Free Loan … they 
have a very similar project now. Even the arrangement of their [organizations] is 
similar to our Jewish foundation and our Jewish Federation and how it’s set up.”  
 
Alima, the director of the ICCHW, which provides social services to newly arrived Iraqi 
Christians, describes the nature of the partnership the group shares with the Jewish 
community in Detroit: 
Alima: Out of this office we're going to be launching an Iraqi Christian loan fund 
[program] shortly. And that's to help people get transportation, to be able to 
purchase a vehicle. And that's modeled after the Hebrew Free Loan in the Jewish 
community … [and] Project Jonah is modeled after Project Hasid in the Jewish 
community. So you know … because they had a period of time where they had a 
large refugee population and you know ... they've been here longer, they're more 
established and ... so we just … we learned a lot from them… 
 
The partnership the ICBA developed with Detroit’s Jewish acknowledges how specific 
historical and social processes impacted both groups. Alima’s comments suggest that 
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social interactions with members of the Jewish community in Detroit, which were 
instigated by shared experiences of persecution and exile, promoted the exchange of 
information that could assist the Iraqi Christian refugee population.  
Conclusion 
 
Organizational work that responded to the refugee crisis in Iraq began at a time 
when the presence of Middle Eastern people in the United States was being contested. 
The tragic events of 9/11 contributed to an ongoing narrative on Americanism. As a 
consequence of the attacks, being Middle Eastern was increasingly associated with anti-
Americanism.  
According to Margaret Somers (1992, 1994) and other scholars (Crites 1986; 
Polletta 2006; Steinmetz 1995, Steinberg 1995) who acknowledge the ontological 
importance of narrative, stories guide action. People use stories to make sense of the 
world. Somers (1992) maintains that narratives are important to social actors because 
they allow us to define who we are. Underscoring the great significance that narratives 
have for sense-making and identity-work she writes,  
But identity, like the self, is neither a priori nor fixed. Ontological narratives make 
identity and the self something that one becomes [emphasis in the original] … 
Narrative embeds identities in time, and spatial relationships; ontological 
narratives structure activities, consciousness, and beliefs… (1992: 603) 
 
For Somers, the stories that people tell are embedded within larger cultural matrixes. 
While some stories gain cultural approval, others do not (Steinberg 1995). Stories are not 
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random. Instead they are consistent or harmonious with stories emanating within cultural 
environments.13  
Similarly, not all events maintain the same prominence or relevance within 
narratives. What is omitted or becomes understood as main events has the effect of 
passing normative judgment about the way things are and the way things ought to be (see 
Steinmetz p. 498). Lexical distinctions allow people to “develop stories as we go along, 
adding chapters as unanticipated events and new directions enter our lives (Steinberg 
1995; Somers 1992; Somers and Gibson 1994). The experiences that figure into stories 
are those that are consistent with established plots, the accounts of how things happen or 
the ongoing themes that allow people to construct a significant network or configuration 
of relationships. The past that is recollected is done with the intention of it playing a role 
in the future (Crites 1986).  
After September 11th, narratives on Americanism were developing in ways that 
excluded “Middle Easterners,” as an undifferentiated group. In order to achieve their aim 
of resettlement in Detroit, the UICC used rhetorical strategies that encouraged the 
cultural citizenship of Iraqi Christians in American society. Organizational rhetoric 
explained how Christian’s long history in Iraq differentiated them from other Iraqis. 
Specifically, rhetoric described Iraq and the people who occupied the country prior to the 
arrival of Islam and the rise of the modern Iraqi state. This aspect of Iraq’s history 
focused upon Iraqi Christians, as a specific group of people who had occupied the 
                                                        
13 Steinberg (1995) wrote, “We create our own stories, [but] we do so within the context 
of our cultural mores. We are under continual, although usually subtle, pressure to create 
only those stories which are socio-culturally acceptable (p. 547).”  
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country during defining eras that impacted the formation of the West. Rhetoric explained 
the group’s association with Babylonia and the emergence of western civilization, prior 
to the emergence of Islam. It explained Islam as a recent development, as a nation, place 
and culture of Iraq. Rhetoric drew upon history and experiences that distinguished them 
from other Middle Easterners—but mainly, from other Iraqis.     
The UICC presented an alternate version of Iraqi history that embedded Iraqi 
Christians in a narrative on “the West” that had cultural acceptance in a way that 
narratives on the “Arab World” did not. The rhetorical strategies the UICC employed 
involved familiar plots and storylines. It conveyed experiences that invoked 
commonalities and shared histories. The UICCs work served as a way of bridging the 
social distance between the American mainstream and a subgroup of Middle Easterners 
that were initially evaluated as part of an undifferentiated collective.  
In order to meet the goal of bringing Iraqi Christian refugees to Detroit, 
organizational rhetoric also focused upon the group’s practice of Christianity (e.g., 
Catholicism) and recent experiences of religious persecution in Iraq. By doing so, the 
UICC set Iraqi Christian refugees apart from others in the Arab World who sought to 
immigrate to the United States.  
Instead of using geopolitical identity to bring a group of Middle Easterners to the 
United States, the UICC used a religious identity (e.g., Christian). Rhetoric that 
emphasized Iraqi Christians therefore did not reflect or engage questions of power. It 
signaled to agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security and the USCIS that 
we are like you, in ways that other Arab and Middle Easterners are not.  
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At that time the UICC was particularly interested in achieving a specific end: to 
bring more refugees to the United States.  This set of political experiences of repression, 
cultural experiences and notions of indigenousness that are similar to western histories. 
Religious rhetoric therefore configured the United States as Christian nation as opposed 
to a pluralist, or non-Christian nation that has religious freedoms. As a Christian nation, 
American society becomes a natural home for Iraqi Christians.    
Ongoing political and social vacillations in Iraq that were consequential to the war 
in Iraq created untenable circumstances for Christians living there. Not unlike earlier 
times of instability, Christians were made vulnerable to a host of social reprisals in Iraqi 
society. Actors in the UICC conveyed their status as religious Other in Iraq by describing 
how their experiences living there were based upon a two-tiered social system that 
privileged members of the majority group (e.g. Muslims). They also conveyed how 
changing circumstances in Iraq introduced another shared experience that was defined by 
exodus – an experience that Muslims living in Iraq at that time were not susceptible to. 
Shared experiences and new aspects of the group’s history in Iraq that included forced 
migration were conveyed in institutional forums where aid was provided to persecuted 
groups and groups that had been involuntarily displaced from their homelands.  
 The work the UICC conducted around immigration and resettlement was also 
charged with the task of addressing institutional concerns in organizations like the 
UNHCR. The organization’s work with the UNHCR involved explaining how the 
collective experiences of Christians in Iraq now were similar to other groups whose 
histories included involuntary exodus. The changing circumstances in Iraq created a 
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growing population of Christian refugees whose forced migration to states like Syria and 
Jordan required political reconciliation.  
This was a shared experience that also defined the histories of many other groups 
the UNHCR had served. The shared experience of exodus Iraqi Christians now had with 
other groups expanded the inclusive boundaries that defined the UNHCR. Displaced 
Christians from Iraq now shared a distinct experience that Iraqis previously did not have. 
The deteriorating circumstances in Iraq meant that the collective history of Iraqi 
Christians not only included the experience of persecution but also forced migration and 
involuntary resettlement. It also reveals an important negotiation of institutional space 
that called for introducing new understandings of Iraqi Christians.  
Similarly, for Iraqi Christians the incorporation of the experience of forced 
migration transformed institutional boundaries in a way that allowed organizational 
actors to build important relationships with powerful stakeholders back in the US. In 
Detroit, the shared experience of exile foregrounded important work the UICC and ICBA 
conducted with the Jewish community. Agencies like the UNHRC were key institutions 
through which the UICC worked to institutionalize their claims to refugee status.  This 
status of “refugee” or persecuted religious minority disassociated them from other Iraqis, 
while linking them to other groups, including Jewish people in Detroit. Gaining 
institutional belonging in inter-organizational spaces in Detroit allowed the ICBA to 
acquire information and resources on providing free health care, low-interest loans for 
refugees. 
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Organizational work shows how the call to become part of the United States also 
requires a certain flattening and expanding of histories that call attention, nonetheless, to 
parts of the contested narratives of who “we” are in American society. The work the 
UICC conducts suggests that histories and collective experience(s) form a critical nexus 
that allows for ethnic authenticity in American society. In the case of the Iraqi Christians, 
identity claims that differentiate them from other Middle Eastern groups. Yet, ethnic 
authenticity is also verified in the relationships they have with other ethnic groups, in 
which they don’t simply distinguish, but liken themselves to others. Especially, and 
perhaps surprisingly, with groups such as Jewish Americans that are often understood to 
be more isolationist, despite their long history of social justice and social services that 
they provide to other groups. Iraqi Christians liken themselves to Jewish Americans in 
Detroit not based on shared “culture” but on shared political histories.  
  In his consideration of democratized societies, Karl Mannheim defines de-
distantiation as a process that reduces the distance that separates elite groups from non-
elite groups in a particular society. Evaluating this idea within the context of the UICC’s 
petition for special immigration status for Christian refugees, organizational work can be 
understood as a form of de-distantiation that effectively reduces the distance between the 
American mainstream and Iraqi Christians. Organizational work is a way of changing 
who is included inside the American mainstream. It also informs how the American 
collective understands historical events that impact its constituency.  
That the UICC was able to work along with Congress toward the approval of the 
Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act in 2007 is evidence of the way organizational work 
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democratizes space. The immigration petition the organization instigated on behalf of the 
Christian refugee population in Iraq was waged in a time when Middle Eastern identities 
were increasingly susceptible in American society. That the organization successfully 
demonstrated how their Middle Eastern background did not preclude them from having a 
Christian identity increased the likelihood of gaining special immigration status. That the 
organization was able to achieve this goal effectively expanded the nation’s inclusionary 
boundaries as they are defined by religion, or Christianity more specifically.  
The way in which actors in the UICC and ICBA maintained connectedness to 
local Christians in Iraq negates assumptions of assimilation that are a part of many 
analyses of American ethnicity (see Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964; Kasinitz, 
Mollenkopf, Waters and Holiday 2008; see also Waters 1990). Focusing strictly upon the 
kind of integration ethnic groups experience in the American context, assimilationists 
suggest that as incorporation into the mainstream becomes more apparent, ethnic 
distinction becomes less salient or disappears entirely. However, the work that is 
conducted in the ICBA suggests that it is not what groups cease to be as a result of 
incorporating into American society, it is what groups continue to be despite their 
participation in American life. Organizational work suggests that salience of ethnic 
identity is not only be a function of incorporation into the mainstream, but also the 
association groups maintain to ongoing historical projects that impact them as a collective 
and events that inform collective responses.  
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CHAPTER V 
RESOLVING CHALLENGES TO INCORPORATION 
THROUGH ORGANIZATIONAL RHETORIC IN CCANE 
 
Like the UICC, CCANE used rhetoric to meet its imperatives. Between the 1980s 
and the first decade of the twenty-first century, CCANE modified its rhetorical strategies 
and organizational actions. Changes in strategy coincided with vacillations in the United 
States political environment, and changing circumstances in places outside the U.S., 
including Cuba and countries in the former Soviet Union.  
While freedom and democracy were consistently used as rhetorical tropes in 
CCANE, how freedom – as a social ideal, and democracy – as a way of life, were 
conceived of in organizational discourse changed. Over time rhetoric acknowledged 
different aspects of Cuban exile’s collective experience. In the earliest years of the 
organization’s founding, rhetoric focused upon achieving a “free and democratic” Cuba 
by enabling participation in the democratic system that historically defined the North 
American continent. However, by the late 1990s, two other conceptions of freedom and 
democracy were being put forth in rhetoric and action. The focus of one of the modified 
discourses drew upon Cuba’s history of political oppression and how it shared this 
experience with other nations – especially those who were once part of the Soviet Union. 
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As opposed to advancing organizational rhetoric encouraging Cuba’s participation in an 
established political and economic system, rhetoric and action emphasized achieving 
freedom from the political oppression that also defined other countries. The second 
strategy coincided with another new organizational effort that drew upon Cuba’s 
independence imaginary. In the latter strategy, organizational rhetoric took into account 
the island nation’s enduring experiences of political interference from other countries, 
including the United States, and how those relationships precluded Cubans from realizing 
their destiny as a nation. In this sense, freedom was conceptualized as a long-standing 
goal of the Cuban people that could be attained by channeling their inherent abilities.  
Cuban Outmigration to the U.S. in Historical Perspective 
 
Historically, Cuban out-migration to the U.S. was facilitated by war and 
unfavorable political climates on the island (Portes and Grosfuguel 1994; Portes and 
Stepick 1993). Exiles first began arriving to American society – Miami, Key West, 
Dayton and Tampa, most specifically – in the late 1800s during the War of Independence. 
During the Spanish-American War, Cubans and Americans worked together to wage war 
against Spain. From that point forward, Cuban military leaders like Jose Marti and others 
used the cities that were emerging in Florida’s swamp lands and other minimally 
occupied areas as strategic safe havens where they could plan responses that challenged 
Cuban’s government.  
Cyclic migration is a defining aspect of the experiences of Cubans living in the 
United States (Portes and Stepick 1993). Recurring political turmoil in Cuba also put into 
motion a migration pattern that was defined by temporary sojourns in the United States 
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and a return to the island when conditions changed. For instance, high rates of out-
migration followed by commiserate rates of return to Cuba occurred after the elections of 
General Gerardo Machado in the 1920s, Batista in the 1950s and finally Castro in the 
early part of the 1960s. In those times, the island’s political instability and unpopular 
system of government seemed to cultivate a culture of exodus, at least within elite 
society. In order to protect their middle and upper-class statuses, periodic exoduses to the 
United States were necessary. Wealth and stability in Cuba was only to be produced in 
the brief intermissions between one political leader and the ascension of another. Portes 
and Stepick (1993) write that,  
Cuban political militants remained nearly invisible in Miami at least until the 
early 1960s; … When the Cuban middle class did start to exit the island, it went 
to a social environment made utterly familiar by years of prior travel… Unlike 
later refugees from other communist regimes – Vietnamese, Cambodians, 
Ethiopians – Cuba’s exiles did not really move to a foreign land. Southern Florida 
was known territory (pp. 100-101). 
   
Portes and Stepick indicate that the cycle of exodus and return was enabled by political 
turmoil in Cuba, and the Cuban elite’s practice of vacationing in South Florida. Their 
analysis suggests that the historical processes that encouraged out-migration to American 
society established a pattern that made return to the homeland a likely outcome (see 
Portes and Grosfoguel 1994).  
Resolving Crises of Cuban Outmigration through Organizational Work 
 
Although the resolution of the earliest political conflicts in Cuba provided the 
opportunity for exiles to return, the revolution that put Fidel Castro in power in 1959 
disrupted a predictable pattern of exodus-and-return. In Miami’s exile community, the 
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arrival of the Marieletos refugees in 1980 was evidence that returning to Cuba was not 
possible unless political change occurred.     
The Mariel crisis was a catalyst for the founding of CCANE. For the 
organization’s founders, the unprecedented event was evidence that major changes 
needed to occur in Cuba. In 1981 when the organization was founded it had two 
objectives. First, the organization wanted to respond to the immediate political and social 
crises the Mariel Boatlift inspired stateside. Secondly, organizational actors wanted to 
create circumstances that allowed for the return of an exile community, who were in 
Miami.  
CCANE’s founding coincided with pivotal changes in American politics. Perhaps 
most importantly, in 1981 the unpopular Carter Administration was brought to an 
unceremonious end. During the 1980 campaign, Reagan and the Republican Party’s 
ideological commitment to economic and social conservatism managed to bring new 
groups to the party’s fold, including working-class whites, fundamentalist Christians and 
Cuban Americans, who embraced Reagan’s anti-communism stance (Edsall and Edsall 
1991; Phillips 1969).  
Generous political contributions from Cuban Americans signaled the emergence 
of a strong Republican constituency in South Florida (see Garcia 1996; Grenier, Perez, 
Chun and Gladwin 2007; Mohl 1988; Moreno 1996, 1997). Over the course of Reagan’s 
first term in office the political relationship between Cuban American constituents and 
the Republican Party continued to grow. By his second term in office, Florida and other 
southern states were majorly comprised of large voting blocs of Evangelicals and rural 
135 
 
 
 
whites that unequivocally supported Reagan’s social conservatism and his political and 
economic visions. Cuban Americans were chief among the state’s conservative 
demographic who were decidedly Republican. 
Authenticity as Organizational Logic in CCANE 
 
The arrival of the Marieletos convinced actors in CCANE that the circumstances 
that drove them to the United States remained a part of the lived experiences of Cubans 
who remained on the island. CCANE believed that like the exiles of the 1960s and 70s, 
the Marieletos came to the United States because they were unable to live in a society 
that lacked essential freedoms. In the eyes of organizational actors, the exodus from the 
island that began in the 1960s continued into the 1980s because political change failed to 
occur.  
In order to fulfill the expectation of return to Cuba, organizational rhetoric took 
into account two aspects of Cuban ethnic history that promoted outmigration to the U.S.: 
the absence of freedom and democracy and the existence of a politically oppressive 
system of government.  
The Absence of Freedom and Democracy 
 
CCANE actors asserted that violations of basic freedoms defined the lives of 
people in Cuba since 1959 when Castro came to power. In their opinion, Castro’s 
totalitarian regime prevented Cubans from realizing a true democracy. For instance, 
during an interview with me Armando stated:  
Armando: People talk about changes. And a lot of people say [in response]: How 
can you talk about change in Cuba if the same person is running it? The same 
person … So it is not just something that happened to me at that time. It’s still 
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happening – in different variation – but it’s still happening. People are still being 
repressed for talking about human rights in Cuba.  
 
Armando’s comments suggest that despite political rhetoric put forth by the 
Castro regime that forces contrary conclusions, Cubans remain an oppressed people. 
The idea that Cuban society was and remains undemocratic was shared by Esteban, a 
member of CCANE’s Board of Directors. Esteban described life in Cuba after the 
revolution as “asphyxiating”. Not long after Castro’s assent to power, he came to the 
United States under a visa sponsored by an uncle who was already living in South 
Florida. He arrived in Miami with his mother and younger brother. He explained that his 
father was not allowed to leave Cuba with them, despite having the proper 
documentation.  
Esteban, like many of the actors in CCANE, openly discussed his allegiance to 
the United States since coming from Cuba. Noting what is possible in a free society, he 
described how after years of military service in the U.S. Army, he established a 
successful shipbuilding business in Miami. Describing life in Cuba after the revolution 
Esteban stated: 
Esteban: My family actually sympathized with the struggle that was going on to 
overthrow Batista, you know? But after the revolution took over, in the first three 
to four months we realized that that was not what the whole thing was about, you 
know? 
  
CJ: He had [Fidel Castro] mislead people? 
 
Esteban: Exactly! It was supposed to have elections within a year, a few months, 
you know? That was the purpose of the revolution – to bring freedom … because 
Batista gave a coup d’état in 1952. OK? Uh … he [Batista] presided by decrees – 
decree of this, decree of that. And that was a disaster. And Castro was supposed to 
have elections, create parties and all that, you know … that weren’t established 
already. And because of the historical period [referring to the Cold War between 
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the U.S. and the Soviet Union], he took a good opportunity to bring the 
Communist, Socialist …That was perfect timing … So he took that as a hell of a 
way to stay in power for 54 years, as it is now.  
 
Esteban’s comments indicate that the Cuban government’s failure to establish vital social 
institutions and democratic policies lead to his family’s unplanned exodus to the United 
States. He also implies that the oppressive nature of Cuban politics that became evident 
in Castro’s early years were influenced by outside political factors that continue to 
preclude Cuban people from having essential freedoms today.  
The Existence of a Politically Oppressive System of Government 
 
I came in on October 3rd of 1961. I was 14 years old [before arriving to the 
U.S.].My life in Cuba – I was getting ready for my 15th birthday. I was going to a 
small private school. And the school was closed at that time because they were 
changing the teaching … you know how they were going to be teaching schools 
from there on. <Because of the revolution?> Castro. Right… Of course my 
parents were panicking. But they didn’t say anything to us. We were very 
sheltered as to what they’re thoughts were [because] I was going to a communist 
school – it had turned as a communist school. And they just didn’t want to give 
any information to us … because we could say [something in school] … that 
would be used against them – you know, if they would ask me. 
 – Sofia, Cuban American immigrant        
 
I got here [in the United States] in January of 2004. I was 16. I had just turned 16 
three days after. <Under what conditions were you allowed to leave?> They do 
this raffle. I think it was a 1998 raffle. My dad was the one who was signed for it. 
So he’s allowed to come with his wife and his kids.  I guess that my parents … 
My mom always wanted to leave because of all the hardships. She had to work 
very hard. Everything was a lot of hassle. They had this view that living in the 
U.S. was easier on them… and they really wanted to give us a better future. I 
guess really they thought that in Cuba there was not really a lot of future. If you 
work and you really don’t make enough money you have to live by the charity of 
the family that you have here [in the United States]. 
 – Julieta, Cuban American immigrant 
The vignettes included above suggest that certain conditions in Cuba have 
endured since the earliest days of Castro’s assent to power. Although over fifty years 
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separate Sofia and Julieta’s immigration to the United States, their comments suggest 
they view Cuba’s system of government similarly. The two women’s comments suggest 
that the oppressiveness of Cuba’s government predicted mundane choices a person makes 
and the others that hold greater significance in the lives of Cubans. They suggest that 
Cuba’s government was and continues to be restrictive and perhaps punitive.  
It was the oppressiveness of the Cuban government that ultimately caused Sofia’s 
parents to send her to the United States via the Pedro [Peter] Pan program. The same 
oppressiveness encouraged Julieta’s father’s participation in a state-sponsored raffle that 
approved immigration to the United States. In CCANE, stories like Julieta and Sofia’s 
were evidence that Cuban political life continued to prohibit Cuban’s from building a 
civil society.  
At the end of the 1990s, these ongoing experiences of political oppression 
motivated the organization’s participation in forums focused on alleviating human rights 
violations in Cuba and other politically oppressed nations. At that time, the organization 
also began to use the information and resources they gained in human rights forums to 
assist grassroots activists in Cuba who wanted to bring about political changes there. 
Similarly, CCANE used their participation in human rights forums as an opportunity to 
share the experiences of Cuban activists with other groups who were facing similar 
challenges.   
Freedom and Democracy as Rhetorical Organizational Strategy: Freedom to 
Participate in the Democratic Americas 
 
In CCANE, the idea returning to Cuba is an expectation. The prospect of return 
was evaluated through a political lens. If adverse political circumstances lead to the 
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exodus of thousands of Cubans, then the resolution of unfavorable political circumstances 
would enable return. The political relationships Cubans established during the Reagan 
Administration meant moving conversations on matters of great concern to Cuban exiles 
from their kitchen tables to more public forums.  
In the 1980s, CCANE worked to achieve this objective through aggressive 
lobbying in Washington, D.C. During these years, the organization adopted involved 
publishing books that described the Cuban government as they knew it. One of the early 
publications sought support from U.S. lawmakers by drawing upon the social ideals of 
freedom and democracy:  
Cuban Americans understand perhaps better than many of their fellow citizens 
that freedom is not just the heritage of the people of the United States. It is the 
birthright of the people of this hemisphere. We in the Americas are descended 
from hearty souls – pioneers, men and women with the courage to leave the 
familiar, and start fresh in this, the New World. We are, by and large, people who 
share the same fundamental values of God, family, work, freedom, democracy 
and justice…Our struggles for independence and the fervor for liberty unleashed 
by these noble endeavors bind the people of the New World together. In the 
annals of human freedom, names like Bolivar and Marti rank equally with 
Jefferson and Washington. These were individuals of courage and dignity, and 
they left for us a legacy, a treasure beyond all imagination. 
But today, a new colonialism threatens the Americas. Insurgents armed and 
directed by a faraway power, seek to impose a philosophy that is alien to 
everything which we believe and goes against our birthright. It’s a philosophy that 
holds truth and liberty in contempt and is a self-declared enemy of the worship of 
God. Whenever put into practice, it has brought repression and human 
deprivation. There is no clearer example of this than Cuba. (p. 27) 
 
 The excepted passage suggests that freedom is a defining feature not only of American 
society, but all those societies that are part of North America. It invokes a common 
history of ‘New World’ accomplishments that resulted from the thrift and mental 
fortitude of like-minded American and Cuban leaders. The passage additionally implies 
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that the Cuban peoples’ failure to fully participate in what had been developed was 
attributable to the country’s unfortunate involvement with other nations [e.g., the Soviet 
Union] who hold contradictory values and beliefs to North Americans. In essence, the 
inherent potential Cuba possessed was made defunct because of the introduction of a 
system of government that was largely incompatible with the [North] American values of 
liberty, democracy and freedom.  
As it relates to the goals of the organization, the publication highlighted the 
failure of the Cuban government to establish vital social institutions and laws that were 
capable of bringing about the civil society the nation’s forefathers intended. The message 
was that Cuba deserved to take its rightful place among democratic societies in North 
America. Achieving this objective required replacing the existing system of government 
with one that was more compatible with democracy, as it had been realized in the United 
States and elsewhere on the North American continent.  
Freedom and Democracy as Rhetorical Strategy: Freedom from Government 
Oppression 
 
During the 1980s CCANE primarily worked with U.S. lawmakers in Washington. 
Organizational actors felt that by conducting political work they could encourage the 
emergence of a democratic society in Cuba. However, in the late 1990s CCANE’s 
organizational strategy changed. At that time, the organization began working in human 
rights forums that were developing in countries of the former Soviet Union.  
This change in strategy coincided with changes in the political climate in the 
United States, which were brought on in part by the end of the Cold War and declining 
political allegiance to Reagan’s economic vision for the country. Then, the United States 
141 
 
 
 
seemed less concerned about what was going on in Cuba, or its’ potential to advance 
Western political ideologies or free market endeavors. One focus of lawmakers at that 
time was on the issue of Latin American immigration. Specifically, congressional work 
intended to resolve apparent breaches in U.S. immigration policy that were stirring 
dialogues on illegal immigration.  
The fall of the Soviet Union and new political policies on Latin America seemed 
to impact the kinds of support U.S. lawmakers were willing to give CCANE. While the 
dialogues on immigration were mostly focused on the contested citizenship statuses of 
Mexican immigrants, laws and policies also reflected changes in the nation’s political 
will to help other Latin groups, including Cubans. During the Clinton Administration 
Clinton, a three-decades-old policy that gave favorable treatment to Cubans seeking 
political asylum in the United States was terminated. In its place the nation introduced the 
wet-foot-dry-foot policy, which granted citizenship to Cuban emigrants and other 
Caribbean groups only when they had effectively placed one foot on dry United States 
territory. Immigrants that attempted to gain entry to the United States but failed to reach 
dry soil were detained and subsequently sent back to their respective homelands. Policies 
like the wet-foot-dry-foot policy suggest that instead of supporting policy and programs 
that enabled Cubans to return to their ancestral homeland, more political commitment 
was placed upon keeping other Latin groups from coming to the United States.  
Despite the shift in American politics, CCANE actors continued to work on their 
goal of establishing civil institutions and a democratic government. They believed that 
accomplishing their goal would create circumstances that allowed Cuban exiles in Miami 
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and other places to return to their homeland. During an interview with me Esteban 
explained how he understood the organization’s strategic approach during this time of 
transition.  
Esteban: We came to a conclusion that not necessarily being lobbyists and 
supporting politicians would bring the changes in Cuba. We came to a conclusion 
that ([parenthetically] we still … hold that conclusion) changes have to come from 
within Cuba, you know? The people in Cuba have to bring their own changes and 
they have to do it in a way that is satisfactory to them. All we have to do here is 
support them. And that’s what we are doing. …We could not depend on a third 
country to free a country. It has to come … you have to keep it between Cubans. 
And not depend on a power. I love this country because I’ve been here most of 
my life and I have done whatever is requested of me from the United States. [In 
the] future we need to bring Cubans together, you know? And the United States of 
course … countries do not many times have friends, they have interests. States 
have interests. And sometimes the interests of one country [don’t] blend with the 
requirements of another, you know? I don’t know if I explain myself…  
 
Alfonso framed the change in strategy within the context of the Elian Gonzalez case that 
occurred in 2000.  
Alfonso: There came a realization that uh … there came the realization that the 
message … that somehow with all the … as effective as … as powerful as we 
thought we were … we couldn’t get people in the United States or in Washington 
to understand something as simple as the fact that this kid was being used by 
Fidel Castro as a propaganda tool. And that in returning him back to Cuba, we 
were going to subject him again to the same … the same penalties that we all had 
avoided by coming to the United States. All the reasons for our community in just 
leaving Cuba –we were just denying these to this little guy there. That his mother 
died tried … just to save him from that situation. And now we were returning 
him. And we couldn’t get the American people to understand that. And we said, 
“God there has got to be something wrong. We are missing something”, you  
know?  
 
According to Armando this change in strategy also meant building different kinds 
of coalitions with U.S. lawmakers other than those that were established when the 
organization first started. To the extent that the organization used its political ties with 
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U.S. political actors, it was to garner support for efforts at political change that were 
unfolding in Cuba. 
Armando: Now we use the [Cuban] political influence and political power to 
make the United States give more assistance to the dissidents in Cuba and also 
they provide us with resources so we can have the dissident movement in Cuba. 
But yes, the focus is now on Cuba. And this is the general idea out in the Cuban 
community [in Miami] right now. I think the last poll of the Miami Herald 
showed that more than 67% of the Cuban community – of Cubans living in Miami 
– Believe that change to be promoted inside Cuba. That the future leaders of Cuba 
are inside Cuba now… [The] idea [of] convincing the United States and so the 
United States [would] take action. It was the general idea at the beginning [when 
CCANE was founded]. And there are still some people who believe that. And by 
fortune they are the minority. Sometimes we have a meeting and somebody says, 
“No. If we convince the U.S. government to …” But then immediately a lot of 
people say, “Oh come on. We have been 20 years trying to do that. And we have 
Republicans, Democrats and any kind of government in the United States... And 
that ain’t going to happen.” So we have to do it ourselves. That’s very important. 
First is the recognition of the capacity of the Cuban people. That there is a power 
and we need to help them to build that power. The number one goal is to have the 
Charter of Human Rights – United Nations Human Rights – be respected by the 
government. That’s what they are striving for. To have freedom of speech, 
freedom of eh … press… all freedoms, you know? 
 
Armando’s comments suggest that the political environment – whether presided over by 
Republicans or Democrats – will only enable so much progress toward CCANE’s 
organizational goals. For Armando, the new strategy reflected a growing consensus 
among Miami Cubans that political change in Cuba should be an internally driven 
process.  
To gain support for their efforts in Cuba, CCANE began participating in human 
rights forums that were emerging in countries of the former Soviet Union. The forums 
were comprised of various actors from new nations in Eastern Europe, who felt 
politically disempowered and susceptible to the effects of nativist cultures and nationalist 
movements that were underway in their respective countries. While nation-state 
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dialogues – including those between the United States and Russia – typically focused 
upon global implications of divergent political aims, Eastern Europeans who were 
participating in human rights forums intended to address the social ramifications of 
oppressive government systems.  
The link to communism Cuban people shared with the groups who were entering 
these forums created an opportunity for another kind of organizational action in CCANE.  
According to Armando CCANE’s involvement in these forums began as an academic 
venture. Shortly thereafter they began to participate in the forums as a member. In these 
forums, CCANE was provided with resources and information that feasibly could help 
Cubans in Cuba bring about political change.  
During an interview with me Armando explained how CCANE came to be 
involved in forums on human rights after participating in a conference in Poland in 2000.  
Armando: The first time I went [to Poland] I went with [names a CCANE 
program]. They have an event there. And they wanted to talk about Cuba. It was 
an academic event at Warsaw University. But then I went there and then I start 
talking to these people. And then I went to Gdansk where … Solidarity Labor 
Union was born. And I was there and I think it was sort of an emotional and 
inspirational trip. Because I was there and I said, “My God. These people were 
here. Demonstrating here.” So I realized we needed to do something else. We 
needed to go to the next level… I think it was 2000 [when he was in Poland] … 
And I say I started the human rights in Cuba in 1988. It had been 13 years doing 
this. And we need to do something else. It’s not enough. And then I start reading 
about non-violent struggle. I met with people from Serbia, [names a person], these 
guys and I say, OK. This is a tool. This is a technique. And I saw a principle that 
we need to follow. I always say that when I was in Cuba, I was dreaming about 
change in Cuba. But then when I get this knowledge I start being a worker for 
change in Cuba. I think that’s the main condition that we are trying to promote 
now in Cuba. Make people knowledgeable about this technique, how it can be 
used. We need to adapt to your own specific circumstances? Yeah but, this is the 
technique. The main thing that we do now. Of course we collect announcements. 
We prepare reports and we present these reports to international organizations. 
But also we empower people so they can promote change from inside Cuba.  
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Armando’s comments suggest that CCANE felt that by participating in human rights 
forums it could support the goal of alleviating what the organization understood to be a 
totalitarian government in Cuba. The comments also show a shift in organizational 
rhetoric. Instead of explaining how political participation could bring democracy and 
freedom to Cuba, the organization was now describing to other groups from countries in 
the former Soviet Union how they shared experiences of political oppression. His 
comments suggest that instead of prioritizing relationships with U.S. lawmakers that 
ostensibly would bring to Cuba the chance for participation in free and democratic 
systems of government and economics, CCANE was now focused upon eliminating the 
experience of political oppression from the island.  
Freedom and Democracy as Organizational Rhetoric: Pursuing the Cuban 
Independence Imaginary 
 
CCANE’s participation in human rights forums was based upon what they believed to be 
a shared experience of political oppression. Cubans, just as some Eastern European 
nations, remained susceptible to oppressive governmental regimes. CCANE felt that by 
working in these forums it could bring equality and greater freedoms to Cuba and other 
nation-states with long histories of political disenfranchisement, especially those that 
were associated with communist regimes like Cuba’s. 
While Emilio acknowledges how changes in the American political climate 
created an environment that encouraged CCANE to change its strategies, he additionally 
suggests that changes in the Cuban context at that time also contributed to the decisions 
the organization was making:  
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Emilio: Yeah I think that … [CCANE] has historically adapted itself the 
appropriate strategies with the times. I think there was a time when there was the 
need for a lot of activism in Washington … um … to push legislation, to --- focus 
on U.S. foreign policy. But as Cuba opened up [after the fall of the Soviet 
Union]…it started a special period. And the Cuban government’s ability to clamp 
down and minimize contact with the island was diminished. There was a lot more 
exchange and a lot more information coming out of the island. And because of the 
reduced ability of the regime to imprison everybody or keep them invisible, we 
were able to learn a lot more about them and then be able to institute direct 
contact and direct programs to work with them. I think that the [organization] 
realized it could support Cuba by not just pushing for U.S. foreign policy and 
measures that were designed to isolate and weaken the regime, but I think 
increasingly realized the equally important and vital strategic significance of 
supporting voices of people within Cuba, incipient civil society within Cuba – 
that just needed support, and needed international recognition. And I think that 
was the genesis of that – to the point where now more than ever [CCANE] is 
very, very, actively involved in working with people on the island. And in sharing 
those contacts with other groups and organizations that are seeking contact as 
well.  
 
So according to Emilio, the decline of Soviet support in Cuba created new opportunities 
for social activism in Cuba. He suggests that the fall of the Soviet Union left Cuba with 
fewer avenues for receiving resources. The reduction in support consequently limited 
what the government could accomplish on its own. The reduced power of the state 
introduced more opportunity for freedom of expression in Cuban society. It also created 
new opportunities for CCANE to be involved more directly in Cuban society. By 
working in human rights forums CCANE could receive and share information that could 
help all parties bring about fair systems of governments. By the end of the 1990s, the 
organization began working with grassroots activists in Cuba.  
 Organizational rhetoric that was directed toward activists focused upon the idea 
that CCANE understood their experiences. Organizational actors asserted that the 
experiences of activists were much like their own experiences in Cuba. They also 
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suggested to activists that achieving freedom was a project that Cubans needed to pursue 
in their own right. In his consideration of the support CCANE gives to activists Armando 
offered the following example: 
If you are going to play baseball, you need a good glove and you need a good bat. 
You need to know how to swing. You cannot just stand there with the bat, or you 
are not going to hit the ball. If you are a pitcher you are not going to throw a 
strike.  And this [activism in Cuba] is the same thing. You need to know the 
technique. And you need to know the rules of the game. So this is what we are 
doing. Giving people the rules of the game. [We say] these are the techniques. 
And also we are going to give you the tools. We are going to give you telephones, 
laptops… We are going to give you anything that you can use to connect to each 
other. So you can improve. So this is basically what we do. We work providing 
information, knowledge and also we provide empowerment and the tools to 
connect to each other. 
 
Underscoring the importance of achieving the goal of a democratic Cuba on Cuban 
people’s own terms Esteban stated,  
Esteban: We cannot be fighting to bring freedom in one party or another. We like 
Republicans. We like Democrats. But we have to be Cubans first. And help the 
people inside Cuba. And that’s what we’ve been doing for the last 7 years… 6 or 
7 years, at least, you know?  
 
CJ: So what is it that you’re doing different now? 
 
Esteban: Different? We help the Cubans inside the island. And let them decide 
which way they want to work. We don’t tell them what to do… [Then speaking 
about the resources CCANE provides Esteban continues] We help them with the 
transportation. And we have sent many, many, many, many cell phones and 
computers … 
 
CJ: For communication with [CCANE]?  
 
Esteban: Exactly, exactly. Not only for communication with us but for 
communication inside the island. That’s a very important thing. And we send 
them video cameras, uh … computers – so they can create an accessible way to 
the World Internet, you know? … They want changes. They want changes and to 
create a civil society. And eventually [have] different parties and have elections. 
That’s their goal.  
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Thus, by engaging directly with Cubans on the island the organization hoped to introduce 
the possibility of democratic self-governance.  
Armando also explained that CCANE’s attention to human rights issues was not a 
new endeavor. From the time the organization was founded it tried to increase awareness 
of the government’s apparent unwillingness to abide by the country’s existing 
constitution, which afforded rights that were not being recognized. The organization’s 
involvement in human rights forums ratcheted up this aspect of their work. He explained 
that new strategies replaced existing ones that involved “simply giving information” to 
activists on the island. Over time, the organization also wanted to provide activists with 
viable strategies and resources to organize against the Cuban government. They intended 
to increase their support of grassroots efforts in Cuba that sought social and political 
change.  
Armando: Well you know I’ll say that that [human rights] work has evolved 
throughout the years. When I was in Cuba human rights activism was, I don’t 
know: make people aware of what the universal declaration of human rights 
were…But we didn’t have an exact idea about how to promote these rights. It was 
all information and making a stand. We were just saying, “We are here. We are 
not afraid and we know that we have these rights.” But we had no practical idea 
about how to promote change in Cuba. When I got out of Cuba and I came to the 
United States and I start working at [CCANE] – first at the radio station. And we 
did the same thing. We collect the announcements from Cuba. We broadcast to 
the people in Cuba because we were working on big idea that the more 
information that we give to the Cuban people eventually they were going to face 
the government. And … that’s not the case. It’s not only because you give 
information. You have to give practical information, targeted information, 
information that makes them useful in promoting human rights – or that makes 
them empowered to fight in a non-violent way. When I went to Poland for the 
first time, it was an eye opening experience for me. And I see … I saw what they 
had done there. I met with [names a Polish organization]. I talked to a lot of 
people there. And I say, well you know, this is it. OK. We need to tell people 
about human rights. But we also need to empower people so they can fight. And 
they need practical tools.  
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Rhetoric also reaffirmed the expectation of returning to Cuba. Referring to Castro 
as an “accident of history” at one point in an interview with me, Emilio, one of the 
organization’s attorneys, explained how he understood the pattern of outmigration that 
defined Cubans as a collective: 
Emilio: …I realized that – that between my two countries – because I always felt 
like I was Cuban and I was American… I felt that America didn’t need me as 
much as Cuba needed me. America is the greatest country in the world. Its power 
– it’s an economic, military and cultural powerhouse. And I felt that there were 
still unfinished things in Cuba that needed my talents and my abilities, as an 
advocate. And having observed the loss of my parents and the hard times they had 
… They didn’t come here because they wanted to, they came here because they 
had to. And I felt that I wanted to try to correct and contribute to um … the loss of 
freedom that occurred in Cuba … to correct the historical mistake that had 
occurred in 1959. And I felt that I had the obligation to participate in the process 
to correct it – to redeem Cuba for the future. Um … and being a student of history 
and having long wished to be alive in Colonial times – to work alongside Thomas 
Jefferson, and Ben Franklin and George Washington – I realized that Cuba’s 
political and historical process was such that I could very well be able to tell 
people that I was there when Cuba became a democratic republic… I was there 
when Cuba was founded. So it’s a way to … to live in history and to participate to 
a positive change in Cuba – as an active participate and observer.  
 
That Emilio would like to ‘correct’ the political and social circumstances that lead to the 
exodus of his and other families many years ago suggests that completing the cycle of 
outmigration that is defined by exodus and return can play a role in assuring Cuba’s 
future prosperity. For Emilio, the prospect of return also signals a new democratic 
beginning for a country whose development has been unfairly arrested by his appraisal. 
Returning to Cuba not only rectifies the history of a country that was beseeched by 
political controversy, it also provides the important opportunity to start a new one that is 
defined by the same democratic ideals that were embraced by American society’s 
forefathers.   
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Describing CCANE’s role and the role he envisions for himself in Cuba should 
democratic change be introduced in a way that allows exiles to return, Armando stated: 
CJ: What role does [CCANE] play at that point – once freedom is achieved?  
 
Armando: That’s when the real work is going to start. We are going to use [the] 
political power [Cubans have here in the US] in order to get a system for [the 
Cuban] government – some central government. …Also we need to train people 
in other things. You know how to create civic institutions, how to work in a 
democratic environment. The [CCANE] has a program for that. It has been there 
for more than 20 years. It’s called The Liberty Project. It’s people who are 
professionals here [in the U.S.] and they are receiving training about Cuban 
history, Cuban conditions, Cuban government conditions – so they are prepared. 
When that happens, they can go to Cuba. And then they start working with 
communities and they can teach those communities about how to organize 
themselves – how to civic organize themselves.  
 
Referring to how the change in Cuba’s system of government might impact him directly, 
Armando stated: 
Armando: I see myself that I’m not going to be complete if I don’t fulfill this 
mission. It’s going to be very hard for me to extract from the events once that 
happens in Cuba. It’s going to be very difficult for me to say, “No. I’m going to 
stay here.”      
 
Like Emilio, the notion of return for Armando is inextricably tied to the introduction of a 
democratic system of governance in Cuba. Also, Armando indicates that the intention to 
close to the current cycle of exodus and return is apparent in the organization’s efforts to 
train people to work alongside Cubans in Cuba to bring about a better society. Returning 
to Cuba is a part of a shared experience of outmigration that exiles and political 
dissidents of the revolution have yet to fulfill. Completing the cycle of outmigration 
means introducing opportunities that have eluded all Cubans – exiles and those who 
remain on the island. 
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The relationships CCANE was able to build with activists on the island provided 
organizational actors with the opportunity to pursue the achievement of an independence 
imaginary that had eluded a nation and all those who called it home. 
Conclusion 
 
To achieve its organizational aims, CCANE employed rhetoric that reflected 
cultural narratives on Americanism, and freedom and democracy. Like the Iraqi 
Christians in Detroit, CCANE’s rhetoric provided Cuban exiles with cultural citizenship 
that promoted incorporation into the American mainstream and institutional belonging in 
international forums.  
In the early years of its founding, CCANE participated in emplotted stories on 
freedom and democracy that were constructed in response to changes in the nation’s 
political-economic system and an anti-communist environment.  
In this context, “North America”, not “America” became the relevant target of 
incorporation in the organization’s work with Washington lawmakers. Making inroads 
toward their organizational aim was based upon the contention that Cuba and the U.S 
shared an interest in “North America,” as a political project that was defined by the social 
ideals of freedom and democracy. Values that defined American society, including 
economic liberty, freedom of movement, free speech and the development of civil 
institutions, also defined Cuban society. CCANE additionally maintained that a tragic 
mistake of history kept Cuba from participating in the presiding environment that valued 
economic liberalism.   
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Cuban exiles in CCANE did not use religious rhetoric. Instead, rhetoric on the 
west was defined by the social ideals of democracy and freedom, and Cuba’s ability to 
participate in a shared vision that included western economic liberalism.  
As was the case with the UICC, CCANE’s work suggests a flattening and 
expanding of histories that contribute to conceptions of “we”, as national collective. Both 
the UICC in Detroit and CCANE used rhetoric that located them in emplotted stories on 
“the west.” Christianity allowed Iraqi Christians to resettle in a different geolocation in 
“the west” – specifically, the Christian west, with which they share a long history and 
affinity.  
Organizational work provided both groups with the opportunity to explain how 
their histories are the same as the US and “the west” or “North America.” This sameness 
lent support to organizational efforts. In both cases, interventions—Muslim, Communist, 
truncate or derail or turn the histories of Iraqi Christians and Cubans in a different 
directions. Organizational rhetoric demonstrated how one of the reasons that Cubans are 
also “American” is that they are North American, with the same history.  Similarly, 
rhetoric in the UICC demonstrated how Christians are also part of the “west” and the 
U.S.   In both cases, the notion of American is expanded in one way or another. In the 
first case, the US must be seen as part of “north America,” a presumed continent wide 
experience and experiment (which of course leaves out Native Americans and first 
nations, and slavery and etc.). In the latter case, organizational rhetoric supports the idea 
that America is also part of “the west” and in particular, of the Christian west.  Here, too, 
the histories of Jews, of Hindus, Muslims, and non-religious people are minimized, along 
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with the heterogeneity of the “Middle East,” a recent political formulation that succeeded 
other heterogeneous configurations, such as Byzantium, the Ottoman Empire, and others.    
Changing political conditions in the United States led to CCANE’s gradual retreat 
from political arenas in Washington and increasing participation in international spaces 
outside the U.S. Then organizational rhetoric that drew upon Cuba’s history of 
oppression and the need to address violations of human rights reflected narratives that 
were emerging in nations of the former Soviet Union. Organizational efforts were less 
concerned about supporting incorporation into mainstream American politics and more 
concerned with becoming incorporated in international forums. Experiences of 
oppression that were created as a consequence of Castro’s assent to power afforded 
CCANE membership in a wholly distinct space where organizational aims could be 
pursued.  
Critical changes that were occurring in Cuba after 1991 supported new kinds of 
incorporation in Cuba. At that time, organizational rhetoric focused upon achieving an 
independence imaginary that was informed by the shared experience of military co-
optation and other political interferences that defined Cuba historically. CCANE’s re-
introduction to Cuba through organizational work provided another opportunity to 
reconcile the nation’s long-standing pattern of migration to the United States that was 
defined by exodus and return.  
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CONCLUSION 
THERE’S A PLACE FOR US: 
CONSTRUCTING THE AMERICAN ETHNICITY MYTHSCAPE THROUGH 
ORGANIZATIONAL ACTION 
 
Constructing the American Ethnicity Mythscape  
 
 In the Broadway musical West Side Story, the lyrics of the song, “Somewhere” 
offer hope to the play’s star-crossed lovers, whose fate seems to be at the hands of 
everything around them. Since the play’s debut in 1957, the song has been adapted by 
popular artists including Barbra Streisand and Phil Collins. After the death of Martin 
Luther King, Jr., the Supremes incorporated a dramatic monologue into the song that 
attempted to respond to the racial unrest that was unfolding in the country,  
Yes, there's a place for each of us,  
Where love is like a passion, burning like a fire,  
Let our efforts be as determined as that of Dr. Martin Luther King,  
Who had a dream that all God's children, black men, white men, Jews, Gentiles, 
Protestants, and Catholics,  
Could join hands and sing …    
 
The lyrics the Supremes incorporated speak to King’s goal of living in a place where 
people feel as though they belong. The work that is done in the UICC and CCANE 
suggests that people continue to seek out such a place. 
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My data and analysis encourage the use of an ecological model for studying 
American ethnicity. This ecological approach evaluates the content of identity claims 
ethnic groups make in light of ongoing geopolitical changes that impact them, and the 
cultural imprint those events have on the American mainstream.  
American Ethnicity and Geopolitical Change 
My findings suggest that these sites provide ethnic actors a platform for 
responding to experiences of inequality. Although immigrant political projects are not 
new to American life (see Glazer and Moynihan 1963; Hattam 2007), the environment in 
which these campaigns occur has changed. Historically, ethnic and racial projects were 
instigated in response to experiences of inequality that were apparent in American life. 
Ethnic actors sought remedies to unequal conditions by engaging the American collective 
in their pursuits.1  
Ethnic political projects are happening at a time when different kinds of 
immigrants (e.g., transnationals, refugees, political dissidents) are arriving to American 
society, and when a global order informs the relationships the United States has with 
nations immigrants come from. Ethnic actors also negotiate their experiences in an 
environment that values multiculturalism (see Embrick and Rice 2011) and enables 
border-crossing politics (Landolt 2008). In this environment, ethnic-specific 
organizations allow ethnic actors to negotiate inter-national political projects while 
engaging the American collective in their efforts. For instance, CCANE worked along 
with U.S. lawmakers to help resolve what it understood as political oppression in Cuba. 
                                                          
1 For instance, civil rights activists engaged American society in its efforts through public 
dialogues, the media, and organizational action.  
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Similarly, the UICC worked with non-co-ethnic actors, including politicians and federal 
agencies, to assist in addressing the involuntary migration of local Christians from Iraq 
that began in 2003. But my data also suggests that these sites allow ethnic actors to carry 
out border-crossing political projects without engaging people who are part of American 
society. For instance, work CCANE performed demonstrates how ethnic-specific 
organizations based in the United States work to resolve unequal experiences in home 
countries by building transnational institutional ties.  
More generally, organizational work enabled political projects of ethnics who 
wish to stay in the United States and those who wish to leave. In the UICC and its 
affiliates, organizational work was done to configure a new home in the United States. 
That commitment is revealed in the work Iraqi Christian entrepreneurs conducted in 
Detroit between 2001 and 2009, and in the work the UICC performed on behalf of 
displaced local Christians in Iraq. Yet in the case of the Cuban exiles, every aspect of 
organizational work – whether engaged work with the American collective, or work that 
occurred in collaboration with transnational institutions – intended to rectify unequal 
experiences in Cuba that allowed for the return of the Cuban diaspora.  
What actors in CCANE regarded as experiences of political oppression and the 
religious persecution of local Christians in Iraq that motivated actors in the UICC guided 
organizational work. But these issues also informed conceptions of identity with the 
Cubans in CCANE and the Iraqi Christians in the UICC. In both cases, events occurring 
outside the U.S. determined how each group evaluated who they were in American 
society. These events also guided how they participated in American society. My findings 
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suggest that the identity claims that were made in each organization were predicated upon 
factors external to social processes and events happening in the United States. That 
identity claims that Cubans and Iraqi Christians made reflected their position on and in 
geopolitical projects suggests that an alternate kind of identity-work is occurring in the 
U.S. within ethnic groups than what other analyses highlight. My findings suggest that 
identity claim-making is not only a consequence of intergroup dynamics that are 
determined and mediated in the American social context. They also reflect outside forces 
that exclusively impact certain groups. That is, Iraqi Christians are not only Iraqi 
Christian in relation to blacks in Detroit. Iraqi Christians base claims of ethnic (and 
racial) difference upon specific histories and experiences that define them as a collective.  
Contemporary immigrants are maintaining ties to homelands in ways that earlier 
immigrants to American society did not (Orum 2002 in Kurien 2007). More and more, 
immigrants are creating and participating in “transnational social fields” between their 
countries of origin and countries of destination.2 For instance, in their discussion of 
contemporary immigration in New York City, Robert Smith (2001) and his colleagues 
consider how the city itself acts as a site where transnational politics and transnational 
life becomes apparent. Other analyses have effectively described how transnational 
migrants maintain familial, economic and cultural ties in the United States and their 
home-countries (Foner 2001; Smith 2006). Patterson (2006) considers transnationalism as 
                                                          
2 The concept of ‘transnational social fields’ was put forth by Linda Basch and her 
colleagues in 1992. While Smith et al note that the early conceptualizations of 
transnationalism that Basch and others put forth have since been critiqued, Basch’s 
assertion that transnationals are people “who may live anywhere in the world and still not 
live outside the [home] state” remains an essential element.  
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a strategy to advance a nation’s collective positioning within existing global hierarchies 
that differentiate between core and periphery countries. He argues that if ties to 
homelands are maintained then the potential for development within homelands and 
receiving countries increases. For Patterson, effective ties between nations also enable the 
collective social and economic advancement of ethnic groups who simultaneously inhabit 
more than one receiving country.  
The multiculturalism ethic enables home-country connections to continue while 
simultaneously validating the cultural assumption that American society is composed of 
different ethnic groups (Kurien 2007). The environment also provides an opportunity for 
ethnic groups who maintain political or economic ties to home-countries to gain access to 
the American political system and to impact U.S. foreign policy through campaigns that 
encourage U.S. intervention or public acknowledgement (Shain 1999).   
The histories and experiences that inform identity claims both groups make 
through organizations are partly defined by ongoing geopolitical projects they are 
(directly or indirectly) impacted by. As an available resource in the nation’s multicultural 
environment, ethnic-specific organizations may provide a means of responding to these 
events in ways that secure groups from detrimental social, political and economic 
outcomes.   
Cultural Imprint of Geopolitical Change 
Nicole Marwell (2004) argues that organizations provide the opportunity to 
organize like-minded people and then parlay those enrolled into constituencies that 
influence the wider political environment. I find that the UICC and CCANE also serve as 
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“free spaces” that provide ethnic actors with opportunities to assert and verify claims of 
ethnic authenticity in social interactions that occur between ethnic and non-co-ethnic 
actors. Organizational work allowed the Iraqi Christians and Cuban exiles I encountered 
to challenge storylines that the dominant culture accepts and put forth in the public 
sphere. For instance, between 2001 and 2009 in Detroit, Iraqi Christian business owners 
experienced three crises that jeopardized their position in the city’s local economy. The 
first crisis occurred after the events of September 11th when hostilities against Middle 
Eastern Americans were on the rise. The second instance occurred when the city of 
Detroit began sponsoring raids on Iraqi Christian-owned grocery and party stores. The 
final challenge occurred when the state of Michigan, the city of Detroit, and its corporate 
partners agreed to bring franchised supermarkets to inner-city Detroit. During these times 
the ICBA provided Iraqi Christians a way to respond to storylines that portrayed Iraqi 
Christians as undifferentiated Middle Easterners, whites (as a consequence of their 
suburban residence), and non-Detroiters (as a consequence of business ownership). 
Similarly, Cuban exiles in CCANE challenged conceptualizations that portrayed 
the group as voluntary immigrants who were intent upon remaining in the United States 
permanently. The organization also countered other storylines that associated Cuba with 
anti-American beliefs and values. In social interactions with non-co-ethnic actors, 
CCANE maintained that despite Cuba’s association with communism, the country and its 
people possessed the same values for economic growth, and the same potential for 
participation in an expanding free market, as did the United States and American citizens.  
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The extent to which organizational goals are deemed legitimate is contingent 
upon their alignment to rationalized social structures that organizations themselves are 
dependent upon, be it the state or other institutions that play a dominant role in social life 
(Moore 1996; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In her discussion of work scientists 
conducted in organizations beginning in the 1950s, Moore argues that organizations, 
“must engage in a process of negotiating what actions constitute responsibility, what 
products are useful, who is legitimately able to judge the utility of science and the relative 
responsibility of scientists, and in whose interests they do and ought to work (p. 1598).” 
My analysis suggest that the contents of the identity claims ethnic actors make in 
organizational spaces play a role in the process of legitimating claims to the American 
social context itself, as well as the resources that are available to people who live here. 
My findings show that organizations may impact the allocation of resources, or determine 
partnerships that can otherwise support the missions of organizations. I argue that these 
sites also allow ethnics to institutionalize identity claims in ways that bring resources or 
support for their efforts. During the refugee crisis in Iraq, the UICC assured that a group 
of Iraqis was afforded refugee status in organizations like the UNHCR when the status 
was not made available to other [non-Christian] Iraqis. In the United States, it also 
worked with lawmakers and federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland 
Security and USCIS, to implement laws and policies that responded to the experience of 
displacement Christians in Iraq were challenged with, and the process of resettlement that 
occurred thereafter.    
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The influx of refugees encouraged the ICBA to seek funding that supported their 
resettlement in Detroit. The ICBA responded to the needs of the refugee community by 
developing programs that brought resources to the new arrivals.  
When resettlement efforts started they also built important collaborations with 
non-co-ethnic actors in the city. They also were able to bring their voice to state and 
national lawmakers and immigration agencies. Likewise in the case of the Cuban exiles 
organizational work resulted in their integration into American politics, human rights 
forums, and grassroots activist efforts unfolding in Cuba. Identity claims that described 
Cubans as a politically oppressed people were institutionalized in similar ways through 
CCANE’s participation in human rights forums in Eastern Europe.    
The identity claims that groups make are formalized in both organizations in 
rhetoric. In the Cuban and Iraqi Christian case, adopted narratives helped explain how 
each group should be evaluated as a distinct collective in American society. Coutu (1993) 
argues that narratives provide groups a means to preserve “virtue” when the larger and 
dominant culture of which they are a part assigns marginal values to them. He writes that, 
“The continuation of virtue among [marginal] groups helps them to preserve self-esteem. 
It also assists group members to explain the dominant assumptions of their society in 
terms of power relations rather than the shortcomings and inferiority of their groups 
(p.61).” Similarly, I find that organizations that serve ethnics provide a means of 
advancing storylines that combat images the dominant culture introduces. Organizations 
allow ethnic actors to create discursive space to challenge prevailing social 
conceptualizations. As a result of their participation in these spaces, new social 
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understandings may emerge that transform or nullify potentially harmful or marginalizing 
storylines that are part of the dominant culture. Organizations provide a means of 
reconciling differences between public representations ethnic actors put forth and social 
understandings the dominant culture introduces. The identity-work ethnics perform in 
these sites also allows them to reject placement in generic social categories they feel do 
not recognize histories and shared experiences that distinguish them from other groups 
(e.g., Arab-Muslims, European immigrants) the dominant culture associates them with.  
The narratives also held currency in the environment in which they were shared. 
Narratives were aligned with cultural assumptions and social wisdoms emanating in 
American society including thoughts on communism and the divergent interests and 
values that distinguished the Middle East from American society. Organizations are 
influenced by normative pressures placed upon them by entities like the state (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983; Zucker 1987). Organizations also provide collectives with the 
opportunity to differentiate themselves from some, while at the same time demonstrate 
likeness to some others. Once formed, organizations can direct the attention of the public 
toward certain factors and divert attention away from others. The context in which 
organizational work occurs impacts the success organizations experience (Moore 1996). 
My findings indicate that as the context changes, the ability to make identity claims that 
support the interests of both organizations diminishes. This is especially the case with the 
Cubans in CCANE, whose claim-making and organizational agenda was heavily 
predicated upon events and conditions between the U.S. and Cuba which are now 
relegated to the historical background.  
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These negotiations create opportunities that allow ethnic groups to reject generic 
social conceptualizations in favor of authentic conceptualizations. That ethnic 
authenticity is a negotiated outcome that takes into account identity claims and public 
appraisals may contribute to ongoing dialogues that evaluate the relative positions ethnic 
and racial groups occupy through structural paradigms (Bonilla-Silva 2001, 2004, 2006; 
Feagin 2006; Guglielmo 2003; Haney-Lopez 2006; Lipsitz 1995; Roediger 1991) and 
those that understand American ethnicity as a form of self-knowledge (Bashi Treitler 
2007, 2013; Valdez 2011). That authenticity may be understood as a negotiated outcome 
may explain how some groups avoid relegation to racialized categories. It may also 
explain how claims of ethnic difference are ultimately recognized by outgroups. 
As available social mechanism that have the potential to impact the kinds of 
resources collectives receive, organizations like the UICC and CCANE also provide the 
opportunity to better understand how “honorary” status is achieved in American society. 
Recent analyses point to an emerging racial hierarchy where the racial privilege-
subordination continuum is sustained in partial consequence to “buffer” racial groups that 
alleviate racial tension. While these studies point to economic and educational outcomes 
to support their theoretical contentions, they do so without identifying specific 
mechanisms that confer intermediate statuses to certain groups, or encourage movement 
from one rung on the racial ladder to another. My findings help explain how 
organizations may protect the relative position of each group in local and national 
contexts.  
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My analysis illustrates the contingency of honorary status. My analysis suggests 
that honorary status may not be an ‘achieved’ status, but rather a status that is contingent 
or mutable depending upon the social and political context in which negotiations for 
resources (or social acknowledgement) occur. Petitions for incorporation may also be 
impacted by socio-political machinations that can at least temporarily jeopardize the level 
of acceptance groups have in the mainstream. By describing the contingency of cultural 
citizenship and the impact these negotiations have for honorary racial groups, my 
findings may lend support to other analyses that differentiate between experiencing 
racism and discrimination and being affected by racialized processes (Song 2004, p. 866). 
This is especially apparent in the case of the Iraqi Christians in Detroit.  
The Content of Ethnic Identity Claims  
I argue that the cultural imprint of ongoing geopolitical events that impact 
collectives living in the United States affect the security of honorary status identities. 
More specifically, I find that cultural citizenship in ongoing conceptualizations of 
American-ness can interrupt ongoing ethnic projects that bring about social and economic 
uplift.  
My findings suggest that Iraqi Christians in the UICC and Cubans in CCANE 
gain cultural citizenship by making identity claims that reflect “emplotted stories” 
(Somers and Gibson 1994) that are embedded in larger cultural matrices.  
In the UICC, three identity claims were integrated into organizational logic. These 
claims reflected Iraqi Christians’ participation in cultural narratives on Christianity and 
“the west.” The first claim explained how Iraqi Christians were the indigenous people of 
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Iraq. It focused upon Iraqi Christians as a group of Iraqis that was different from others 
based upon a history in the country that predated the arrival of Islam and the emergence 
of the Iraqi nation-state, as a member of the Arab World. A second claim by the UICC 
used the groups association with Christianity (e.g., Catholicism) to differentiate Iraqi 
Christians from other Iraqis. A third identity claim explained how the group’s position as 
a “second-class” minority in Iraq created social differences between them and other Iraqi 
groups and thus made them susceptible to persecution.  
The identity-claims the UICC made on behalf of Iraqi Christians occurred at a 
time when ‘us’ and ‘them’ dynamics separating Americans from Middle Easterners (or 
Arabs) were heightened. The war in Iraq had a devastating impact on local Christians in 
Iraq. Destabilization of the country and its political system increased the number of 
attacks against Christians and other vulnerable groups. As a consequence, thousands of 
Christians were forced to leave their homeland. The UICC sought to address the refugee 
crisis by bringing displaced Iraqi Christians to the United States. New restrictions on 
Middle Eastern immigration that were put into place after the events of September 11th 
challenged its efforts.  
The claims the organization made at that time located Iraqi Christians in 
unfolding narratives on American-ness as it was being defined in relation to Arab-ness. 
The claims also located the group inside narratives on Christianity and “the west” in ways 
that differentiated [Christian] Americans from Arab Muslims, and configured the United 
States as a place distinct from countries in the Arab World.  
166 
 
 
 
In response to the immigration challenges the organization faced, rhetoric 
described how Iraqi Christians shared the same values and beliefs as most Americans and 
therefore differed them from Middle Easterners associated with Islam. Iraqi Christians in 
the UICC employed rhetoric that engaged familiar plots and storylines related to 
Christianity and “the west.” Rhetoric that described Iraqi Christians as the indigenous 
people of Iraq and as a group that had foundational ties to Christianity invoked shared 
histories with people in western nations like the United States. In a context where Middle 
Eastern incorporation was contested, this rhetoric reduced the social distance between the 
American mainstream and a subgroup of Arabs who wished to leave Iraq.  
In CCANE, one identity claim focused on the group’s membership in the North 
American collective. Organizational actors explained how their status as North 
Americans made them keepers of democracy and freedom – just as were other North 
Americans, including people in the United States. This claim provided organizational 
actors with a means of locating Cuban exiles in conceptualizations of American-ness that 
were defined by a shared commitment to democracy and freedom, and the free market.  
Another identity claim provided Cuban exiles entry into dialogues on the absence 
of democracy and freedom. The identity claim the organization made in this regard 
explained how Cubans were a politically oppressed people. Claims of political oppression 
were offered at a time plots and storylines on freedom were engaged in institutional 
forums on human rights. The claims CCANE put forth likened the experiences of Cubans 
to groups who were participating in these forums.    
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In both organizations identity claims were reflected in stories that were shared 
with outgroups. Tilly (2002) argues that stories play an important role in the social 
construction of identity because they “impute a kind of coherence and self-propulsion … 
to ‘peoples’ and ‘communities (p.8).’ According to Tilly, stories emerge from social 
interaction and they are modified (and constrained) in social interchanges that occur 
between groups. Stories provide actors with “accounts of where they came from, and 
imputations of shared attributes to the entities on each side of the line (p.11).”  
This kind of identity-work is apparent in both organizations. The claims ethnic 
actors make show how the “enactment of uniformity (Tilly 2002:8)” occurs at the 
boundary that differentiates one group from another. In terms of identity-work, the 
rhetoric both organizations employed also describes how ethnic actors locate their 
collective experiences in external events that inform dialogues on American-ness.  
In his discussion of national identity, Duncan Bell (2003) distinguishes between 
collective memory and collective remembrance. According to Bell, collective memory 
“contains shared understandings and conceptualizations or representations of past events 
generally considered to be vital in the forging of group identity.” Whereas collective 
memory is based upon historical representation, collective remembrance, Bell argues, is 
an “inter-subjective phenomenon” that is reliant upon direct experience and then the 
sharing of direct experiences in social interactions.  
For Bell distinguishing between the two competing forms of identity formation is 
important in that it makes clear the political significance of collective memory. As a 
“governing myth” collective memory subverts subaltern myths that may offer competing 
168 
 
 
 
understandings of a national past. Bell maintains that the “national mythscape” serves as 
a discursive realm where “myths of the nation are forged, transmitted, reconstructed and 
negotiated constantly.”  
Bell argues that mythscapes are contested discursive terrains. The negotiations 
that ensue – whether around stipulations of the law or cultural understandings that evolve 
as a consequence of [perceived] history – are opportunities to introduce competing 
understandings of historical events and opportunities to reconcile how they will be 
incorporated into the nation’s collective memory. The work that occurs in the 
organizations I studied provides ethnic actors opportunities to participate in discursive 
fields where questions about national identity and belonging are asked and answered. 
Thus, the identity claims ethnic actors make in these sites not only distinguish them from 
other groups, they also justify belonging in larger collectives. 
My findings suggest that the dentity claims that Iraqi Christians and Cubans make 
– the way they tell stories about who they are in American society in organizational 
spaces – are contingent upon and reflective of ongoing geopolitical events. I additionally 
maintain that each groups’ ability to make the claims they make effectively is impacted 
by a cultural climate that is made and remade over time in the United States as a 
consequence of global (and national) events that impact the nation and/or the people who 
live here. The stories that rule our lives are constructed (Lyotard 1979; see also 
Czarniawska 1997). Advancing a constructivist perspective of organizational identity, 
Czarniawska argues that,  
… [W]e have to see conversations as dramatized stories, in which the participants 
are actors, authors, directors, and producers. In other words, conversations in 
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particular, and human action in general, are enacted narratives [emphasis in the 
original]… the common way of understanding human action is by placing it in a 
narrative, that is, a narrative of an individual history, which in turn must be placed 
in a narrative of social history or in a history of the narrative… What is more, 
other people or institutions sometimes concoct narratives for us, without including 
us in any conversation … They decide our jobs, where we should live, our 
identities. But even as puppets in a power game, we are still coauthors of history, 
that other enacted dramatic narrative in which we are also actors. (p.13-14) 
  
Czarniawska argues that it is identity should be treated as a continuous process of 
narration where the repertoire of legitimate stories is found in a process of constant 
formulation, editing, and refusing of certain elements. I find that organizations provide 
ethnic actors with a necessary audience – a public venue – to advance particular social 
conceptions about who they are as a collective. The conceptualization that is carried 
forward affirms ethnic distinction.  
My data also suggest that cultural citizenship can be interrupted when the 
American context changes. While organizations may provide ethnic actors with the 
opportunity to answer the questions, “Who are we in American society? and “How do we 
belong here?, the reception they receive is contingent. The efforts of groups who file 
petitions for cultural citizenship can be detracted by ongoing geopolitical events that 
impact [mainstream] Americans and those who are seeking access to the [cultural] 
mainstream. This finding suggests that the collective position a group occupies in 
American society may not be the only (or most robust) predictor of substantive 
incorporation. My analysis highlights different kinds of incorporation projects and 
underscores their significance for groups presumed to hold honorary status.  
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